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Abstract
The goal of this research is to provide a mid-range rationalist explanation of the 
dynamics of institutional change occurred in the European Union during the 
sovereign debt crisis. My starting hypothesis is that the crisis may represent a 
driving force for the emergence of major institutional changes. Moreover, I claim 
that the policy outcomes adopted are not a pure reflection of actors’ bargaining 
powers, but they are decidedly mediated by the existent institutional rules, and 
the  decision  making process  behind their  adoption,  i.e.  intergovernmental  or 
supranational, can be determinant for their successfulness. Taking stock of the 
institutional  changes occurred between 2010 and 2014,  the  research aims at 
understanding  whether  the  Eurozone  crisis  triggered  a  deepening  of  the 
European integration, reflected by any eventual upload of authority from the 
national to the supranational level. In order to assess these issues, I analyze three 
different economic policies, namely the progressive strengthening of the rules of 
fiscal discipline,  the creation of  the financial  instruments to support member 
States in need and the progressive setup of a banking union in the EU. For each 
issue area, I search empirical validation of my starting hypotheses and I apply an 
original index to measure the “rate of supranationalism” of different aspects of 
the policy. By comparing the institutional setup before and after the crisis, I am 
able to provide an assessment of the eventual supranationalization of each single 
policy, then of the EU as a whole.
My findings offer a substantive empirical validation of the leading hypotheses. 
Namely, I demonstrate that the timing of adoption of major policy outcomes is 
strongly  related  to  the  most  acute  phases  of  the  crisis  in  terms  of  financial 
markets’ pressure. Moreover, I show that intergovernmental policy making tends 
to  create  only  incremental  outcomes  and  even  institutional  deadlocks,  while 
supranational decision making produces more effective outcomes.  Finally,  the 
application of the original index suggests that over the last years the European 
integration undertook a deepening process, resulting in a widening of the scope 
of supranational policies, an intensification of EU institutions’ powers as well as 
different forms of authority delegation to supranational bodies. These patterns of 
supranationalization were mainly driven by the pressure of financial markets 
and by the necessity of overcoming the institutional deadlocks engendered by 
intergovernmental  negotiations,  demonstrating  that  the  Eurozone  crisis  has 
represented a political momentum for transformative institutional changes in the 
EU. 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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1. Main goals and research questions
“Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions 
adopted for those crises”, Jean Monnet wrote almost forty years ago 
(1978:417),  showing an enviable foresight.  That  Europe is  in crisis  is 
abundantly clear.  Since September,  15th,  2008,  the day on which the 
failure  of  Lehman  Brothers  catapulted  the  world  economy  into 
disorder, and even more since the onset of the sovereign bond crisis in 
the Eurozone in early 2010, European countries have been confronted 
with  social,  economic  and  political  obstacles  that  put  severely  into 
question  the  bases  of  their  economies  and  social  structures.  The 
challenges the Eurozone has faced have been defined as an existential 
crisis for Europe (Giddens 2014). Even scholars reluctant to use crisis 
rhetoric assess that the current situation is without any doubt a major 
crisis  for  the Eurozone (Parsons and Matthijs  2015).  This  reveals  the 
historical importance of the phase we are currently living for the future 
of  the  European  integration  –  as  well  as  for  the  life  of  around 500 
millions of European citizens.
What  is  slightly  more  debatable,  in  Monnet’s  prediction,  is  the 
assessment of whether Europe is heading towards closer union thanks 
to the solutions envisaged to overcome the crisis. The governance of the 
Eurozone, and of the European Union more generally, has witnessed 
impressive  changes  in  the  last  few  years,  but  the  institutional 
framework that has resulted is profoundly complex. So much so, that at 
on  the  face  of  it,  the  long-term  implications  of  these  changes  are 
difficult to assess – even more so, considering that the development of 
this framework is still in progress. On the one hand, the economic crisis 
may have boosted a sort of policy re-nationalization or a retrenchment 
into the national sphere. Such a response is often posited as a natural 
defensive move by States in times of economic crisis, as witnessed in 
the  1930s  when  hitherto  integrated  national  economies  threw  up 
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barriers  to  trade  (James  2002).  Thus,  the  Eurozone  crisis  could  well 
trigger a dis-integration of the single market and of the European polity 
more broadly. On the other hand, circumstances may have triggered a 
sort  of  “supranational  leap”;  that  is,  the  crisis  may  have  made  it 
necessary for EU member States to further deepen some aspects of the 
integration process in order to overcome the crisis, captured in the idea 
of  moving  “forward-through-crisis”  (Gross  2011;  Lefkofridi  and 
Schmitter 2015). The truth – as the proverbial saying goes – is probably 
somewhere in the middle. For sure, the chain of events and the political 
development of these years are far from self-evident. Rather, the crisis 
has involved a series of back-and-forth, a mix of contradicting figures, 
which can lead the observer toward one of the two directions illustrated 
or, paradoxically, toward both at the same time.
The main aim of this research is therefore to solve this dilemma, by 
offering  an  in-depth  understanding  of  the  institutional  impact  of 
economic crises in Europe, and of the Eurozone crisis in particular, by 
recognizing which dynamics of change are fostered by major economic 
distress on the process of European integration. To be more precise, my 
research objectives are situated on two levels – a policy level,  and a 
systemic level. 
Concerning the policy level,  the research focuses on the institutional 
change  that  occurred  in  some specific  European  policies  due  to  the 
economic crisis. The premise of the research is that, as the consolidated 
scholarship  in  political  science  suggests,  “institutions  matter.” 
Institutions,  understood  principally  as  institutional  rules,  are 
scrutinized in two different ways.  On the one hand, the dissertation 
aims to determine how the economic crisis impacted – and eventually 
transformed – institutional structures in Europe. On the other hand, it 
will analyze how already existent rules were determinant in orienting 
that  institutional  change.  For  instance,  how  did  the  unanimity  rule 
within the European Council influence the decision making at moments 
of  crisis?  But  also,  what  kind  of  change  in  terms  of  different 
interpretation and application did any given rule undergo because of 
the changed environmental circumstances due to the crisis? 
In this light,  the research sits  squarely within the neo-institutionalist 
framework  (Hall  and  Taylor  1996).  In  particular,  it  shares  the  main 
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assumptions  of  rationalist  explanations  of  European  integration  – 
especially, distributional rational choice institutionalism (Héritier 2007) 
–  about  the  rationality  and  purposiveness  of  the  actors  involved. 
Stemming  from  the  empirical  observation  of  the  creation  of  policy 
outcomes  in  different  policy  areas,  and  adopting  the  analytical 
framework provided by the strategic choice approach (Lake and Powell 
1997), the research will provide an interpretation of the policy change 
that  occurred  by  looking  at  the  interplay  of  actors  and  their 
environment,  accounting  for  the  role  played  by  the  crisis  on 
institutional structures.  1
On a broader level, which I define in systemic terms, the goal of the 
research is to understand the overall impact of crises on the European 
polity.  Here,  the  emphasis  is  on  understanding  how  much,  and  in 
which  direction,  the  balance  of  power  between  national  and 
supranational actors has shifted during the crisis. In other words, taken 
together,  which  are  the  comprehensive  effects  of  the  different 
institutional changes witnessed in the last few years? While remaining 
somewhat agnostic within the debate between the two so-called grand 
theories  of  European  integration  –  liberal  intergovernamentalism 
(Moravcsik  1998)  and neo-functionalism (Haas  1958,  1970;  Schmitter 
1970) – the research intends to provide a sort of mid-range explanation 
to  assess  if,  in  the end,  a  major  economic crisis  boosts  or  limits  the 
supranational  sphere  vis-à-vis  the  national  one.  Such  assessment  is 
made  possible  by  the  construction  of  an  original  “index  of 
supranationalism”,  which  includes  policy-specific  indicators  and  is 
applied to each policy under scrutiny.
Formally, the central research questions concerning the dissertation are: 
what is the institutional impact of economic crises on the process of 
European  integration?  How  did  the  crisis  effectively  translate  into 
policy outcomes? And how did these changes impact on the balance of 
power between national and supranational level? 
These  apparently  simple  questions  actually  open  up  space  for 
potentially infinite discussions, given the complexity of the issue, which 
 For  the  accurate  presentation  of  the  theoretical  and  methodological 1
framework, refer to chapter 2.
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forces  a  necessary  scope  limitation  in  the  observation.  The  last  few 
years, indeed, have represented for the European Union, and for the 
Eurozone in particular, a sort of institutional “big bang”, with several 
radical  changes  and  infinite  minor  evolutions,  which  have  affected 
many policy areas. Without even looking beyond domain of economic 
and monetary affairs, a non-exhaustive list of policy changes and major 
transformations  would include changes  across  a  swathe of  sectors  – 
financial  supervision,  the  banking  system,  fiscal  discipline,  capital 
taxation  and  control,  financial  aid  programs,  and  public  debt 
management. And of course one could add the inevitable effects that 
the crisis has triggered on other sensitive policy areas such as external 
relations,  international  trade,  neighborhood  policy,  social  policies, 
migration policy,  and so on.  A related point  is  that  for  every single 
policy area observed, a plurality of actors are involved (not least, all 28 
member  states  and  the  European  institutions),  which  makes  the 
analysis inexorably complex. 
For  this  reason,  the  dissertations  tries  to  tackle  the  issue  of  the 
institutional impact of economic crises by focusing attention over a few 
and  circumscribed  aspects.  Analysis  centers  on  three  distinct  but 
important policy areas, all related with economic and monetary aspects 
in the management of the common currency: (1) the evolution of the 
rules  of  fiscal  discipline;  (2)  the  provision  of  financial  support  to 
member States, and; (3) the creation of a banking union. For each of the 
three policies, the research aims to monitor the policy outcomes that 
have occurred, explaining in which measure the crisis was functional to 
their  adoption  or  to  their  effective  implementation.  The  final  step 
assesses  whether  those  outcomes  can  be  seen  as  a  deepening  or  a 
restriction of the supranational sphere vis-à-vis the national one, thus 
combining the analysis of the policy level institutional change with the 
macro-level of general evolution of the integration toward – or away 
from – supranationalism.
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1.2. Europe and crisis: An ongoing debate
The historical period in which we are living lends itself to research on 
the  impact  of  economic  crisis.  Indeed,  according  to  Charles 
Kindelberger (2005:7), “The production of books on financial crises is 
countercyclical”. In other words, the interest of academics in economic 
and  financial  troubles  rises  –  quite  understandably  –  during  an 
economic  backlash,  and  rapidly  disappears  when  the  crisis  fades. 
Scholars  are  inevitably  intrigued  by  economic  crises  while  they  are 
experiencing them. It is natural to attempt to understand their causes, 
explain their development and foresee any sort of future implications. 
After  all,  despite  the  diffuse  impoverishment  and social  unrest  they 
usually engender, crises are fascinating because they represent moments 
of fracture. Crises give the impression of history in the making, of the 
end of “normal politics”, and of imminent epochal transformation as 
history prepares to move in fundamentally new directions. For good 
reason,  then,  scholarship  in  political  science,  particularly  historical 
institutionalist approaches , see crises as “critical junctures” that trigger 2
fundamental  institutional  changes  and  forge  new  institutional 
pathways  (Pierson  2004).  Crises  constitute  the  exogenous  shock  par 
excellence – inflection points that shift the course of history. 
What is  a crisis, then? According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a 
crisis  is  “a  vitally  important  or  decisive  stage  in  the  progress  of 
anything”, and it  especially applies to “times of difficulty, insecurity, 
and suspense in politics or commerce”. Such suspense is largely given 
by a sentiment of the unknown, of something which is in fieri but still 
out  of  our  control.  According  to  Antonio  Gramsci,  “Crisis  consists 
precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in 
this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear” (1971: 
276). Focusing the attention more on the interconnection among causal 
elements and outputs during a crisis, Maier claims that “applied to a 
society or a regime, [crisis] refers to a situation in which institutional 
arrangements  no  longer  deliver  the  results  expected  from  them  – 
whether public order, economic transfers and social justice, or economic 
growth – and where normal corrective actions seem only to make the 
 Political economists make similar claims (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).2
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situation worse”, adding that “crises do not always destroy regimes or 
economic systems, but they do significantly recast institutions“ (2010: 
25-26).  As  a  result,  there  is  a  strict  causal  link  between  crisis  and 
change, be it social, political or economic.
For our purpose, crisis is defined as a protracted period of instability 
which  gives  rise  to  political  and  institutional  change,  challenging 
existent  structures  and  contributing  to  the  casting  of  new  ones.  It 
follows that a crisis can be economic, political or institutional, when the 
instability  concerns  respectively  financial  markets  and  markets  in 
general, the political system, and the institutional setting. According to 
this  basic  definition,  the  Eurozone  crisis  is  at  the  same  time  an 
economic, a political and an institutional crisis, since it originated in a 
diffuse crisis of confidence in financial markets. This triggered major 
repercussions on the sustainability of national public debts, and thus 
soon became the source of political tension among member states.  It 
also brought immense pressure to bear on institutional setting of the 
Monetary Union, which proved largely inadequate for the challenge.
In  line  with  Kindleberger’s  claim,  studies  on  economic  crises  are 
prominent in the literature, starting from the main historical reference 
in  the field,  the  Great  Depression (Galbraith  1954,  Kindleberger  and 
Aiber  2005).  In  assessing the  institutional  consequences  of  economic 
crisis,  scholars  have  sought  to  understand  how  they  can  radically 
change  the  political  space.  Studies  have  focused  on  the  effects  on 
political and social structures (Gourevitch 1986), and on the economic 
system (Cassis  2011).  Concerning European studies,  since one of  the 
dominant  narratives  has  seen  crisis  as  the  engine  of  European 
integration,  scholarship  on  this  subject  is  abundant,  both  in  the 
historical  (Olivi  and  Giacone  2007)  and  in  the  political  perspective 
(Schmitter 1970) , even without considering the literature on the current 3
crisis.
 As a matter of fact, all the neo-functionalist scholarship considers economic 3
crises  as  main  elements  triggering  functional  spillover  toward  deeper 
integration,  hence  the  attention  devoted  to  the  concept  by  neo-functionalist 
scholars. 
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It goes without saying that the Eurozone crisis confirms this trend in 
the scholarship. The Eurocrisis has attracted the attention of scholars 
since  its  inception,  with  coverage  spanning  the  perspectives  of 
economists (Lapavitsas 2012, Heise 2013, Pisani-Ferry 2014, Daianu et 
al. 2014, Sinn 2014), through to political philosophers (Habermas 2012, 
Beck 2012, Morin 2014), to cite but a few examples. Political scientists 
have  devoted  their  efforts  in  multiple  directions,  trying  to  give  an 
account of the role played by single actors, such as Germany (Schild 
2013;  Bulmer  and  Paterson  2013;  Newman  2015),  the  European 
Commission (Bauer and Becker 2014),  or the European Central Bank 
(Irwin 2013;  Torres 2013).  Others have looked at the development of 
internal  and  external  policies  (Rodriguez  and  Xiarchogiannopolou 
2014), or the setup of new Treaties (De Witte 2011; Gocaj and Meunier 
2013). Specific events involving specific countries have been the focus 
of  yet  more  studies,  with  Greece  featuring  first  and  foremost 
(Featherstone 2011, Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos 2011, Pappas 2014). 
When it comes to the link between the Eurozone crisis and European 
integration, scholars’ increasing attention to the issue has accompanied 
the  writing  of  this  dissertation.  Indeed,  while  my  research  was  in 
progress,  numerous articles  and books on the  issue were  published, 
signaling the centrality of the issue at the present time. A number of 
special issues of academic journals dealt with the subject , accompanied 4
by  a  vast  array  of  very  recent  contributions  (among them:  Fabbrini 
2013;  Hooghe and Marks 2014;  Schimmelfennig 2014;  Lefkofridi  and 
Schmitter 2015; Ioannou et al. 2015; Matthijs and Blyth 2015). All make 
the consequences of the crisis on the development of the integration 
process  and its  institutional  logics  their  subject.  The purpose of  this 
research,  then,  is  to  contribute  to  this  lively  debate  by providing as 
accurate  an  account  as  possible,  bearing  in  mind  that  a  complete 
understanding of the subject comes only through the juxtaposition of 
different theoretical perspectives.
 Among  them,  the  Journal  of  European  Integration  in  2013  (Special  issue: 4
“Redefining  European  economic  governance”)  and  in  2014  (Special  issue: 
“Coping with crisis:  Europe’s  strategies and challenges”)  and the Journal  of 
European Public Policy in 2015 (Special issue: “European integration in times of 
crisis: Theoretical perspectives”).
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1.3. Outline of the chapters
Following  this  introductory  section,  chapter  2  lays  out  of  the  main 
theoretical  and  methodological  issues  underlying  the  research,  and 
presents in detail an explanatory model to be applied to the different 
case  studies.  In  this  chapter  the  leading  research  hypotheses  are 
outlined, as well as the main methodological aspects underpinning the 
dissertation. Subsequent chapters are devoted to the empirical analysis 
of  the institutional  changes that  have occurred during the Eurozone 
crisis in different policy areas. Chapter 3 provides a bird’s eye view on 
the major developments in the Eurozone crisis as it unfolded. Here, the 
course of the crisis is reconstructed, by offering a functional chronology 
of  events to aid the empirical  assessment of  the leading hypotheses. 
Chapter  4  deals  with  the  first  case  study –  the  redefinition of  fiscal 
obligations for member states after the outbreak of the crisis. Chapter 5 
tackles  the  case  of  the  policy  of  financial  assistance  to  distressed 
countries,  by  looking  at  those  instruments  implemented  to  offer 
financial aid to troubled States in the Eurozone. The last case study, the 
progressive  setup  of  a  banking  union  in  the  European  Union,  is 
discussed in chapter 6. The concluding chapter offers a discussion on 
the  findings  of  the  research,  with  a  redefinition  of  the  explanatory 
model  in  light  of  the  empirical  findings  resulted  by  the  analysis.  It 
discusses  the  theoretical  innovations  that  have  emerged  from  the 
analysis, suggesting at the same time some broader implications for the 
process of European integration as well as for further research on the 
issue.
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Chapter 2
EU and the crisis: A Theoretical Framework
2.1. Introduction
As a brief reminder, this dissertation addresses the following question: 
what is the institutional impact of the economic crisis on the process of 
European integration? The answer will  be provided on two levels:  a 
single-policy  level,  and  on  a  macro  level.  At  the  policy  level,  the 
dissertation scrutinizes the role of economic pressure on institutional 
change occurring during the crisis, and the dynamics that characterize 
this  change.  This  can  be  considered  as  the  core  of  the  dissertation, 
which takes into account key variables such as the environment created 
by the crisis, actors’ strategic behavior, and the fundamental role played 
by existing  institutional  rules.  By  aggregating different  single  policy 
analyses, then, the dissertation tries to understand, at a systemic level, 
the consequences of  the Eurozone crisis  for the process of  European 
integration. Namely, whether crisis triggers a limitation or an expansion 
of policy supranationalization. 
The  combination  of  the  policy  level  and  of  the  systemic  approach 
constitutes  a  sort  of  logic  and  temporal  sequence  underlying  the 
analysis, which is also reflected in the leading hypotheses. That is, the 
research faces  the issue of  the institutional  change during the crisis, 
trying to understand (I) the causes of the institutional change – more 
specifically with respect to the role played by economic distress and 
markets’  pressure  towards  change;  (II)  the  dynamics  of  change  – 
namely  the  pattern  of  change  engendered  in  supranational  or 
intergovernmental policy processes; and finally (III) the consequences 
of  the  institutional  change,  with  special  reference  to  institutional 
structures of the EU and their supranational nature.
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In order to assess the research questions outlined in the introduction, it 
is  necessary  to  define  the  theoretical  framework  and  the 
methodological  aspects  guiding  the  research.  This  first  chapter  is 
devoted to the definition of the main theoretical aspects, such as the 
general  framework  in  which  it  is  located,  the  main  perspective  it 
adopts, as well as the hypotheses leading the research. By adopting a 
strategic choice approach, the dissertation aims at investigate the main 
institutional  shifts  witnessed  in  the  European  Union  in  these  recent 
years of deep and challenging economic crisis. To this end, along with 
three  main  hypotheses,  it  develops  an  explanatory  model  which 
constitutes an interpretation of the main EU main institutional shifts, 
which is then applied to three different policy areas, each representing a 
case study. In this first chapters these theoretical and methodological 
aspects  are  discussed  and defined,  in  order  to  set  the  stage  for  the 
analysis. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In a first section, the main theoretical 
aspects of the dissertation are outlined. At the outset, a survey of the 
principal  theoretical  arguments  regarding institutional  change in  the 
neo-institutionalist scholarship is presented. In particular, the issues of 
institutional creation, stability and transformation, as well as the main 
interpretations  of  the  elements  triggering  institutional  change  are 
covered. Then I will discuss the strategic choice approach adopted to 
carry out the analysis, along with the main variables used in the core of 
the analysis – actors, environment, and institutional rules. Finally, I will 
outline the explanatory model and formulate the associated hypotheses 
leading the analysis. The second section, for its part, is devoted to some 
methodological  aspects,  such as the presentation of  the case studies, 
some problematic issues concerning case selection and comparison, the 
instruments adopted to assess variation of the variables used, as well as 
the modalities of data collection.
2.2. Theoretical framework
2.2.1. Institutions and institutionalism(s)
Institutions  are  key  concepts  to  the  understanding  of  social  and 
political  reality  (March  and  Olsen  1989),  because  they  facilitate  and 
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constrain  social  interaction  (North  1990).  Throughout,  I  conceive 
institutions principally as institutional  rules.  This definition is central, 
for two main reasons. The first is that institutions define the modes of 
governance and of policy making required in a specific policy area and 
orient  it  along  a  certain  path,  both  restricting  and  enabling  actors’ 
behavior.  In short,  actors do not act  in an institutional vacuum;  their 
behavior is always shaped by the institutional rules surrounding them, 
which for  the most  part  are  prior  to  their  action.  In this  sense,  it  is 
crucial  to understand the role of existing institutions in shaping any 
process  of  policy  development  and more  specifically  of  institutional 
change.  Secondly,  when  trying  to  assess  changes  that  occurred  in 
Europe  during  the  crisis  institutional  rules  become  themselves  the 
object of analysis. In other words, a policy outcome – understood as the 
result  of  a  process  of  change  –  is  nothing  more  than  a  formal  (or 
sometimes even informal) change in terms of institutional rules, which 
creates a new institutional framework in which actors keep moving. 
To  be  sure,  institutional  change  may  occur  even  without  the 
intervention of an external crisis, but for our purpose the presence of an 
external  shock  is  fundamental.  Institutions,  then,  are  both  an 
independent variable of the analysis – albeit not the only one – capable of 
producing  effects  on  outcomes,  and  a  dependent  variable,  because 
change  is  appreciated  through  the  nature  of  institutional  change  at 
stake.  That  is  why a  preliminary presentation of  major  issues  about 
institutions and institutional change is necessary to set the stage of the 
theoretical  framework  of  the  research.  More  importantly,  the 
underlying  conception  of  the  terms  “institution”  and  “institutional 
change” clearly shape the theoretical perspective leading the analysis, 
and must be clearly specified. In the following paragraphs I will discuss 
the various conceptions of institutions and institutional change among 
the  different  interpretations  given  by  the  predominant  neo-
institutionalist  approaches  to  political  studies:  historical 
institutionalism,  rational  choice  institutionalism  and  sociological 
institutionalism (for  a  comprehensive  overview,  see  Hall  and Taylor 
1996).
Taking institutions as fundamental aspects of social and political reality 
and  focusing  on  their  role  in  structuring  behavior,  the  three  neo-
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institutionalisms  present  different  sensibilities  and  stress  particular 
elements of institutions over others, though amalgams and overlaps of 
concepts  among  them  are  far  from  the  exception  (Katznelson  and 
Weingast 2007).  Historical institutionalism tends to view institutional 
development  by  emphasizing  path  dependence  and  unintended 
consequences, relying on the importance that history and “path” have 
in shaping such development (for a thorough discussion see Steinmo 
2008). Rational choice institutionalism sees institutions as solutions to 
collective action problems. Assuming actors are rational – thus having 
determined  sets  of  preferences  and  acting  strategically  in  order  to 
maximize  their  goals  –  rational  choice  institutionalism  considers 
institutions  as  creations  which  are  designed to  facilitate  cooperation 
among actors (for a discussion over origins and internal differentiations 
of rational choice institutionalism see Shepsle 2005). Against the claims 
of actors’ instrumental rationality and the idea of rules as outcomes of 
strategic interaction, sociological institutionalism considers institutions 
predominantly  as  structures  of  cultural  practice,  which  are  not 
necessarily linked to any form of efficiency-seeking, but as products of 
social reproduction among actors (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). 
2.2.2. Institutions and institutional change: Definition and theoretical 
perspectives
The definition of a concept reveals a lot of the conception behind it, and 
this  applies  also  to  the  concept  of  institution.  According  to  the 
definition  presented  by  North  (1990),  institutions  are  conceived  as 
actor-created rules of behavior, thus institutional rules, that restrict and 
enable actors’  behavior.  Such definition is  closer to the sensibility of 
rational choice institutionalism, rather than the two other strands. Thus, 
following the differentiation in the institutions’ dimensions operated by 
Greif (2006), institutions are not intended as organizations (such as the 
European  institutions)  nor  –  as  sociological  institutionalists  would 5
 Of course, when talking of the European institutions (European Parliament, 5
European  Commission,  European  Central  Bank  and  so  on)  the  term 
“institution” will be used, but in the analysis these will be considered as actors 
(see following paragraph).
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have it  –  as  social  norms,  i.e.  standards  of  behavior  internalized by 
members of a society influencing behavior, nor finally as shared beliefs, 
i.e. internalized beliefs about the state of the world. 
The concept  of  institutions  as  institutional  norms highlights  the  fact 
that  they  are  created  by  actors,  and  not  socially,  though  standing 
outside the choice of individual actors; they provide informations that 
somehow  coordinate  behavior,  and  they  finally  induce  behavior  by 
offering  rewards  or  threatening  sanctions  (ibid.).  Moreover,  it  is 
important  to  notice  that  institutional  rules  may  have  distributional 
implications,  that  is,  each  institutional  configuration  is  more  or  less 
beneficial for individual actors (Knight 1992). Finally, institutional rules, 
though primarily formal and written down such as laws, treaties and 
constitutions, may also be informal (Stinchcombe 1968), and in this case 
they are not subject to formal sanctioning.
A second important aspect concerning institutions is the differentiation 
between  institutional  stability  and  institutional  change.  On  the  one 
hand, indeed, parts of the institutionalist literature have highlighted the 
character  of  institutional  persistence  over  time,  while  others  have 
focused on how and why institutions change. In particular, historical 
institutionalism is  more  prone  to  stress  institutional  continuity  over 
change,  explaining  the  persistence  of  some  institutions  over  long 
periods of time (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2004), mainly relying on the 
concept of path dependence, which creates a sort of lock-in situation 
preventing  institutions  from radical  change,  or  at  least  allowing  for 
gradual change over time. Another model that privileges institutional 
continuity  is  punctuated equilibrium (Aminzade  1992;  Abbott  2001). 
Here, institutions are characterized by general stability but subject to 
more or less radical changes, from time to time, due to external shocks, 
considered as  ruptures,  or  critical  junctures  (Capoccia  and Kelemen, 
2007), at either the social or cultural level – according to sociological 
institutionalism  –  or  at  historical  one  –  according  to  historical 
institutionalism.
Unlike these conceptions, scholars have also showed how once created, 
institutions can change over time, more or less gradually, but anyway 
significantly. Considering endogenous change not merely as possible, 
but also as differentiated in its forms, in a transformative and gradual 
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way, Streeck and Thelen (2005) have identified five different ways in 
which institutions may incrementally  vary over  time:  layering,  drift, 
displacement, conversion and exhaustion. Layering occurs when new 
institutional elements are added to existent ones; drift when institutions 
are challenged by external elements; displacement happens when some 
elements  of  an  institutions  become  more  important  over  time; 
conversion comes when institutions are  redirected to  new functions; 
exhaustion  finally  happens  when  an  institution  gradually  loses  its 
functions.  For  any  of  these  peculiar  changes,  anyway,  the  elements 
triggering change may be various, both exogenous and endogenous. 
Most of the literature on institutional change stresses the importance of 
external  elements  to  explain  change:  change  in  beliefs,  new 
interpretative frames, external events and so on may all trigger change. 
Exogenous  elements  are  generally  considered  essential  to  variation 
because  institutions  are  seen  as  stable  constructions,  internally 
coherent, which cannot easily vary without an external shock or shift. 
Among the theorizations of institutional change given by endogenous 
elements we find one by Greif  and Laitin (2004) which relies on the 
differentiation between parameters and quasi-parameters as well as on 
the  concept  of  self-enforcement  of  rules,  admitting  that  institutional 
rules  may  endogenously  vary  over  time.  Another  theorization  of 
endogenous institutional change is the one of interstitial institutional 
development elaborated by Farrell and Héritier (2005, 2007), according 
to whom institutional change occurs when ambiguities in higher-order 
rules – because of  their  nature of  incomplete contracts  – lead to the 
negotiation of  informal  rules  endogenously determining institutional 
change.  Other  scholars  for  their  part  try  to  combine exogenous and 
endogenous elements in a new model of institutional change (Mahoney 
and Thelen 2010). According to them, institutional change is given not 
only to the characteristics of the political context and of actors’ nature 
(exogenous  elements),  but  also  to  the  features  of  the  institutions 
themselves, in particular to their degree of ambiguity and possibility of 
open interpretation  of  their  provisions  (endogenous  element).  Taken 
together, the two elements may account for institutional change. 
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2.2.3. Rationalist explanations of institutional change
Each  one  of  the  three  neo-institutionalisms,  then,  account  for 
institutional  change  in  different  ways.  If  sociological  and  historical 
institutionalism,  though stressing the element of  stability,  admit  that 
institutional  change  is  possible,  yet  essentially  triggered  by  external 
elements – being social evolution or critical junctures according to the 
approach – rational choice has different interpretations of institutional 
change  (Héritier  2007).  Among them,  one  can  identify  a  functional-
rationalist  explanation  and  a  distributional  one.  According  to  the 
functional  rationalist  explanation,  institutional  change  occurs  when at 
least one actor has an incentive to reconsider the existing institutional 
rule and propose an altered rule that is more advantageous for her than 
the existing one. Thus, institutional change is triggered by the will of an 
actor  of  reconsidering  the  existent  equilibrium.  On  the  other  hand, 
distributional  rational  choice  institutionalism  emphasizes  the 
distributional  implications  of  institutions  as  outcomes  of  a  power-
oriented bargaining process, emphasizing political conflict and strategic 
bargaining  among  actors,  whose  results  are  well  explained  by 
asymmetries  in  resource  ownership.  In  this  perspective,  institutional 
change could result  from a  breaking apart  of  the  dominant  change-
resisting coalition,  or  from a change in the bargaining power of  the 
actors due to a change in their resources or fallback positions, possibly 
caused by a change in the environment. Such change, for the purpose of 
the  research,  is  exactly  what  happens  during  major  economic  crises 
with reference to those distributional policies which will be examined.
If then, as a general rule, each one of the theories listed can account 
more accurately for some specific situations rather than others, for the 
purpose of this study a rationalist  perspective,  and more precisely a 
distributional  rational  choice  explanation  of  institutional  change  (a 
power-based explanation, essentially) will be adopted, supposing that 
such a perspective is the one that can best explain the issue at stake in 
the dissertation. 
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2.2.4. A mid-range rationalist explanation of EU integration
European affairs, much like other aspects of international relations, can 
be seen through the lenses of a variety of theoretical approaches, each 
of  them  adding  a  particular,  if  partial,  contribution  to  the  whole 
understanding of facts and events. The use of a single approach may fit 
better one situation rather than another, or might better explain part of 
a story, and there are claims about the necessity of integrating different 
approaches,  in  line  with  a  particular  necessity  of  “going  empirical” 
when  studying  Europe  (Jupille,  Caporaso  and  Checkel  2003).  As  a 
general claim, given the complexity of reality, of course, no theory can 
account  for  institutional  change  under  any  and  all  circumstances 
(Héritier  2007:  228).  That  is,  every  approach  presents  its  own 
potentialities  as  well  as  its  limits:  if  on  the  one  hand  a  certain 
perspective may help in better explaining a social fact, on the other it 
may  overshadow  other  characteristics,  that  would  probably  benefit 
from another approach. In this sense, any choice about the perspective 
used  in  a  research  brings  about  the  recognition  of  stressing  some 
aspects rather than others. 
Embracing pragmatism, this dissertation will not erect barriers among 
different  perspectives,  i.e.  no  theory  will  be  unequivocally  followed 
excluding any other competitive explanation. Rather, it will primarily 
adopt a strategic choice approach (Lake and Powell 1997), thus not a 
rigid  theory  with  straightforward  assumptions,  but  an  approach 
combining  instruments  and  assumptions  of  different  rationalist 
traditions, in order to get the most accurate analysis of the events under 
scrutiny.  Within  the  analytical  framework  of  the  strategic  choice 
approach, insights from bargaining theory will be functional to better 
understand  actors’  behavior,  focusing  on  devices  adopted  during 
negotiations, such as their credibility, the credibility of their threats, the 
enforcement possibilities and the social context affecting their choices. 
As  a  result,  the  research  is  a  study  of  European  Union  under  an 
institutionalist  perspective,  which  has  become  a  prominent  way  of 
studying internal dynamics and evolutions of the integration process 
(Dowding 2000).
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The dissertation, in line with other rationalist  explanations,  does not 
aim to present a new general theory of the European integration , but 6
its aim is to offer a deeper understanding of some underlying dynamics 
of specific evolution of the integration, thus a mid-range explanation of 
the  events  occurring  in  Europe  while  it  is  confronted  with  those 
complex  phenomena  that  are  economic  crises.  In  this  light,  the 
rationalist approach seems to be more promising than the perspective 
given by a grand theory. Indeed, while a grand theory helps designing 
the larger frame of European integration and its underlying long-term 
processes,  rationalist  explanations  can  account  for  the  day-by-day 
negotiations,  the  role  of  single  rules  in  the  smaller  processes  of 
institutional  change and the minor – though fundamental  –  changes 
which  are  proper  of  a  mid-range  explanation.  Nonetheless,  some 
insights from the classical grand theories of European integration will 
be recalled (for instance, the concept of functional spillover from neo-
functionalism  or  the  stress  on  collective  action  problems  from  the 
liberal-intergovernamentalist  perspective)  but  their  use  will  be 
functional to an ex-post appreciation of the observed dynamics at stake, 
rather than used as a priori categories of analysis.
2.3. The analytical framework: A strategic choice approach
Providing analytical tools, the strategic choice approach considers two 
crucial  units  of  analysis  of  international  relations:  strategic  problems 
and interactions.  This  approach  fits  particularly  well  the  aim of  the 
research,  namely  the  interest  in  investigating  the  reasons  and 
mechanisms  triggering  institutional  change,  with  a  special  focus  on 
actors’ behavior and the environment in which they operate. Indeed, 
actors and the environment are taken as the fundamental independent 
variables  in  the  system,  and  they  are  assumed  to  be  analytically 
separated (ibid:  8),  unlike  other  constructivist  and more  sociological 
 The term general theory, or grand theory, refers to those explanations trying to 6
theorize the whole process of European integration. The two competitive grand 
theories  of  European integration are liberal  intergovernamentalism and neo-
functionalism.  For  an  overview  on  the  different  theories  of  European 
integration see Wiener and Diaz (2009).
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perspectives. As this definition suggests, the strategic choice approach 
considers that actors operate strategically, i.e. their ability to reach their 
goals  depends  on  other  actors’  actions,  more  importantly  because 
actors’  preferences  are  divergent,  and  some  sort  of  interest 
reconciliation is needed. In brief, “in any given setting, an actor prefers 
some outcomes to others and pursues a strategy to achieve its  most 
preferred possible outcome“ (Frieden 1997: 41). 
2.3.1. Main assumptions on the units of analysis
The  strategic  choice  approach  involves  some  assumptions  on  the 
characteristics of the units of analysis considered, as well as a scale of 
simplification of the reality, which is nonetheless a useful tool to better 
understand the complex interaction among actors. As stated, the actors 
and the environment are considered to be the independent variables of 
the system. This is particularly functional to the aim of the research, 
because it helps defining the causal role played both by actors and the 
environment, by taking them duly separated (Frieden 1997: 39). More 
specifically,  by  treating  the  features  of  the  environment  as  an 
independent  variable  it  will  be  possible  to  assess  the  particular  role 
played  by  the  crisis  in  determining  outcomes,  with  reference  to  its 
variation, taking constant actors’ preferences over time. Moreover, as 
actors  form  strategies  based  on  the  possibilities  presented  by  the 
environment (ibid:  46),  it  will  be possible to assess the effective role 
played by the crisis – thus, a variation in the environment – in affecting 
strategic interaction, then outcomes in the end. 
In  the  strategic  choice  approach,  actors  are  composed  of  their 
preferences and of their beliefs, thus their preferences over other actors’ 
preferences. The content of states’ preferences is given, but different for 
any  actor  and  for  every  policy  outcome,  and  more  importantly 
preferences  of  different  actors  over  outcomes  are  divergent.  Thus, 
strategic  choice  refuses  the  realist  assumption  of  indistinct  state 
preferences of power maximization (Morgenthau 1948) or the neorealist 
one of security and survive (Waltz 1979). National preferences, then, are 
different and divergent for states. Moreover, they are somehow policy-
specific,  i.e.  for  every different  policy,  states  formulate  differentiated 
preferences.  As  a  branch  of  rational  choice  institutionalism  and  of 
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bargaining  literature,  the  approach  considers  actors  as  rational  and 
instrumental,  thus  they  can  rationally  rank  their  preferences  over  a 
specific goal and they can, given the environment, act strategically in 
order  to  reach those goals.  It  should be noted that  the  definition of 
actors’  rationality  here  considered  is  rather  minimalist  (Lake  and 
Powell 1997:7), and it does not involve full information but only normal 
cognitive abilities.
For  its  part,  the  environment  is  composed  of  the  actions  that  are 
available to actors  as  well  as  the information structure,  that  is  what 
actors  know  –  or  what  they  can  possibly  infer  from  other  actors’ 
behavior. In this light, the environment represents the space in which 
actors operate and interplay with others in order to reach their goals, or 
more specifically, the external conditions enabling or facilitating actors’ 
behavior.  As  an  independent  variable,  the  environment  has  direct 
impact on actors’ strategic behavior, i.e. a variation in the environment 
implies different strategic behavior, than different outcomes in the end, 
taking actors’ preferences constant and divergent. For the purpose of 
the research,  the economic crisis  is  a  fundamental  component of  the 
environment,  because  it  has  significant  influence  on actors’  strategic 
behavior. Indeed, crises are peculiar moments in which actors have to 
radically change their strategies because of a changing environment. In 
particular, a crisis can influence strategic interaction by restricting the 
available actions of actors, or they can put pressure on policy makers, 
thus influencing the timing of the policy making. 
In order to clarify the role that crises can have on actors’ behavior it 
may be useful to borrow the concept of “pressing functional demand” 
from  Lindseth  (2010),  which  he  considers  as  one  of  the  three  main 
historical  components  fostering  institutional  change,  along  with  the 
political  and  the  cultural  dimension.  Pressing  functional  demand  is 
defined as the dimension “in which existing institutional structures and 
legal categories come under pressure and are even transformed as a 
consequence of  objective social  and economic demands” (ibid:  13).  I 
claim  that  economic  crises  can  be  regarded  as  exerting  pressing 
functional  demand  on  European  institutional  structures,  thus 
generating  a  sort  of  environmental  change  constraining  actors’ 
behavior. This idea is also shared by neo-functionalist explanations of 
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European  integration,  which  see  into  crises  a  driving  force  toward 
further integrative steps (Schmitter 1970). For its part, the information 
structure  within  the  environment  for  a  great  part  is  conveyed  by 
institutional rules, which make actors’ behavior more foreseeable (see 
§2.2.6).
To sum up, the strategic setting is composed of actors’ preferences and 
beliefs,  and  by  the  set  of  available  actions  and  the  information 
structure: these four elements are capable of explaining variation of the 
dependent  variable,  that  is  the  policy  outcome  (fig.  1).  A  direct 
consequence  of  the  strategic  setting  is  that  in  the  strategic  choice 
perspective,  there  are  no  untheorized  preference  shifts,  that  is,  the 
variation  in  a  single  policy  outcome  is  not  explained  by  an  actor’s 
changing  preference  over  time  (Lake  and  Powell  1997:19).  Instead, 
actors’ preferences are considered divergent, given and constant over 
time.  The  variation  of  outcomes  is  thus  dependent  on  the  strategic 
interaction.
 
   
 Figure 1. Strategic setting defining policy outcomes.
2.3.2. Definition of actors and their features
For our purpose, some further specification is needed to construct the 
strategic setting, both concerning actors and the environment, the main 
independent variables of the model. Concerning actors, it is first of all 
necessary to define them, stating as well their main characteristics. It is 
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difficult,  and probably  impossible,  to  take  into  account  every  single 
actor  –  individual  or  collective  –  which  has  played  any  role  in  the 
development  of  the  crisis.  They  would  include  domestic  actors,  i.e. 
single  personalities,  leaders,  organizations,  collectivities,  organized 
groups  such  as  parties  and unions,  interest  groups  –  multiplied  for 
every single member of the EU – as well as international actors such as 
states,  EU members and otherwise,  international  organizations,  large 
corporations and so on. That would probably provide a more accurate 
analysis  of  the  events,  but  it  would  involve  an  unwieldy  level  of 
complexity. For the sake of the analysis, for a necessary parsimony in 
the  model  that  I  propose,  and  for  the  consolidated  tradition  of  the 
discipline of international relations, the dissertation considers as main 
actors states and European institutions. In the former the member states 
of  the  EU are  included,  while  the  latter  consist  mainly  in  the  main 
European  institutions  (European  Commission,  European  Parliament, 
European Central Bank) , as well as in some external institutions, such 7
as  the  International  Monetary  Fund,  which  has  been  playing  a  non 
negligible role. 
States  and  institutions  are  considered  as  unitary,  rational  and 
purposive.  I  deliberately  overlook  the  process  of  national  interest 
formation, then conflicting sub-national interests and their composition 
(Moravcsik 1993, 1998). In other words, the process of national interests’ 
formation is not under scrutiny: national preferences are taken as given, 
whatever complex the process leading to them might have been. Thus, 
actors  are  considered to  have  precise  and fixed preferences  over  an 
issue, as well as the capacity to rationally rank them and, most of all, of 
strategically  operating  in  order  to  reach  those  goals  depending  on 
others’ actions and preferences. Thus, the dissertation assumes that a 
state has fixed preferences over time about a specific issue, and that 
notwithstanding a normal political and cultural evolution – elections 
involving  a  government  shift,  the  development  among citizens  of  a 
certain sensibility over an issue, the transformation of lobbies’ behavior 
and so on – those preferences do not sensibly change over time. In this 
 The European Council and the Council of EU are not considered because, as 7
essentially intergovernmental arenas, their preferences are the composition of 
single members preferences, which are considered individually.
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way, as already stated, variation in the observed outcomes cannot be 
reconnected to preferences’ shifts.
Even considering only state actors, thus neglecting the sub-state level, 
the fact of dealing with 28 member states and other main international 
organizations,  might  lead  the  analysis  toward  excessive  complexity. 
That is why EU member states are organized in homogenous groups 
along their preferences. For sure, such division might overview some 
specific positions of a single state over an issue,  but considering the 
dynamics  at  stake  within  the  European  Council,  it  can  appear  as  a 
simplification, but not a radical misrepresentation of the confrontation 
among member states. Indeed, by carefully looking at the history of the 
integration  process,  the  same  groups  of  states  often  appear  to  be 
opposed along the same line, when it comes to economic and monetary 
affairs.  A familiar, though sometimes stereotyped, division is the one 8
opposing Northern Europe countries and Mediterranean ones, which is 
somehow overlapping to the cleavage between creditor/surplus and 
debtor/deficit  countries  –  but  also  anti-inflationary  vs  inflationary 
countries.  9
The  division  between  creditor  and  debtor  countries  is  not  a  real 
oversimplification  of  the  dynamics  inside  the  European  Council. 
Though leaving apart some states that do not stand overtly as debtor or 
creditor – namely those outside the Eurozone – it crystallizes very well 
some  recurrent  fractures  toward  the  main  policies  concerning  the 
common currency and economic integration in general. Indeed, today’s 
creditors are usually yesterday’s so-called “economicists” as opposed to 
 While examining every single policy case, a more accurate definition of the 8
position  and  preferences  of  each  group  will  be  obviously  analyzed,  and 
eventual policy-specific actors will be presented.
 In any case, the cleavage at stake is not the one rich vs poor countries, that 9
seems  to  have  minor  significance  for  the  political  economy  of  European 
integration (Schelkle 2012).
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the  “monetarist”  countries  (Lucarelli  2013).  That  demonstrates  that 10
states’  preferences  toward  financial  and  monetary  aspects  of  the 
integration are not so swinging even in the medium and long term. The 
former group – northern/creditor countries – is headed by Germany, 
and includes the Netherlands, Finland and Austria, but also to a certain 
extent  Slovakia.  These  countries  gained  competitiveness  since  the 
creation of the Euro, shifting most of their resources in the export sector, 
they have historically low inflation, a surplus position with regard to 
public debt and generally obey to fiscal rules. The latter – southern/
debtor countries – includes France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece. The 
contingencies  of  the  crisis  have  led  some  other  states  to  “join  the 
south”, as in the case of Ireland. These countries are traditionally more 
inflation prone, which determined a consistent competitiveness loss in 
the  last  decade,  they  generally  present  a  deficit  position  in  the 
management of public debt, and their interpretation of fiscal discipline 
turns generally out to be quite flexible.  The two groups of states are 11
considered as unitary actors, with determined preferences, which will 
be preliminarily presumed for every single policy observed.
In such configuration, it is a bit more difficult to include within the two 
groups  those  states  that  are  out  of  the  Eurozone  –  UK  above  all  – 
because  their  preferences  over  monetary  issues  might  be  more 
ambiguous. It is also true that their effective role in influencing policies 
linked to the common currency has been limited. Nonetheless, all along 
 In view of creating a monetary union, a division opposed countries on the 10
timing  of  the  creation  of  the  common  currency  and  the  achievement  of  a 
convergence  of  economic  indicators.  The  so-called  “economicist”  countries 
were  those  that  considered  fundamental  a  process  of  solid  economic 
convergence before the creation of a common currency, fearing that eventual 
divergences in the economic fundamentals would undermine the cohesion of 
the monetary union. On the other hand, the “monetarist” countries – whose 
vision  prevailed  in  the  end  –  were  those  countries  considering  that  the 
monetary integration would naturally lead toward an economic convergence. 
 These features, for sure, do not apply for each one of the members of the two 11
groups. For instance, one can note that at the onset of the crisis Spain presented 
a very good fiscal position, or that Netherlands and Finland – though being 
part of the German-led coalition – over the last years lost their status of creditor 
countries. 
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the scrutiny of the different case studies, a preliminary presentation of 
the actors at stake – as well as of eventual policy-specificities – will be 
made, and specific positions of any states not included in one of the 
two groups will be duly assessed. 
When  it  comes  to  European  institutions,  for  sure,  their  number  is 
limited,  including  only  the  European  Parliament,  the  European 
Commission  and  the  European  Central  Bank  –  taking  apart  the 
European Council and the Council of Ministers representing eminently 
states’  preferences.  In  this  respect,  however,  a  differentiation  among 
institutions has to be made, since not all of them have formal powers in 
the decision making. For instance, the European Central Bank does not 
formally  intervenes  in  the  policy  making,  though  it  has  a  de  facto 
political weight in the institutional confrontations. That is why, when 
discussing the individual case studies, a slight differentiation will  be 
made between the preferences and behavior of institutions with formal 
powers in the decision making (European Commission and European 
Parliament) and other actors without such powers (ECB), which will be 
considered as influential allies of other actors.
Unlike actors’ preferences, the environmental conditions are not taken 
as stable, but they change over time. Namely, the observation of crisis 
periods  subsumes  that  crises  are  fundamental  in  determining 
outcomes, thus part of the variation in the outcome can be related to the 
variation  in  the  independent  variable  which  is  the  environment.  In 
particular,  as  specified  in  the  methodological  section  (see  §1.3.3), 
variation  will  be  assessed  through  a  distinction  between  periods  of 
crisis and those of non-crisis,  but even an internal distinction within 
crisis’ years, with reference to peaks and bottoms of the crisis itself.
2.3.3. Institutions: Mediating effects and independent role
In  the  logic  of  the  research,  institutions  are  considered  in  a  double 
aspect, both in the process of change and in their role of affecting such 
change.  Indeed,  existent  institutions  in  a  given  strategic  set  may 
influence the process of institutional change, leading the pattern toward 
certain outcomes rather than others (Snidal 1996). Observed outcomes, 
then,  are  not  a  pure  reflection  of  states’  bargaining  power,  but 
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institutions  have  a  mediating  effect,  which  will  be  duly  taken  into 
account  in  the research.  Also,  they provide information to actors  on 
other  actors’  likely  behavior  (Greif  2006),  making  it  possible  to 
coordinate behavior. Such coordination is made possible by the fact that 
institutional  rules  allow  to  involved  actors  to  incorporate  the 
expectations on other actors’  behavior on the bases of existent rules, 
thus  constituting  an  important  source  of  information  on  others’ 
presumed behavior. In other words, strategic interaction does not occur 
in  an  institutional  vacuum.  For  instance,  the  institutional  rule  of  the 
unanimity  within  a  certain  organization  may  mediate  a  decision 
making process toward certain outcomes rather than a majority rule. In 
this  light,  institutions  are  considered  to  influence  the  process  of 
strategic interaction among actors, representing a fundamental element 
of the environment in a twofold direction: on the one hand they orient 
the nature of policy outcomes; on the other they shape the information 
structure which is analytically part of the environment in which actors 
behave.
A clear  example  of  how  an  institutional  rule  may  orient,  and  even 
decidedly influence,  the  negotiation outcome is  the  decision making 
process.  We  may  say  that  decision  making  processes  are  a  set  of 12
institutionalized formal rules which apply to specific cases in a policy 
making process, which have peculiar impact on bargaining structures, 
because of their ability to convey information and shape likely behavior 
among participants. In the field of European policies and EU decision 
making,  a  clear-cutting  differentiation  is  made  between  so-called 
intergovernmental and supranational decision making, each applied in 
specific policy contexts. Intergovernmental decision making implies the 
requirement of the unanimity among member states in order to get a 
 For sure, institutional rules concerning the decision making are not the only 12
possible  way in  which institutions  may exogenously  affect  outcomes.  Davis 
(2004),  for  instance,  shows  that  the  institutionalization  of  cross-sector  issue 
linkages, i.e. the combination of different sectors in a single negotiation process 
–  differing  from  separate  negotiations  for  single  issues  –  has  tangible 
consequences in the negotiation process, and over outcomes in the end. Héritier 
and Schoeller  (2015)  also  consider  the  issues  of  delaying strategies,  linking-
arenas  strategy and urgency of  decision making as  other  elements  that  can 
affect outcomes.
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decision. In these cases European institutions generally do play little 
role in the decision making process. The conduct of a European foreign 
policy  is  an  example  of  intergovernmental  policy.  Supranational 
policies, or the ones conducted according to the community method, 
are  the  set  of  policies  whose  decision  making  process  within  the 
Council of Ministers is lead by the majority vote criterion, and where 
European institutions play a  greater  role:  the  European Commission 
has the traditional monopoly of legislative initiative and the European 
Parliament and the European Council are involved in the co-decision 
procedure.  
The consequences of each decision making process are patent, and a 
decision taken by unanimity differs from one taken by majority – and 
even  by  qualified  majority.  In  the  former  decision  making  process, 
indeed, the outcome will realistically represent a sort of least common 
denominator among the actors at stake, because the risk of veto playing 
– which is up to every single participant – will prevent any risk taking. 
And such dynamic is directly functional to the number of participant in 
the  negotiation  process:  the  higher  the  number  of  participants,  the 
higher  the  possible  veto  players,  the  least  the  possibility  of  having 
transformative policy outcomes. Instead, a majority vote regime leaves 
more room to negotiation, because the outcome shall not make every 
single participant satisfied. 
The consideration of the role played by institutional rules results in a 
slightly more complex illustration of the strategic interaction, because 
at  this  stage  the  environment  is  affected  by  institutional  rules  and 
policy outcomes are not a pure reflection of the combination of actors 
behavior, but they are mediated by the presence of existent institutions 
which affect their nature (figure 2). Institutions, then, boldly affect the 
nature  of  the  policy  outcomes.  In  this  view,  the  mediating  role  of 
institutions is crucial to determine the nature of the policy outcomes in 
terms of their failure or success.  More precisely, it  is probable that a 
heavier  decision  making  process  which  requires  a  unanimity 
compromise  among  several  actors  has  a  more  incremental  –  and 
possibly engendering deadlocks – outputs than one in which agreement 
among actors is taken by majority. That is why a causal relation – to be 
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proven – is addressed between modes of governance in a single policy 
domain, and the relative successful nature of its outcome.
Figure  2.  Strategic  setting  defining  policy  outcomes  in  presence  of  mediating 
institutional rules.
2.4. Hypotheses formulation and associated variables   
Three main hypotheses are formulated, which are to be tested for each 
of the case studies considered. In particular, the first one refers to the 
general  link  existing  between  economic  crisis  and  institutional 
development of EU structures, while the second and the third one are 
more related to the mechanism leading to the policy outcomes observed 
with  explicit  reference  to  the  dichotomy  intergovernmental/
supranational decision making. The three hypotheses reflect a sort of 
temporal  and logic  sequence in  the development  of  the institutional 
change during economic crises, each of them representing a theoretical 
step  linking  economic  crises  to  their  general  consequences  for  the 
integration process.  They investigate three subsequent aspects of  the 
institutional  change in  the EU:  the causes  (the “why” question),  the 
modality  of  development  (“how”  question)  and  the  consequences 
(“then  what?”  question).  Indeed,  the  first  one  refers  to  the  role  of 
economic crises in shaping institutional change, the second one focuses 
on  the  type  of  institutional  change  according  to  the  modes  of 
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governance  used,  while  the  third  and  last  one  addresses  the 
consequences of economic crises on the institutional structure of EU. 
2.4.1. Hypothesis n. 1
The first hypothesis formulated is that, given the existent conditions in 
the EU, (H1) an economic crisis is fundamental in the determination of 
major  institutional  changes,  in  terms  of  their  quantity  and  quality, 
because it  exercises a functional pressure toward change over policy 
makers and institutional structures. Such functional pressure exercised 
by financial markets has been particularly strong since the Eurozone 
crisis has been an economic crisis resulted from a financial crisis; this 
particular  type  of  crisis  makes  it  more  necessary  for  policy  makers 
regaining  market  credibility,  much  more  than  in  other  kinds  of 
economic crises, such as those resulted from supply-side shocks. 
To be more specific, according to the first hypothesis, (H1a) the less the 
pressure on policy makers,  the more they are prone to postpone the 
adoption  of  major  and  transformative  policy  outcomes;  conversely 
(H1b), the more the pressure on policy makers, the more they are forced 
to  adopt  those  policy  outcomes.  According  to  the  strategic  choice 
approach,  the  main  independent  variables  at  stake  for  H1  are 
environment  and  actors,  with  the  preferences  of  the  latter  taken  as 
given and constant. Evidently, H1 takes as the dependent variable the 
presence  of  institutional  change  in  terms of  quality  and quantity  of 
policy outcomes adopted. 
To summarize, for H1 we have:
H1:  An  economic  crisis  is  a  fundamental  driver  of  major 
institutional  changes,  both  in  terms  of  their  quantity  and 
quality;
Independent variables:
- Pressure on policy makers given by economic crisis;
- Actors’ preferences (fixed);
- Institutional  rules  with  mediating  effects  on  policymaking 
(fixed)
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Dependent variable: 
- Policy outcome
2.4.2. Hypothesis n.2
The  second  hypothesis  refers  to  the  link  existing  between  the 
institutional setting defining policy making procedures and the nature 
of resulted outcomes. In particular, the second hypothesis focuses on 
successful or unsuccessful nature of policy outcomes, according to the 
idea  that  institutional  rules  do  have  tangible  effects  in  the 
determination of final outcomes. In particular, it can be explored how 
the dichotomy between intergovernmental and supranational decision 
making reflects of the effectiveness of policy outcomes.
According  to  H2,  intergovernmental  policy  making  tends  to  have 
incremental  and ineffective policy outputs and to create institutional 
deadlocks;  conversely,  supranational  policy  making  tends  to  have 
successful  and more  effective  outputs.   The independent  variable  at 
stake  is  the  modes  of  governance  used  in  the  crisis  management, 
addressed in the dichotomy supranational/intergovernmental decision 
making. For its part, the independent variable in this second hypothesis 
is  the character of the policy implemented in terms of its  success or 
failure to target the initial goal. 
Then, resuming, for H2 we have:
H2:  Intergovernmental  policy  making  tends  to  have 
incremental  and  ineffective  policy  outputs  and  to  create 
institutional  deadlocks;  conversely,  supranational  policy 
making tends to have successful and more effective outputs;
Independent variable: 
- Kind of decision making process (supranational/intergovernmental)
Dependent variable:
- Policy success/Policy failure
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2.4.3. Hypothesis n.3
In  light  of  H2,  the  third  hypothesis  (H3)  claims  that  the  failure  of 
intergovernmental  solutions  leads  to  a  process  of  delegation  to  the 
supranational  level,  determining  an  empowerment  of  supranational 
institutions  vis-à-vis  member  states.  H3  draws  from  rationales  of 
delegation  and  principal-agent  theory  (Pollack  2003),  according  to 
which delegation enhances policy credibility through the use of neutral 
actors  as  arbiter  among conflicting interests  and improves  outcomes 
thanks to technical expertise of the delegated. Then, in case of conflicts 
engendered  by  dead-locked  intergovernmental  policy  making 
(independent  variable)  we  may  find  the  presence  of  authority 
delegation  from  the  national  to  the  supranational  level  (dependent 
variable),  that  is,  an  upload  of  competencies  to  supranational 
institutional creating a de facto supranationalization in the policy area 
considered. 
Formalizing it, we have that:
H3: In the case of policy failure due to irreconcilable conflicting 
interests or institutional deadlocks, a process of delegation to a 
neutral  –  i.e.  supranational  –  actor  occurs,  resulting  in  an 
empowerment  of  supranational  institutions  vis-à-vis  member 
states.
Independent variable: 
- Presence/absence of policy failure;
Dependent variable:
- Presence/absence of supranationalization through authority 
delegation to supranational institutions.
2.4.4. An explanatory model
Taken together, the hypotheses represent a challenging interpretation of 
the role of the economic crisis on the institutional structures of the EU, 
and of the Eurozone in particular, because they could potentially reveal 
a  crucial  paradox,  if  proved  to  be  true.  Namely,  the  fact  that, 
notwithstanding a quintessential intergovernmental setup of the EMU, 
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as well as the predominance of the intergovernmental management of 
the crisis, economic crises do increase the level of supranationalism of 
EU, thus a step toward the ever closer union prefigured in the treaties, in 
a  sort  of  neo-functionalist  perspective,  against  liberal-
intergovernmental claims. That is not to say that one of the two grand 
theories is completely discharged and the other one is considered to 
perfectly  fit  all  the  evolution  of  the  European integration.  Rather,  if 
confirmed,  the  hypotheses  might  suggest  that  a  neo-functional 
perspective is more adapt to explain the institutional evolution of the 
integration process  in those peculiar  and temporarily limited phases 
which  are  major  economic  crises,  giving  then  the  big  frame  of  the 
different dynamics to be uncovered through rationalist explanations.
The interaction among the three hypotheses results in the explanatory 
model underlying the research (fig. 3), which for its part tries on the one 
hand  to  reveal  the  temporal  and  logical  sequence  among  the 
hypotheses, an on the other hand to link the set of independent and 
dependent variables as to offer – if the hypotheses prove to be true – a 
mid-range  explanation  of  the  dynamics  occurring  in  Europe  during 
major economic crises.  
Figure 3. Explanatory model of the dissertation.
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2.5. Methodological aspects 
The  dissertation  stems  from  the  idea  that  in  order  to  assess  some 
characteristics of the EU one has to take into account the set of policy 
domains it is composed of. Thus, it has not too much sense to discuss in 
abstract of the institutional nature of the European Union, unless one 
accurately looks at the different single policies (Wallace et al. 1977). In 
this  view,  in  order  to  understand the consequences  of  the  economic 
crisis  on the institutional structures of EU, I  will  adopt an empirical 
approach, that is, the reflection will be mostly guided by the focused 
observation  of  different  policy  domains.  By  doing  this,  it  will  be 
possible  to  uncover  general  trends  in  the  integration  and  to  give  a 
plausible interpretation of the institutional patterns taken by EU when 
confronted  with  major  economic  crises.  In  practice,  I  will  test  the 
leading hypotheses of the research for three different policy domains, 
which represent three case studies under scrutiny. In this section I deal 
with the main methodological aspects underlying the choice of the case 
studies and their practical observation.
2.5.1. Choice of case studies
The three case studies all refer to the institutional change that occurred 
during the Eurozone crisis, thus to the events destabilizing European 
economy  since  2009  onwards.  Methodologically,  the  case  studies 
represent different variations in the independent variables, thus, they 
are  different  cases  in  which  a  certain  outcome  is  observed  (policy 
outputs in consequence of crisis, supranational delegation) as the result 
of  a  variation  of  the  independent  variable  (crisis/no  crisis).  By 
consequence, it will be possible to assess whether similar variation in 
the  independent  variables  do  correspond to  similar  variation  in  the 
dependent  variable,  which  might  give  raise  to  recurrent  observable 
patterns of institutional change. 
The three policy domains, referred to the Eurozone crisis, are all related 
to monetary and economic aspects of  European integration.  Namely, 
they  are:  (1)  the  evolution  of  the  rules  of  fiscal  discipline;  (2)  the 
provision of financial support to member states and (3) the setup of a 
banking union. Before looking more closely to them, it is necessary to 
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make it  explicit  the  logic  underlying their  choice.  The first,  evident, 
reason  why  the  three  cases  all  concern  economic  aspects  of  the 
integration is that in this peculiar domains it could be easier to find, if 
any, direct correlation with the surrounding economic crisis. That is not 
to say that other policy domains of the EU were not affected by the 
economic  crises ,  rather,  that  it  is  intriguing  to  find  direct  links 13
between economic crisis and the development of economic policies.
The second reason is that,  for their nature,  the three policy areas all 
involve similar dynamics among the actors involved. Indeed, they all 
represent  policy  areas  whose  outcomes  imply  some  distributional 
effects. For instance, a reformulation of the rules of fiscal discipline – or 
the setup of financial support for member states – implies a substantive 
redistribution of resources among member states, unlike other policy 
domains  in  which  such  distributional  effects  are  less  evident  (e.g. 
enlargement  policy;  research  and  innovation  policy).  Such 
distributional  effects  directly  affect  the  interaction  among  actors, 
making  the  element  of  strategy  at  the  core  of  their  relations,  and 
making at the same time the three case studies a comfortable field of 
application  of  distributional  rationalist  explanations  of  institutional 
change discussed above. 
Finally, a third reason underlying the choice of the case studies is that 
the three policy areas were highly interdependent and interconnected 
both in provoking the Eurozone crisis and in determining its evolution 
(Drudi,  Durré  and  Mongelli  2012).  Indeed,  there  is  a  strong 
interdependence among fiscal stability (addressed by the strengthening 
of fiscal discipline),  financial stability (addressed by the programs of 
financial assistance) and price stability (mainly concerning the role of 
banks, thus linked with the creation of a banking union). In a monetary 
union, all the three elements are strictly connected, and a genuine one 
should provide firewalls in order to prevent spillover effects from one 
country  to  another.  Following  McNamara  (2015),  an  “Embedded 
 Some  studies  highlight  that  other  policy  domains,  not  strictly  related  to 13
economic affairs, were actually affected by the economic crisis. See for example 
Rodriguez and Xiarchogiannopolou (2014) for what concern social  policy,  or 
Chetail and Bauloz (2011) for the asylum policy.
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Currency Area”  needs four elements: a credible lender of last resort – 14
which  is  the  issue  addressed  by  the  policy  of  financial  support;  a 
mechanism  of  fiscal  redistribution  –  related  to  the  field  of  fiscal 
discipline; a regulation of financial risks – assessed by the setup of the 
banking  union;  and  finally  political  solidarity  –  which  for  its  part 
should have characterized all the three domains. Nonetheless, in lack of 
these  elements  –  the  “three  forgotten  unions”  at  the  base  of  the 
unfinished  institutional  design  of  the  Eurozone  (Matthijs  and  Blyth 
2015) – the Eurozone lived contagion effects determining the systemic 
crisis of last years, which spread from an economic field to another.
The  first  policy  domain  considered  is  then  the  progressive 
transformation of the rules of fiscal discipline for the members of the 
Eurozone. Indeed, this domain saw major changes since the incept of 
the crisis in 2008-2009: while before the crisis it was regulated by the 
sole Stability and Growth Pact of 1997 – with its notorious provisions of 
the limit of 3% between annual deficit and GDP and the other of 60% 
between  national  debt  and  GDP  –  the  pact  saw  progressive 
modifications, in line with the economic troubles of the Eurozone crisis. 
Indeed,  changes  were  adopted  for  what  concerns  the  application  of 
sanctions,  the  reinforcement  of  its  provisions  as  well  as  of  their 
enforcement  and  the  related  sanctioning  system,  through  a  rich 
transformation both at the level of treaties (e.g. the Fiscal Compact) and 
of secondary legislation (e.g. the Six Pack and the Two Pack).
The second case study refers to the provision of financial support to 
member states. In particular, it will be analyzed how the financial aid 
programs  and  the  financial  facilities  were  created,  the  underlying 
conflicts  among  member  states  and  the  clash  among  their  visions. 
Despite  the  explicit  no-bailout  clause  inserted  in  the  treaties,  EU 
institutions  and  member  states  have  provided  financial  support  to 
some of the peripheral states severely hit  by the crisis.  In particular, 
 Drawing  from Polanyi  (1944),  McNamara  suggests  that  even  a  monetary 14
union, in order to be effective and legitimate, should be “embedded” within 
larger social  institutions.  To this end, they should present the four elements 
here  recalled,  which  rather  than  an  optimum,  do  constitute  a  minimum 
foundation for monetary union (2015:26). 
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bilateral  loans  amounting to  €80 billion were  provided to  Greece  in 
March 2010, then financial support was given to Ireland (€85 billion in 
November, 2010), Portugal (€78 billion in May 2011) and again Greece 
for a second financial aid in March 2012 (€130 billion).  Moreover, a 15
certain  amount  of  money  flew  towards  Spain  and  Cyprus  for  the 
recapitalization  of  their  banking  sectors,  as  well  as  to  other  non-
members of the Monetary Union. This case study then analyzes how 
this  financial  aid  where  provided,  through which means  and which 
were their consequences. In particular, an analysis will be carried out of 
the progressive creation of new instruments used to support peripheral 
states,  which  were  an  absolute  novelty  in  the  EU  institutional 
environment,  namely  the  EFSM  (European  Financial  Stabilization 
Mechanism), the ESFS (European Financial Stability Facility), the ESM 
(European  Stability  Mechanism)  and  the  the  two  programs 
implemented  by  the  ECB,  namely  the  SMP  (Securities  Markets 
Programme) and the OMT (Outright Monetary Transactions). 
The third and final  area is  represented by the creation of  a  banking 
union in  the  EU,  which is  a  ex  novo  policy  creation,  after  that  such 
creation has been envisaged for decades (Enria 2013). As a response to 
the financial turmoil in the banking sector endangered by the crisis and 
to the often opaque and ambiguous relation between member states 
and  their  major  banks,  the  so-called  banking  union  consists  in  the 
creation of a Europe-wide supervision of banking institutions – which 
are put under the common supervision of the ECB – through the Single 
Supervisory  Mechanism,  and  the  provision  of  a  Single  Resolution 
Mechanism, in order to ensure an orderly resolution of failing banks 
with minor costs for taxpayers. The empirical observation reconstructs 
the progressive steps toward the setup of a banking union – which is 
still in progress given that a major component, the Single Resolution 
Fund, will be effective only in the next years – from a situation on very 
loose  coordination  among  member  states,  up  to  the  creation  of  a 
stronger one through the banking authorities and finally the setup of 
the main pillars of the banking union in 2013 and 2014.
 The  third  financial  plan  accorded  to  Greece  in  July  2015  is  out  of  the 15
chronological  scope  of  the  dissertation,  which  considers  the  span  of  time 
2009-2014.
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For each of the case studies the three hypotheses will be tested, in order 
to understand what the real role of the financial disorder in the creation 
of  the  instruments  was,  in  which  way  the  intergovernmental 
negotiations  affected  their  nature  and  potential  performances,  and 
whether or not, in the end, the institutional framework created in this 
field  represents  a  sort  of  supranationalization  of  the  Eurozone 
structures, because of any upload of competencies to the supranational 
level. 
2.5.2. Measuring outcomes and variations: Methodological aspects 
The test of hypotheses passes through the empirical check of events in 
search  of  eventual  confirmations  of  the  propositions  made.  For  the 
purpose of the research, the hypotheses are confirmed if respectively: a 
direct  and causal  link is  found between the economic crisis  and the 
adoption of major and transformative policy outcomes (H1); there is a 
relation  between  modes  of  decision  making  and  success  of  policy 
outcomes, and more specifically if intergovernmental decision making 
creates only incremental outcomes and/or institutional deadlocks – and 
if, conversely, supranational decision making leads to successful policy 
outcomes (H2); if finally an institutional deadlock created by the failure 
of  intergovernmental  decision  making  leads  to  a  delegation  to 
supranational institutions in order to solve the original problem (H3).
As a general rule for the dissertation, quantitative methods are barely 
helpful  for  the  analysis.  A number  can  hardly  indicate  whether  an 
outcome  is  more  or  less  supranational  than  another,  more  or  less 
successful  or  how  much  intergovernmental  is  a  decision  making 
process. That is why the research mostly relies on qualitative indicators, 
plus  an  original  index  of  supranationalism,  which  is  functional  to 
interpret the patterns of institutional change, giving sense of the final 
findings of the research.
Concerning the first  hypothesis,  the first  variation to measure is  the 
presence  of  any  pressure  on  policy  makers  given  by  the  context  of 
economic  crisis.  In  this  regard,  a  preliminary  specification  is  to  be 
made: the dissertation only takes into account case studies coming from 
a  period  of  crisis  –  namely  the  development  of  the  Eurozone  crisis 
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between 2009 and 2014 – without any explicit comparison with periods 
of non crisis. Thus, a diachronic comparison for a single policy will be 
taken  somehow implicit.  The  reference  to  assess  eventual  variations 
will be their development in the pre-crisis years, thus the span of time 
since the creation of the common currency up to 2008. In this respect, a 
diachronic comparison is not always linear and evident. Indeed, if it is 
relatively easy to assess the variation in the management of the rules of 
fiscal discipline because some rules within the same policy area were 
already there (the Stability  and Growth Pact  since 1997)  it  might  be 
difficult to assess a presumed variation in the field of financial aid to 
peripheral states, since they were never provided before 2010. The case 
of the banking union is somehow in between the two cases. Indeed, if 
the effective design and implementation of a system of banking union 
and banking supervision at European level occurred only during the 
Eurozone crisis, a certain coordination was already present for certain 
aspects.  Long-term variations, then, will  be assessed between policy-
specific terms of references: namely, the pre-existent institutional setup 
before the onset of the crisis is the main term if reference for the rules of 
fiscal discipline and the banking union, while the variation concerning 
the policy of financial support will  be assessed with reference to the 
very first phases of the crisis.
For the aims of the research, it is necessary to assess variation in the 
independent variable not only in the medium term, that is, in relation 
to a broad distinction between periods without crisis and periods of 
crisis (i.e. respectively, the first decade since the creation of the Euro, 
and the years following 2009). Rather, it is essential to understand the 
intensity of market pressure even within a protracted period of crisis, 
by identifying even shorter periods of intense pressure, which can be 
considered  as  peaks  of  a  crisis.  These  acute  phases  are  not  always 
perfectly  reflected  by  macroeconomic  indicators.  Indeed,  the 
unemployment rate is not an immediate indicator for the day-by-day 
attitude of financial markets, and GDP is measured only quarterly, thus 
it can hardly indicate the shortest periods of intense crisis and market 
pressure.  In  this  respect,  a  good  indicator  may  be  the  trend  of  the 
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spreads among sovereign bonds in Europe , as well as the course of 16
credit  default  swaps  (CDS)  on  the  same  sovereign  bonds.  Indeed, 17
since 2010, they represented a daily indicator of economic situation all 
around Europe. 
The  graphic  (see  appendix:  fig.  a1)  shows  the  yields  of  10-years 
government  bonds  of  seven  European  countries  over  twenty  years, 
since 1992 up to 2012, with the indications of the launch of Euro in 1999 
and  the  onset  of  the  international  financial  crisis  in  late  2008.  The 
figures  suggest  two  main  issues:  firstly,  the  decade  prior  to  the 
Eurozone crisis can be correctly judged as one without great economic 
pressure.  Indeed, it  seems that the creation of the common currency 
contributed to a substantial convergence in the cost of debt serving for 
Eurozone  members.  Secondly,  within  the  Eurozone  crisis’  years, 
spreads’  trend  shows  a  series  of  up  and  down  and  an  increasing 
divergence  among  member  states,  signaling  that  pressure  on  policy 
makers has been far from homogenous all  along the crisis,  and it  is 
quite  differentiated  for  every  country.  Such  a  sclerotic  attitude  of 
financial  markets  is  also witnessed by the trend of  CDS on national 
bonds, that as a highly volatile financial product immediately reflects 
any variation in markets expectations (see appendix: fig. a2).
In  the  next  chapter  I  identify  the  most  problematic  phases  of  the 
Eurozone crisis – i.e. a variation of the independent variable – in order 
to  check  if  in  those  occasions  peculiar  policy  outcomes  have  been 
adopted. To this end, the most immediate indicator of market pressure 
is  the  trend  of  co-movements  of  CDS  premiums  on  the  sovereigns 
bonds,  that  is,  the  aggregate  dimension  of  their  value,  a  very  good 
synthetic  indicator  which  gives  an  accurate  representation  of  the 
“economic  climate”  all  over  the  crisis  (see  appendix:  fig.  a3).  An 
 The spread between sovereign bonds represents the difference between their 16
yields, and it is a measure of how much a bond is considered to be riskier than 
another. Indeed, the spread represents the risk premium that investors demand 
to hold the risky asset.  During the Eurozone crisis,  peripheral  states’  bonds 
spread skyrocketed with reference to the German ones, which are considered to 
be one of the most secure assets in the world.
 CDS are a sort of investors’ insurance against the risk of bankrupt of a state; 17
the higher their value, the more likely it is supposed the state to go bankrupt. 
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increase in the indicator suggests an increase in the joint default risk, 
thus  a  period  of  more  intense  pressure  of  markets  towards  policy 
makers. Starting from 2010, six peaks of the crisis can be identified: two 
in  2010,  the  very  onset  of  the  crisis  in  Greece  in  May and the  first 
contagion in Ireland in October-November; two again in 2011, with the 
contagion to Spain and Italy during the summer and a new dramatic 
phase of October-November due to the fears of a referendum-induced 
“Grexit”;  a  very big one in mid-2012 because of  a new menace of  a 
Greek exit following general elections in May and June; and then a last 
one in March due to the banking crisis in Cyprus. I claim that in those 
phases policy makers were incredibly urged to act,  in order to calm 
down markets.
When it  comes to  the  second hypothesis  (“Intergovernmental  policy 
making tends to have incremental and ineffective policy outputs and to 
create institutional deadlocks; conversely, supranational policy making 
tends  to  have  successful  and  more  effective  outputs”),  it  has  to  be 
assessed the variation in the modes of decision making, as well as in the 
degree  of  success  or  failure  of  the  policy  outcomes.  Concerning  the 
dichotomy  between  supranational  and  intergovernmental  decision 
making,  references  are  present  in  the  theoretical  section.  18
Supranational decision making, or community method, is  the one in 
which  the  European  Commission  has  the  monopoly  of  legislative 
initiative – on the main policy lines dictated by the European Council – 
and then the Council and the Parliament vote in the so-called ordinary 
legislative procedure (art. 294 TFEU). In this system, decisions within 
the  Council  are  taken  by  qualified  majority.  On  the  opposite, 
intergovernmental  decision  making  resides  in  the  monopoly  of  the 
process in the hands of member states. Namely, the European Council 
defines broad strategies, while the Council implements and develops 
 See §2.3.218
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concrete measures. Decisions are taken by unanimity, and the role of 
other institutions is limited to advise governments.  19
What  is  to  be  specified  is  that  the  dichotomy  doesn’t  catch  a 
fundamental passage of the integration process, namely supranational 
delegation, which for its part represents the dependent variable of the 
third hypothesis. It is defined as “the delegation of political authority 
from representative organs to non-majoritarian institutions, which are 
neither  elected  by  the  people  nor  directly  managed  by  elected 
politicians” (Tallberg 2002).  In this sense,  supranational delegation is 
not  to  be  confused  with  the  formal  shift  of  a  policy  from 
intergovernmental management toward community method, generally 
sanctioned  by  a  formal  treaty  (e.g.  the  “communitarization”  of  the 
environmental  policy  occurred  through the  Single  Act).  Rather,  it  is 
qualitatively  more  than  a  simple  “communitarization”  of  policies, 
representing a further integrative step, thus the complete abandon by 
member  states  of  a  once  national  competence  in  the  hands  of  a 
supranational  body,  generally  non  representative  (i.e.  European 
Commission, European Central Bank). Such delegation can be informal 
or – more often – formally sanctioned, and it applies to specific aspects 
of a single policy, e.g. the monitoring of fiscal obligations of member 
states. If occurring, then, supranational delegation means that a single 
aspect  of  a  policy  is  completely  left  in  the  hands  of  supranational 
institutions,  contributing  to  the  general  supranationalization  of  the 
entire policy.
When it comes to policy outcomes, an assessment on their failure or 
success  is  clearly  case  specific.  For  example,  the  signature  of  a  new 
treaty containing new rules of fiscal discipline can be seen as successful 
if it helps in relaxing the financial environments (e.g. by reducing the 
spreads); on the contrary, if the decisions taken in a summit contribute 
to  the  deterioration  of  the  climate,  it  obviously  results  that  such 
 A third type of decision making residing somehow in the middle is the one of 19
Open Method of Coordination, often used in the area of social policies, whose 
elements are soft coordination among member states, benchmarking and share 
of best practices and decisions taken by consensus (Radaelli 2003).
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outcome is far from optimal.  When discussing each case study, the 20
criteria  to  assess  the  successful/unsuccessful  nature  of  a  certain 
outcome will be presented.
2.5.3. The “supranationalization rate” index
It is necessary to find a way to validate or disconfirm the underlying 
conjecture of the research, i.e. that the economic crisis is functional to an 
increase of the supranationalism in the European polity. That is, a major 
economic crisis can be a driving force for a substantial enlargement of 
competencies and authority at the supranational level. According to the 
empirical approach of the research, such assessment derives from the 
direct  observation  of  single  policies.  That  is  why  it  is  necessary  to 
evaluate  how  much  an  individual  policy  outcome  is  more  or  less 
supranational than another, or better said, if  a single policy outcome 
contributes to make the policy more or less supranational than before.
To this end, it  can be helpful to borrow the concept of a continuum 
between  intergovernmental  and  supranational  politics  proposed  by 
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997) (figure 4). The aim of the two authors 
was to build a new theory of European integration , and to this end 21
they  created  an  index  to  evaluate  the  level  of  supranationalism/
intergovernamentalism in European politics, which was assessed along 
three  main  dimensions  (rules,  organizations,  society).  From  their 
theorization  I  borrow  the  idea  –  common  to  much  research  on 
 A great example of failing outcome from the Eurozone crisis is the so-called 20
“collective action clause” taken in the Deauville agreement between Merkel and 
Sarkozy in October 2010 and then welcomed by the European Council – and 
opposed by the head of ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet – which determined weeks of 
panic among international investors (Bastasin 2012:239).
 In  the  line  of  the  neo-functionalist  tradition,  Stone  Sweet  and  Sandholtz 21
proposed  a  theory  of  the  integration  relying  on  three  causal  factors: 
transnational  exchanges,  supranational  organizations  and  EU  rule  making. 
Their  idea  is  that  growing  transnational  exchanges  require  more  and  more 
supranational regulation, provided by supranational institutions in a process 
which  results  in  their  rising  institutionalization  and,  in  the  end,  further 
integration.
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European  integration  –  of  the  continuum,  which  has  as  its  poles  a 
completely intergovernmental or a fully supranational character. Like 
the two authors, I consider that within the complex framework of the 
EU, certain policies can be situated in a specific site of the continuum, 
while others can be situated elsewhere. 
 Figure 4: The continuum of supranationalization of a policy.
To better specify the different sites of the continuum, I operationalize 
the indicators by using the five-point scale proposed by Borzel (2005) to 
assess the level of authority of supranational institutions over policy 
processes.  In  particular,  the  pole  at  the  extreme  left  (=1  point) 
corresponds to a situation in which competencies lye exclusively at the 
national level,  and policy coordination at  EU level is  absent.  On the 
contrary,  the  pole  at  the  extreme  right  (=5  points)  represents  an 
institutional setting were the authority over a policy is completely in 
the  hands  of  supranational  institutions,  thus  there  is  a  complete 
centralization of authority. The intermediate sites do represent different 
shades of the concept. Level 2 means that competencies are shared very 
lightly,  prefiguring  a  sort  of  intergovernmental  cooperation  on  the 
issue. At level 3 there is a balanced distribution of authority between 
the national and supranational level, in what can be defined as a joint 
decision making. At point 4 of the continuum we find the configuration 
of  the  community  method,  which  is  not  yet  a  full  centralization  of 
authority  at  the  supranational  level,  but  largely  involves  European 
institutions.
In order to assess the degree of supranationalism of a policy, and not of 
a  political  regime  in  general,  I  adopt  three  different  categories  of 
indicators, which taken together can give precise indications on how to 
!42
situate  a  single  policy  along  the  continuum.  The  index  of 
supranationalism is then composed by the following dimensions, each 
including  policy-specific  indicators:  (1)  width  of  supranational 
management of policy cycle; (2) power of supranational institutions in 
the  policy;  and  (3)  presence  of  any  supranational  instrument, 
mechanism or procedure.
The width of supranational management of the policy consists in the 
assessment  of  how much of  a  policy  resides  “in  Bruxelles”,  that  is, 
which  is  the  balance  between  responsibility  of  governments  or 
supranational  institutions in the different  phases of  the policy cycle: 
agenda-setting,  elaboration,  implementation  and  evaluation  of  the 
policy. At a level 1 we would find a pure “intergovernmental” policy, in 
which the elaboration, the decision making and the implementation are 
all  in  the  hands  of  governments,  and  where  there  is  no  room  for 
supranational authority. At the opposite pole, instead, we would find a 
policy  whose  management  is  fully  in  the  hands  of  supranational 
institutions – such as, for example, the monetary policy for the member 
states  of  the  Eurozone.  Being  every  single  indicator  of  this  first 
dimension situated more or less close to one of the two poles, from the 
average  of  the  different  aspects  one  can  determine  how  much  the 
management of  the whole policy cycle is  relied to the supranational 
sphere – and how much eventually this value shifted over the crisis 
years.
The  second  dimension,  i.e.  the  power  of  supranational  institutions, 
refers to the effective role of  European bodies within the policy:  are 
institutions effectively responsible in the policy field, or their role is one 
of subsidiarity to governments? How much freedom do member states 
enjoy in implementing the policy? Again, to situate a single policy in 
the  continuum  it  is  necessary  to  look  at  the  different  phases  of  the 
policy making.  If  supranational  institutions have effective powers in 
the design, the decision making and in the implementation, the policy 
resides on the right  pole.  Otherwise,  if  governments  lead the whole 
process, then the policy stands on the left pole. For sure, the presence of 
any recognition of supranational delegation as defined above, signals 
an  evident  move  towards  the  right  pole  in  the  policy  eventually 
concerned by the act of delegation.
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The  final  dimension  refers  to  the  presence  of  any  supranational 
instrument, mechanism or procedure, whose creation is functional to 
the management of the policy at supranational level. Indeed, common 
mechanisms or  instruments are often created as a  way to upload to 
supranational level a certain competence without a complete abandon 
of authority by the states. Both the Single Resolution Mechanism and 
the European Stability Mechanism are examples. With regard to these 
instruments, states have a certain role, but they suggest that the policy 
area is undertaking a process of supranationalization. Beside, certain 
policies  present  peculiar  procedures  which  can  be  more  or  less 
intergovernmentally-oriented, such as the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
under  the  SGP.  In  this  perspective,  the  presence  of  any  particular 
procedure,  and  its  nature,  helps  in  better  defining  the  rate  of 
supranationalization of the policy.
Taken together,  the three dimensions –  which will  hardly situate  on 
opposite  poles  for  every  single  policy  –  help  identify  how  much  a 
policy can be considered supranational or intergovernmental, and how 
much it became more or less supranational than before the crisis. In this 
way,  by  confronting  all  the  case  studies  at  stake  and  appreciating 
eventual variations, one can have an accurate framework to understand 
whether or not economic crisis contributed to the further integration of 
Europe. 
2.5.4. Sources and data collection
Concerning data collection, the quality of the sources is fundamental 
for the validity of the dissertation. While not a strictly historical work, 
major  mistakes  on  the  reliability  of  sources  and  an  inaccurate 
reconstruction  of  events  can  undermine  the  overall  validity  of  the 
research, or at least decrease its explanatory power (Lieshout, Segers 
and  van  der  Vleuten  2004).  That  is  particularly  the  case  for  this 
research, because it heavily relies on empirical analysis. Reliability of 
sources is even more important because on the basis of sources, actors’ 
preferences have to be realistically presumed. This is far more difficult 
than simply describing their actions, since unlike behavior, preferences 
and motivations are not observed (Frieden 1997: 40). 
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Concerning data collection about the Eurozone crisis, reliable material 
already exists,  notwithstanding the obvious absence of  the historical 
perspective that  is  only possible  after  several  decades.  Nevertheless, 
accurate reconstructions of the Eurocrisis’ events have been made by 
several authors (Bastasin 2012, Irwin 2013, Peet and La Guardia 2014), 
and they provide a solid base for the analysis. At the same time, I rely 
on  official  documents  of  both  national  and  European  institutional 
bodies, member states’ officials,  media coverage, newspapers, official 
reports and all  kinds of documents which are easily available today, 
and  whose  number  is  already  quite  impressive.  For  what  concerns 
newspapers’ sources, many of the most important newspapers in the 
world have their  special  eyes on Brussels,  represented by journalists 
and observers very close to their sources,  well  inside the coulisses  in 
Bruxelles, and thus reliable in their analyses and reconstructions. The 
best examples are the blog of Peter Spiegel for the “Financial Times” , 22
the one by Jean Quatremer for the French press “Libération” , or the 23
“Charlemagne” blog in “The Economist”.  Their contribution in the 24
reconstruction of the events, as well as in the reconstruction of strategic 
behavior of actors – which is sometimes difficult to uncover through 
official documents – will be of major importance.
 “Brussels blog” can be found at: http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/22
 The blog is named “Coulisses de Bruxelles” and it can be found at: http://23
bruxelles.blogs.liberation.fr/coulisses.  The  author  of  the  blog  published  two 
very  interesting  reconstructions  of  two  different  phases  of  European 
integration,  namely the construction of  the monetary union (Quatremer and 
Klau 1999) and the years around 2000, including the negotiations behind the 
Nice  Treaty  and  the  French  referendum  on  the  European  Constitution 
(Quatremer and Clarisse 2005).
 The column “Charlemagne” can be found at: http://www.economist.com/24
blogs/charlemagne. 
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Chapter 3
The Eurozone Crisis: An Overview
“Crisis appears to be the new normal state of affairs in the European 
Union”, according to Copsey and Haughton (2012:1). Indeed, since the 
eruption of the international financial crisis in 2007-2008, Europe has 
witnessed the deepest and longest crisis in its 60-year history, which 
severely  put  into  question  the  economic  bases  of  the  integration 
process. Moreover, the exemplar of European integration, the common 
currency, and indeed the entire political and institutional framework of 
the European Union are in doubt. “If the Euro fails, Europe fails,” has 
been  a  mantra  (Spiegel  2014a).  Over  the  last  few  years,  crisis  has 
become a  sort  of  normal  state  of  affairs  because  the  end  game has 
always been unclear,  and because year after year new developments 
have only served to exacerbate the crisis.  New problems and threats 
came about, making it very difficult to formulate any sort of prevision 
even with regards to the near future. Although at the time of writing 
the  debt  crisis’  acute  phase  seems  to  be  over,  the  weak  economic 
outlook,  the  danger  of  deflation  and  some  unresolved  issues  about 
public  debt  in  some countries  make it  impossible  to  affirm that  the 
crisis is completely behind us. The main aim of this chapter is to offer a 
brief overview of the events that happened in Europe since May 2010, 
which can be considered as the beginning of the Eurozone crisis, up to 
the latest developments in late 2014, which – considering the ambiguity 
of the future – is the temporal limit of the analysis carried out in this 
dissertation. 
3.1. The global financial crisis and the Eurozone
The Eurocrisis is a complex matter, a multidimensional series of events 
related to a growth crisis, a banking crisis and a government debt crisis 
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(Schambaugh 2012) that, being highly interdependent, erupted into a 
serious political crisis among the member states of the European Union, 
and the Eurozone in particular. In temporal terms, it can be considered 
as the dramatic appendix of the global financial crisis,  the third and 
final  phase  of  a  transformative  crisis  that  passed  through  an  initial 
phase of market turmoil (August 2007- September 2008), followed by a 
systemic global financial crisis (September 2008-May 2010), and finally 
the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis (May 2010-onwards) (Drudi, Durré 
and Mongelli 2012: 881). 
The Eurocrisis is the debt crisis that involved some of the peripheral 
member states of the Eurozone – the so-called PIIGS: Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, Greece, and Spain – which at different levels found themselves in 
trouble  while  refinancing  public  debt.  Though  primarily  concerning 
those peripheral states, the debt crisis had serious repercussions for the 
European economy as a whole with most of  the Eurozone members 
living  a  double  dip  recession.  The  unemployment  rate,  particularly 
youth unemployment, raised to unprecedented levels, the indicators of 
public  finance  deteriorated  and  industrial  production  began  to 
stagnate. The figures are striking, and show how the debt crisis turned 
into a social crisis: Greece lost 25% of its GDP in a few years; Portugal 
lost  15% of  its  work  force,  and in  Spain,  one  person out  of  four  is 
currently unemployed – for young people the rate is one in two.
How was this possible? A simplistic narrative reduced Europe’s chaos 
to just one fundamental reason: profligacy of member states. That is, 
the  idea  that  fiscal  troubles  in  peripheral  states,  at  the  origins  of 
uncertainty among investors and of the rapid escalation of the costs of 
debt serving, were essentially due to public overspending of the PIIGS 
countries. Such a vision, often taken as the official version by European 
officials  and  politicians  (Schäuble  2011;  Fernholz  2013),  relied  on 
academic  works  (Reinhardt  and  Rogoff,  2010)  whose  findings  later 
emerged as partially wrong (Krugman 2013). The merits of austerity – 
seen by many as necessary to counteract the crisis – shaped the debate 
over  the  last  years.  Nevertheless  a  seemingly  straightforward 
explanation  is  just  one  part  of  the  story,  and  things  are  far  more 
complicated. Excessive public spending was not the core reason of the 
Eurozone crisis – or, at least, it was not the only one.
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Several elements contributed to the transformation of the international 
financial  crisis  into a  Euro-specific crisis.  Most  of  the problems date 
back  to  the  creation  of  the  Monetary  Union,  when  policy  makers 
committed  some  original  sins,  leaving  the  common  currency 
infrastructure  incomplete  and  unable  to  face  eventual  major  crises 
(Nordvig 2014). Namely, errors included the absence of a centralized 
fiscal policy – in other words, a bold EU budget – to counterbalance 
natural economic divergence among member states ; the lack of any 25
European control  of  national budgets,  which were largely left  to the 
discretion of national governments; and the one-size-fits-all monetary 
policy that cannot help save an individual economy during periods of 
economic stress, especially if the central bank cannot print money and 
has  the  sole  objective  of  price  stability  defense.  A second  element 
concerns  European banks  that,  apart  from transmitting  the  financial 
crisis  to  the  real  economy  through  the  so-called  credit  crunch  in 
2008-2009, since the creation of the Euro progressively became “too big 
to bail”  in absence of a central bank that can act as a lender of last 26
resort (Blyth 2013: 74). Having adopted hazardous operations such as 
incredibly  high  leverages,  and large  bond holdings  –  often  strongly 
biased in favor of their own sovereign debt (Peet and La Guardia 2014: 
36)  –  banks  risked to  go  burst  when large  investors  began to  leave 
peripheral states’ bonds determining a fall of their value. Governments 
were  then  forced  to  provide  financial  support  to  save  the  banking 
system  from  collapse,  generating  enormous  public  deficits,  and 
engendering,  de  facto,  the  most  immediate  mechanism  for  the 
transformation of banks’ debt into state debt (Blyth 2013: 46). 
 Divergence showed up in two main dimensions. The first is the inflation gap 25
among member states: countries with higher inflation (Greece, Ireland, Spain) 
experienced rising labour costs, and non-inflationary countries (Germany and 
its  “close  periphery”)  took  advantage  of  a  relative  improvement  in 
competitiveness. The other element of divergence is the current account, which 
was largely in deficit for some countries (e.g. Greece) and in surplus for others 
(again,  Germany).  This  determined  a  destabilizing  flow  of  foreign  capital 
towards the periphery, making PIIGS far more exposed to eventual financial 
crises. On the economics and politics of the Eurozone crisis, see Hall (2012).
 Just to offer a figure, in 2008 Deutsche Bank alone had assets for over 80 per 26
cent of German GDP (Kirchfeld, Logutenkova and Comfort 2012).
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In  this  situation  of  systemic  weaknesses,  some  national  experiences 
triggered the Eurocrisis. Within the fragile and incomplete institutional 
framework of the Eurozone, national experiences worked as successive 
catalysts  for  the  explosion  of  the  situation  and  for  its  progressive 
deterioration. Greece is the best, though inglorious, example.  The case 27
of Greece is one of a state that took too much advantage of the low 
borrowing costs engendered by the common currency , and that run 28
expansionary policies progressively widening its current accounts and 
enlarging public deficits and debt.  Along with a progressively lower 
productivity,  a  very  weak  system  of  tax  collection  and  an 
uncoordinated system of public spending, Greece became the sick man 
of  the Eurozone,  in  spite  of  the apparent  economic growth since its 
access to the monetary union.  The tragedy erupted in 2009,  and the 
very  bad  coordination  of  European  governments  deteriorated  the 
situation of the Hellenic state, which – at the time of writing – is still 
uncertain.
Nevertheless, PIIGS are hardly homogenous. Where the Greek case can 
be duly considered as one of bad management of public finances, the 
others  cannot,  and successive  waves  of  the  crisis  were  triggered by 
different  reasons.  For  instance,  the  Irish  and  Spanish  crises  were 
underpinned by a housing bubble.  In particular, since their access to 29
the common currency, both countries witnessed a striking flow of cheap 
money  which  was  mainly  directed  towards  the  housing  sector, 
determining a soar in real-estate pricing. To cover increased domestic 
lending,  Irish  banks  funded  themselves  in  the  United  States  at 
impressive levels of leverage, and when the banking system collapsed 
in the US – due to the Lehman Brothers affair – Ireland almost went 
 For a thorough discussion of the Greek case: Featherstone (2011), Pelagidis 27
and Mitsopoulos (2011). 
 After its access to the Eurozone, Greece profited more or less of the same 28
interest  rates  on  sovereigns  as  Germany,  though  being  the  two  economies 
completely different and progressively divergent: a clear signal that financial 
markets  were  dysfunctional  and  unable  to  correctly  discriminate  economic 
situations (De Grauwe and Ji, 2012).
 For the evolution of the crisis in Ireland see Donovan and Murphy (2013); for 29
the Spanish case see Pascual-Ramsay (2014) and Ferreiro and Serrano (2012).
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bankrupt.  The  Irish  state,  guaranteeing  the  entire  banking  system’s 
liabilities, created an enormous public deficit. A similar housing bubble 
burst in Spain,  which represents seven times the Irish economy, and 
thrust  Spain  into  the  PIIGS  club.  Given  that  the  housing  sector 
employed 14 per cent of the working population before the crisis, the 
sudden  burst  of  the  bubble  generated  unprecedented  levels  of 
unemployment, very high levels of private debts, a major decrease in 
tax revenues and an increase in social spending, which contributed to 
the general deterioration of public finances.
Portugal and Italy, for their part, experienced neither a housing bubble 
nor  a  completely  reckless  public  finance  management.  Instead,  the 30
problem is low competitiveness and productivity, and low rates of GDP 
growth, combined with persistently high levels of public debt. While 
were not a real problem before the financial turmoil – even Portugal 
and Italy enjoyed very low borrowing costs – they set the stage for a 
domino effect  once borrowing costs  rose.  Indeed,  with a  heightened 
perception of  risk after  2008-2009,  all  of  a  sudden the two countries 
emerged  on  the  frontier  of  the  debt  crisis,  though  the  objective 
underlying risk was relatively limited. It was as if investors overnight 
discovered that Italy holds one of the largest public debt stocks in the 
world, and that the long-term prospects for economic growth remain 
weak.  This  contributed  to  the  general  deterioration  of  the  already 
fragile conditions of European economic system. 
3.2. The main evolution of the crisis
The main feature of the Eurocrisis was that it didn’t proceed linearly, 
but events developed, month after month, through a striking series of 
more  and  more  dramatic  waves,  that  repeatedly  put  the  common 
currency – as well as the economic system in Europe, and not only – on 
the brink of the abyss. And whenever policy makers seemed to set the 
 For an account of the evolution of the crisis in Italy, with interesting insights 30
on the national political interplays, see Barbera and Feltri (2014); for a historical 
perspective  on  Italian  social  and  political  situation  engendering  crisis,  see 
Amato and Graziosi (2013).
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stage  to  restore  confidence,  a  new drama erupted.  With  the  help  of 
hindsight, since the beginning of the Greek tragedy, up to 2014, one can 
identify  six  different  waves  of  the  Euro  crisis,  each  representing  an 
acute phase of the crisis and engendering specific policy outcomes.  To 31
be sure, even before 2009 Europe had experienced significant financial 
turmoil due to the subprime crisis in the US , warning that the climate 32
was  already  tense.  Indeed,  the  bankruptcy  of  Lehman  Brothers  in 
September 2008, engendered a series of unfortunate events, up to the 
definite begin of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis in early 2010.
3.2.1. Greece and the first wave of the crisis
Between end of  2009 and spring 2010,  the first  wave of  the crisis  is 
represented  by  the  Greek  drama.  National  elections  in  October 
sanctioned the victory of the PASOK headed by George Papandreou, 
which unveiled the  previously  hidden,  enormous,  deficit  left  by the 
precedent  government  (14  per  cent  of  GDP,  more  than  three  times 
above the target). At that point, investors almost completely abandoned 
Greek  government  bonds,  rating  agencies  downgraded  the  Hellenic 
debt, the borrowing costs soared, and Greek GDP consequentially fell 
sharply. That was the beginning of the Eurozone crisis as we know it. 
After the formal request from Papandreou, among tense negotiations, a 
rescue plan was granted to Greece (110€ billion) in the form of bilateral 
loans by European peers and the IMF, at a “non concessional rate” and 
under strong conditionality, namely the set up of a harsh austerity plan 
in order to reassure the markets and contain fiscal deficit and national 
 As argued in the methodological section (§2.5.2), the main peaks of the crisis 31
are identified through the observation of the course of CDS on sovereign bonds, 
a synthetic though accurate indicator of markets’  pressure on policy makers 
(see fig. a3).
 In July 2007 the German IKB was bailed out; a month later the French bank 32
BNP Paribas  froze  two  funds  heavily  exposed  to  subprime  credit;  then,  in 
February 2008 there was a run on a British bank, Northern Rock, which was 
later nationalized. For a reconstruction of the events occurred in the financial 
sector – and the relative role of central bankers since 2007, see Irwin (2013). For 
an  American  perspective  on  the  subprime  crisis  and  the  consequent 
international financial crisis: Blinder (2013).
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debt. Its supervision was left to a new established technical body – the 
Troika – composed by the staff of the European Commission, the ECB 
and the IMF. For its part, the ECB started an unprecedented operation 
of  bond  purchase  on  the  secondary  market ,  the  SMP  (Securities 33
Markets Programme) in order to relax the pressure in the market of 
sovereigns. Beside, two different instruments were created to provide 
financial  aid  to  Eurozone  members:  the  EFSM  (European  Financial 
Stabilization Mechanism) and the ESFS (European Financial  Stability 
Facility). The former is an emergency funding program guaranteed by 
the European Commission able to raise up to €60 billion; the latter was 
a temporary rescue mechanism with a lending capacity of €500 billion, 
which  would  act  as  a  firewall  against  speculation  and  uncertainty 
among investors.
3.2.2. The second wave: From Greece to Ireland 
That wasn't enough. A second wave of crisis was to come in the last 
months  of  2010,  when  Ireland  came  under  the  attack  of  financial 
markets. After that spread on its 10-years bonds soared to the explosive 
rate of 9%, the once Celtic tiger asked for a financial support (€85 billion 
delivered  in  November).  That  was  the  first  real  contagion  of  the 
Eurocrisis, that from Greece had moved to Ireland, and would attack 
other  peripheral  states.  A  few  weeks  before,  a  hardly  visionary 
agreement  between the  Chancellor  Merkel  and the  French president 
Sarkozy  –  the  “Merkozy”  duo  progressively  became  a  sort  of 
directorate  of  the  Eurozone  –  panicked  financial  markets.  In  a 
comprehensive  agreement  on  the  management  of  the  crisis,  in 
Deauville  the couple agreed that  future bail  outs  would require “an 
adequate participation of private investors”, a formula known as PSI – 
private  sector  involvement.  The  official  approval  by  the  European 
Council  opened up the space for the “Merkel crash” in the financial 
markets,  in  a  time when the  European Commission  was  striving  to 
 European Treaties prevents ECB to directly purchase national bonds (art. 123 33
TFE). In any case, the official motivation behind SMP was not to help troubled 
States, but to “hampering the monetary policy transmission mechanism” (Pee 
and La Guardia 2014: 48).
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calm  down  markets  through  the  presentation  of  the  so-called  “Six 
pack”, a set of directives to strengthen fiscal discipline in the Eurozone 
– which was finally voted after one year. The end of 2010 then saw a 
new  rush  of  the  crisis,  requiring  a  certain  activism  of  European 
governments, which agreed to raise the capacity of the EFSF, to create a 
stable  mechanism  of  financial  support  (the  European  Stability 
Mechanism, ESM) and to sign a new treaty for the fiscal consolidation, 
known as the Euro Plus Pact.
3.2.3. Summer 2011: The crisis hits Eurozone’s core
After  a  period of  relative  calm in  the  first  months  of  2011,  markets 
turned to Lisbon. In May, after an official request by the Portuguese 
government, a bailout was provided to the country (€78 billion). The 
rescue was not a real shock for the markets per se – they were quite 
confident that bailout funds would effectively help smaller peripheral 
economies – but it was traumatic because the fall of Portugal brought 
about  contagion  to  some  of  the  most  important  economies  in  the 
Eurozone, the ones “too big to save”: Spain and Italy. Collectively, the 
instruments  implemented  would  be  insufficient  to  bail  out  the  two 
countries.  Summer  2011  represented,  then,  the  third  wave  of  the 
Eurocrisis,  the  one  in  which  a  crack  was  approaching  the  core  of 
Europe. The bad situation of Spanish banks, weakened by the housing 
bubble,  and the gargantuan Italian debt  began to  frighten investors, 
pushing up the spreads of the two countries. At a time where Italian 
government  headed  by  Berlusconi  seemed  unable  to  counteract  to 
markets’ attack, a massive purchase of Italian and Spanish bonds by the 
ECB, under the SMP, helped to temporarily calm down markets, but the 
worst was yet to come.
3.2.4. The fourth wave: the Eurozone on the brink
The last months of the year represented, more than a further wave of 
the crisis, “the point where clearly the Eurozone as we know it could 
have exploded: it was the feeling [that with] the contagion, at this point, 
you  were  on  the  brink  of  explosion”,  according  to  a  French  official 
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(Spiegel 2014b). Along with uncertainties over Italy, in view of a new 
austerity plan, the Greek government called for a referendum over its 
membership  to  the  Eurozone.  That  was  the  first  open  and  official 
reference  to  a  possible  “Grexit”,  which  precipitated  markets’  trust, 
opening  up  a  political  tug-of-war  in  the  core  of  Europe.  In  a  few 
dramatic  weeks,  through a European Council  and a G20 meeting in 
Cannes,  Italian  and  Greek  governments  were  substituted  by  two 
technocratic  cabinets;  a  haircut  of  the  Greek  debt  was  decided;  the 
Greek referendum was cancelled and a second bailout was offered to 
Greece (€130 billion), while the European Commission strengthened the 
fiscal policy framework through the Two pack’s proposal – came into 
force in 2013. Problems seemed to be over when in December European 
governments agreed on a new Fiscal Compact for a further tightening 
of fiscal obligations, on a new version of the ESM with more funds, and 
when finally  the newly elected president  of  the ECB,  Mario Draghi, 
announced two rounds of LTROs  (Long Term Refinancing Operations) 
in favor of European banks. 
3.3.5. Greece, again
But again,  the situation deteriorated a few months later,  and Athens 
was again the catalyst  of  a  new wave of  the crisis.  At  a  time when 
Hollande was elected as the new French President in May 2012, Greek 
voters failed to elect a stable majority in the Greek parliament, making 
necessary a new ballot  in June.  Though the conservative –  and to a 
certain extent, pro-European – Samaras won in the end, the danger of 
having a Euro-skeptic government headed by the leftist Syriza’s leader 
Alexis Tsipras  again precipitated a Europe-wide panic. The fear of a 34
dissolution of the common currency was still alive, and two bailouts 
programs  and  two  rounds  of  debt  restructuring  seemed  not  to  be 
enough to revive the Greek economy. Contagion, again, passed towards 
Italy and Spain, whose spreads approached the psychological threshold 
 Alexis Tsipras would later become Prime Minister, in January 2015, overly 34
challenging the Troika in order to obtain some sort of renegotiation of Greek 
debt. New early elections in September 2015 confirmed Tsipras at the head of 
the Greek cabinet.
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of 7%. At a time when the new ESM was still not fully implemented, 
the  intervention  of  the  ECB was  providential:  in  July  Mario  Draghi 
announced that the ECB was ready to do “whatever it takes” to save 
the Euro, and a few months later – against the resistance of German 
member of the Governing Council, but backed by Angela Merkel – ECB 
launched the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), the nuclear bomb 
against  speculation  coming  from  Frankfurt.  OMT  are  a  program  of 
unlimited  purchase  of  sovereigns  bonds,  to  be  implemented  under 
formal request of a state and attached to formal conditionality.  In the 35
meantime,  a  loan  of  €100  billion  was  provided  to  Spain  for  the 
recapitalization of its  banks,  and a fundamental  rule by the German 
Constitutional  Court  legitimated  the  ESM,  which  finally  became 
operative in October, eight months after the governmental agreement 
on its new version.
3.3.6. The final wave: Cyprus’ affair
Beginning in 2013, the Fiscal Compact too entered into force, and the 
combination  of  the  new  instruments  implemented  concurred  to  a 
certain  optimism.  Such  optimism  was  punctually  deceived  a  few 
months later, when a final – for the moment  – wave of the crisis came 36
from Cyprus. The consequences of the international financial crisis and 
the high exposure of  Cypriot  banks to  Greece sinked the over-sized 
financial sector of the island, making it necessary an external bailout. 
Dangerously intertwining Russian political  interests  –  Cypriot  banks 
are full  of oligarchs’ money – a final compromise was finally found, 
 Conditionality and formal request by a state are the two fundamental aspects 35
in which OMT differ from SMP, which being limited and without conditionality 
were effective in the short-run, but hardly successful in the long time (Eser and 
Schwab 2013).
 While writing the dissertation, the expectation that the crisis in Cyprus was 36
the last one was proven wrong. Indeed, in the summer 2015, the Greek crisis 
erupted  again  with  the  distinct  possibility  that  the  country  could  exit  the 
Eurozone, following a non reimbursement to the IMF. The further crisis led to 
the delivery of a new financial aid program to Greece, the third one, amounting 
at €86 billion.
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under the form of a €10 billion loan and a haircut of banking deposits, 
with major consequences for the European scenario (Hall 2013; Jones 
2013). If the Greek economy is relatively small, Cyprus’ can be seen of 
very relative importance if  compared to  the Eurozone.  Yet,  the little 
island’s troubles were big enough to put into question – again – the 
whole  common  currency,  which  after  that  seemed  to  very  weakly 
recover.  Moreover,  it  became  even  more  necessary  for  European 
policymakers  to  focus  their  attention  on  the  creation  of  a  banking 
union, since the Cypriot crisis was first and foremost a banking crisis.
3.3. General remarks on the Eurozone crisis
Before moving to the test of the leading hypotheses for the three case 
studies,  it  is  worth providing some general  considerations about the 
origin and the development of the Eurozone crisis, in order to offer a 
broad  comprehension  of  the  events,  whose  complexity  was  only 
partially deconstructed in this short discussion.
Indeed, the interplay among actors was actually complex, given their 
number and the stakes. The crisis saw the interaction of the immaterial 
–  though  highly  influential  –  financial  markets,  of  conflicting 
governments and different European institutions. In this framework, a 
convincing  narrative  of  the  events  is  the  one  proposed  by  Bastasin 
(2012)  which  sees  the  crisis  as  a  tug-of-war  between  European 
governments, retrenched in their national interests and unable to offer a 
Europe-wide solution to the crisis,  and European institutions – ECB, 
more specifically – forced to become primary actors, often beyond their 
formal  powers  according  to  the  treaties.  If  on  the  one  hand,  states 
cannot be held the sole responsible for triggering of the crisis, on the 
other much of the fault for its deterioration is in their hands. If sclerotic 
financial markets and inadequate framework of the common currency 
decidedly  contributed  to  the  explosion  of  the  crisis,  the  strategic 
disputes within the European Council and the Ecofin were key to the 
dramatic exacerbation of the crisis.
As a general result, by no doubt, the Eurocrisis contributed to enlarge 
economic and political divergences among member states, with a core 
of  countries  opposed to  peripheral  ones.  A sort  of  hierarchy among 
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creditor and debtor countries has been constructed, and it will probably 
continue  to  influence  EU  political  life:  the  formal  equality  among 
member  states  has  progressively  disappeared  in  the  concrete 
development of events – more than ever happened over the integration 
process, actually. Germany, thanks to its undoubtedly good economic 
performance, acted as a clear veto player in many policy aspects, and 
yet failed to act as a true hegemonic leader capable of steering a path to 
resolution  (Bulmer  and  Paterson  2013;  Newman  2015).  As  the 
ringmaster of the crisis management, Germany tried to impose a simple 
equation to peripheral states: solidarity – that is, financial aid – must 
come  only  after  the  respect  of  harsher  fiscal  rules.  The  following 
analysis will highlight how much the overwhelming bargaining power 
of Germany reflected on policy outcomes. Indeed, thanks to its better 
bargaining resources and, over all, thanks to a better fallback position 
in case of negotiations’ failure, Germany became the most important 
actor of the strategic setting of the Eurozone. 
Finally,  the  reconstruction  deliberately  overviewed  the  fundamental 
issue of the relation between democracy and democratic accountability, 
market expectations and political decision making. The appointment of 
technocratic  governments  in  Italy  and  Greece  in  2011,  the 
empowerment of non elected body such as the Troika in the elaboration 
of economic policies, as well as the direct role played by the ECB in 
exhorting  –  or  even  blackmailing  –  national  governments  in 
undertaking austerity-driven reforms  were all of primary importance 37
in this perspective. The crisis showed that the timing and the priorities 
of  financial  markets  do  greatly  differ  from  those  of  democratically 
elected  governments,  and  of  bruxelloise  negotiations  even  more. 
Moreover, it showed that states were found completely unprepared to 
 In August, 2011, the ECB sent two letters to Italy and Spain – at high risk of 37
financial contagion – in which it explicitly dictated the instruments of economic 
policy to be implemented in a short  time.  The counterpart  of  these reforms 
would  be  the  maintaining  of  purchase  of  Italian  BTPs  and  Spanish  bonos 
through the SMP. The letter to the Italian government was immediately leaked 
(Corriere della Sera 2011), while the contents of the one to Spain were known 
only two years later. 
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face such challenges, transforming a financial turmoil into a historical 
economic defeat.
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Chapter 4
The evolution of the rules of fiscal discipline
The first case study under scrutiny is represented by the transformation 
over the last years of the rules of fiscal discipline for the members of the 
Eurozone, in a complex process of revision and strengthening of the 
provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) agreed in 1997. The 
aim of the chapter is to provide the first empirical examination of the 
process of institutional change that occurred during the crisis, testing 
the three leading hypotheses in the narrower context of the evolution of 
a specific policy. 
A preliminary caution is in order. It can be difficult to completely isolate 
the events surrounding a specific policy area from those that occurred 
in other sectors,  given the high level of interdependence of different 
levels of the crisis. For instance, negotiations over the reform of the SGP 
largely  overlapped with those  on financial  assistance  programs,  and 
policy outcomes were sometimes the result of cross-sector negotiations. 
In fact, while the former represents the “stick,” the latter is the “carrot” 
offered to distressed states.  That said, events, preferences and issues 38
of every specific policy will be isolated analytically as much as possible 
from others.  A second caution concerns the policy-specific objects  of 
analysis. When not specified, rules of fiscal discipline are observed in 
processes  of  rule  creation  and adoption,  with  a  focus  on  the  policy 
process leading to outputs and the strategic interaction among actors 
underlying  their  creation,  rather  than  their  effective  implementation 
over time, which would require a closer observation of their impact on 
the long-time. This is problematic given the time proximity and would, 
in any case, represent a different research focus. For the purpose of the 
 Methodologically,  this  means  that  the  three  case  studies  are  not  causally 38
independent, but certain elements of the strategic setting of one could well be 
be relevant for others, an unavoidable feature while dealing with such a level of 
policy interdependence.
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dissertation, for instance, it is not of fundamental importance whether a 
state does or does not comply to a Commission’s recommendation in 
view  of  adopting  a  national  budget,  but  it  is  important  that  the 
Commission  has  acquired  over  time  the  power  of  issuing  such 
recommendation before the budget is written – or before it is voted in 
national parliament.
Fiscal rules are a fundamental element of the EMU’s framework – EU 
treaties  make  explicit  reference  to  the  necessity  of  fiscal  policy 
coordination among member states (art.  119 to 126 TFEU) – because 
they force member states to maintain their fiscal dynamics under more 
or  less  controlled  paths,  prudently  binding  their  behavior  in  public 
spending. The rationale behind this sovereignty limitation is linear: in a 
monetary  union  unsustainable  fiscal  dynamics  in  one  country  may 
trigger  dangerous externalities,  forcing other  states  to  bear  the  costs 
produced  by  non  prudent  behavior,  namely  inflationary  debt 
monetization  and  the  eventual  necessity  of  fiscal  transfers  towards 
“undisciplined” countries (Buti and Carnot 2012: 900). A transfer union 
is precisely what Germany and some other countries wanted to avoid 
while  constructing  the  EMU  –  and  still  today,  apparently  (The 
Economist 2010). Nevertheless, the rules agreed before the onset of the 
crisis proved insufficient to constrain states’ behavior and to prevent 
contagion of the crisis among member states. Thus, events triggered the 
necessity of  further constraining member states’  fiscal  discipline,  the 
end result of which was the adoption of new treaties (the Euro Plus 
pact  and the Fiscal Compact) and of brand new secondary legislation 39
(the sets of directives in the Six Pack and in the Two Pack) that, taken 
together, represent a comprehensive and substantive reform of the SGP.
The aim of the chapter is to observe the progressive reform of the SGP 
throughout the crisis years and then use collected data to test the three 
leading  research  hypotheses,  as  well  as  the  underlying  conjecture 
according  to  which  economic  crises  do  foster  an  effective 
 The contents  of  the Euro Plus Pact  will  not  be closely scrutinized,  as  the 39
agreement focuses much more on instruments  to  foster  European countries’ 
competitiveness.  It  also  includes  provisions  on  fiscal  discipline,  namely  the 
engagement to translate budget rules into national legislation, which were later 
confirmed and formalized in the Fiscal Compact.
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supranationalization of EU policies. Each of the three hypotheses will 
be tested by linking specific independent and dependent policy specific 
variables (table 1). 
Table 1: Reform of the SGP: Relevant variables and indicators of the case study.
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TYPE OF 
VARIABLE
POLICY-
SPECIFIC 
VARIABLE
POLICY-SPECIFIC INDICATOR 
H1
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE
Pressure on 
policy makers
- Course of yields’ spreads and CDS 
(2010-2014)
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE Policy outcome
- Amendment of existing fiscal rules
- Adoption of new rules in the field of 
fiscal discipline
H2
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE
Modes of 
decision 
making: 
intergov./
supranational
-Presence of international agreements 
-Presence of intergov. negotiations
-Presence of unanimity regime 
                (or, conversely)
-Adoption  of  outcomes  via  community 
method 
-Adoption  of  new  instruments  by 
supranational institutions 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE Policy success
-Possibility of easy enforcement of the    
rules-Low level of politicization of rules’ 
enforcement-Low flexibility in rules interpretation 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE Policy failure
-Politicization of the enforcement phase 
preventing the effective implementation 
of rules
-High flexibility of rules’ interpretation
-Lack of effective enforcement of rules 
H3
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE
Supranational 
delegation
-Formal act of delegation to supranational 
institutions (e.g. Treaty change)
-Upload of competencies for policy 
management (e.g. implementation or 
monitoring phase)
-Creation of new legislative procedures 
empowering supranational institutions
As discussed in the theoretical section (§2.4), the three main hypotheses 
of the dissertation are the following ones:
H1: An economic crisis is a fundamental driver of major institutional 
changes, both in terms of their quantity and quality;
H2: Intergovernmental policy making tends to have incremental and 
ineffective  policy  outputs  and  to  create  institutional  deadlocks; 
conversely, supranational policy making tends to have successful and 
more effective outputs;
H3:  In  the  case  of  policy  failure  due  to  irreconcilable  conflicting 
interests or institutional deadlocks, a process of delegation to a neutral 
–  i.e.  supranational  –  actor occurs,  resulting in an empowerment of 
supranational institutions vis-à-vis member states.
The chapter is structured as follows. First of all, a brief outline of the 
functioning of  the SGP is  provided in order to better  appreciate  the 
institutional change that occurred over time, namely before/after the 
crisis. I’ll then provide an analysis of the comprehensive reform of SGP 
adopted  in  the  last  years.  After  defining  the  relevant  actors  and 
assessing  their  assumed  positions  over  outcomes,  the  strategic 
interaction  behind  the  adoption  of  each  output  will  be  analyzed. 
Finally,  the  leading  hypotheses  of  the  dissertation  will  be  tested, 
drawing  on  the  empirical  date.  Some  concluding  remarks  and  an 
assessment  on  the  overall  significance  of  the  policy  in  the  broader 
context of European integration will complete the analysis.
4.1. Fiscal discipline before the crisis: The Stability and Growth Pact
After  creating  the  EMU and setting  up the  rules  to  access  it,  states 
realized that no provision was there to discipline behavior once a state 
joined  the  common  currency.  For  this  reason,  Eurozone  members 
agreed in 1997 to sign the Stability and Growth Pact (Council of the 
European  Union  1997a,  1997b)  to  enforce  the  monitoring  and 
coordination of fiscal policies in order to assure sound public finances. 
Formally, the pact is composed by two regulations, whose dispositions 
are recalled in the protocol n. 12 attached to the treaties. 
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The  SGP is  composed  of  two main  pillars:  a  preventive  arm and a 
corrective one.  The preventive arm set up targets of fiscal discipline 40
for  member  states,  namely  fiscal  positions  close  to  balance  or  in 
surplus, so that in bad times the annual deficit should not exceed 3% of 
GDP. In order to achieve this, member states set an annual Medium-
Term  Objective  (MTO)  for  maintaining  a  safety  margin  and 
guaranteeing  a  progress  toward  a  sustainable  budget  position.  The 
European Commission (EC), in case of any deviation from the MTO’s 
objectives, triggers a warning, and even sanctions in case of significant 
gap – up to 0.5% of GDP in case of repeated failure. The corrective arm, 
for its part, copying nominal convergence criteria from the Maastricht 
Treaty (public deficit under 3% of GDP and public debt under 60% of 
GDP),  illustrated  the  reduction  steps  to  be  undertaken  in  case  of 
acknowledged excessive deficit or debt. Failure to respect these targets 
may engender an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) by the EC. In both 
cases, sanctions were preceded by early warnings by the Commission, 
then by an examination of the Ecofin, and only after a vote by qualified 
majority  –  on  the  bases  of  a  recommendation  of  the  Commission  – 
could the Council impose sanctions to undisciplined member states. As 
a  result  of  this  set  of  institutional  rules,  and  mainly  due  to  the 
possibility given to the Council of opposing a sort of veto on penalties, 
no sanctions were ever imposed to member states. In 2003, at a time 
when  France  and  Germany  came  under  the  EDP,  Ecofin  refused  to 
deliver  sanctions  against  the  two  countries,  revealing  the  main 
deficiencies  of  the  SGP’s  enforcement  framework,  i.e.  non automatic 
sanctions  and  political  interplays  within  the  Council  capable  of 
interfering with the rules. In the event, more powerful countries proved 
able to ignore the procedure at will, seriously undermining the overall 
sense of collective discipline.
Moreover,  a  reform to  the  SGP in  2005  introduced the  concept  of  a 
“structural balanced budget,” which is an accommodating measure that 
“purges”  the  nominal  government  balance  from  the  effects  of  an 
eventual  recession,  thus taking into account difficulties presented by 
 For a technical presentation of the SGP, see Geeroms et al. (2014: 245-255); for 40
a thorough discussion on the political rationale of SGP and its enforcement over 
years, see Heipertz and Verdun (2010).
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the  economic  cycle.  An  explicit  reference  to  “individual  national 
circumstances” was added, which has the effect of justifying eventual 
infractions to the pact (e.g. the high level of private savings of Italian 
households). Then, further flexibility was put into the pact, relaxing the 
timing  for  correcting  excessive  deficits,  which  resulted  in  a  de  facto 
watering down of  the pact’s  provisions.  In particular,  the ambiguity 
inherent  in  vague  concepts  such  as  “consideration  of  individual 
national circumstances” and “exceptional circumstances,” as well as the 
unclear  delineation  of  precisely  what  would  constitute  a  structural 
balanced budget represented a set of ad hoc escape clauses included by 
member states in order to decrease the possibility of having penalties 
imposed on them for errant behavior. 
In retrospect,  the pact was never actually enforced strictly, especially 
considering the favorable economic conditions of the decade, leading 
observers to speak of “wasted good times” (Schuknecht et al. 2011). An 
overly flexible interpretation of rules (in practice, the threshold of 3% 
represented  a  target  rather  than  a  hard-limit),  the  lack  of  strong 
incentives to comply, the absence of automatic sanctions, and political 
argy-bargy among member states undermined the economic rationale 
of the rules of fiscal discipline embedded in the pact, opening up the 
stage for the outburst of the crisis, and the urgent necessity for their 
reform.
4.2. Fiscal discipline after the crisis: A step-by-step reform of SGP
Beginning in 2010, when the international financial crisis had already 
affected  the  European  economy,  the  newly  elected  president  of  the 
European Council Herman Van Rompuy was given a mandate by the 
EU member states to establish a task force, along with the European 
Commission  and  the  ECB,  to  design  a  renewed  framework  for 
economic surveillance. The “Van Rompuy Task Force”, a clear sign of 
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the  progressive intergovernmentalization of  the  crisis  management , 41
issued  its  proposals  in  October  (Van  Rompuy  Task  Force  2010), 
anticipated by those  of  the  ECB (2010).  Concerning the  fiscal  policy 
framework, both documents pledged to enhance fiscal surveillance in 
order to avoid negative spillovers among member states. Some of their 
suggestions  were  progressively  implemented  over  the  crisis’  years 
through different  legislative  instruments,  but  the  modalities  of  such 
reform remained contested. The different actors at stake, indeed, given 
their  divergent  preferences  over  outcomes,  determined  a  strategic 
interaction leading to  the  measures  adopted,  resulting in  a  series  of 
fundamental institutional changes.
4.2.1. Assessing actors and their preferences over new fiscal rules
Though conscious that the SGP had failed to prevent the spillover of 
fiscal  troubles  among  member  states,  member  states  and  European 
institutions could not  agree on the design of  the new rules  of  fiscal 
discipline. Indeed, the issue raised a tug-of-war among different groups 
of actors, each supporting a different vision of the transformation of the 
legal framework. The great debate was the one opposing discipline to 
solidarity (Geeroms et al. 2014: 244): at different degrees, actors can be 
situated in the continuum spanning from the pole of those demanding 
harsh  measures  of  fiscal  discipline  and a  rules-based and automatic 
sanctioning  system  and  the  other  of  those  claiming  for  much  more 
flexibility in the system, the recognition of country-specific situations 
and formalized instruments of solidarity towards members in financial 
troubles.
The  main  representatives  of  the  first  group  of  states  are  northern 
creditor  countries,  i.e.  Germany,  Netherlands,  Austria,  Finland  and 
 It is to be noticed the coincidence between the beginning of the crisis and its 41
management with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty (Dinan 2011), that 
came into force in very late 2009,  and whose provisions contributed to give 
further  visibility  and responsibilities  to  the European Council  (Puetter  2012, 
Fabbrini 2013).
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Slovakia.  They  saw  the  tightening  of  fiscal  discipline  rules  as  a 42
necessary, and preliminary, step before any provision of financial aid to 
presumed profligate states.  Common guarantees backed by creditors 
may come only after a process of structural convergence, with tighter 
rules  as  the  main  element,  in  a  sort  of  “Germanization”  of  Europe 
(Bastasin 2012: 308). Their rationale was both economic and moral. In 
economic terms, the definition of clear-cutting rules and their effective 
enforcement was considered as a  necessary firewall  against  negative 
externalities in the Eurozone and a precaution against fiscal transfers 
toward peripheral states. The Eurozone crisis, however, contributed to 
transform  normal  political  interplays  into  a  morality  play  (Hewitt 
2013:107): for Germany, “deficit sinners” were to be punished, and rules 
to be obeyed. According to Germany and to its close periphery, to the 
extent  that  one  can realistically  presume from officials’  declarations, 
such  rules  would  imply  automatic  sanctions  for  non-compliant 
countries, up to the suspension of voting rights in the Council as well 
as  the  suspension  of  development  and  agricultural  funds  (Spiegel 
2010).  Moreover, according to German finance minister Schäuble, the 
European  Commission  shall  have  a  formal  veto  right  over  national 
budgets, so as to preventively block any possibility of unsound policies 
through the independent figure of a commissioner for economic and 
monetary  affairs  (Pisani-Ferry  2014:  111).  German  chancellor  Angela 
Merkel went as far to propose the exclusion of rule-breakers from the 
Eurozone (Euractiv 2010). All in all, a tougher SGP resided as one of the 
key pillars strongly supported by creditor countries all along the crisis, 
together with the respect of the no-bailout clause and the independence 
of the ECB. 
 On the definition of “creditor” – that is, a country showing a surplus in the 42
balance of payments, thus able to finance foreign net investments – it has to be 
noticed that if it was true at the beginning of the crisis for all the countries here 
recalled, over the last years a few of them (e.g. Finland and Netherlands) lost 
this status, remaining however member of the northern/surplus coalition. In 
this  sense,  it  holds  the  observation  made  at  §2.3.2  (footnote  n.  10)  on  the 
application of these generalizations to each member of the two groups of states 
identified.
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On the other side, peripheral debtor countries strove to have as much 
flexibility as possible in the renewed SGP. Headed by France, the group 
was composed of Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and in general by those 
states  in  fiscal  troubles.  According  to  their  diagnosis,  states  under 
markets attack are not fiscal sinners, but victims of financial speculation 
(Hewitt  2013:  107).  Hence,  tighter  rules  are  necessary,  but  their 
preferences are for a flexible system, in which governments may retain 
their possibility to impose sanctions on their peers (Bastasin 2012: 225), 
in a process that remains highly politicized. Moreover, debtor countries 
fought to inverse the temporal sequence between financial support and 
rules:  these  may come later,  once  financial  assistance  is  provided to 
weak states,  so as to prevent contagion first of all.  To this,  a further 
divergence was in the form in which these rules may come: according 
to Germany, a treaty reform was necessary to make commitments more 
credible (ibid: 209; Hewitt 2014: 214), literally “legally unchallengeable” 
(Peel 2010), while other states opposed this solution, aiming at a simple 
amendment of EU legislation.
The Franco-German couple, then, emerged as quite a strange creature. 
If indeed they led together much of the crisis management, the couple – 
with no significant differences between the presidency of Sarkozy up to 
2012 and the one of Hollande onward – was internally divided even on 
the great orientations. Indeed, each one of the two countries was the 
champion of a different vision of the crisis management. Interestingly, 
Hewitt (2014: 98) argues of “opposite twins”. Between the two poles, 
and  paradoxically  enough,  the  UK’s  position  was  that  of  pushing 
forward  European  integration,  by  tightening  fiscal  rules.  While 
reaffirming British opt-outs concerning fiscal policies,  however. More 
and more biting rules, then, but just for Eurozone members. Indeed, all 
over the crisis’  years,  the UK position was one of  guaranteeing that 
Eurozone  troubles  would  not  spread  towards  London,  striving  to 
maintain at the same time the privileges that the UK had achieved over 
time, namely concerning financial supervision. According to observers, 
such attitude turned out to make Great Britain largely irrelevant and 
isolated in the negotiations, and even more during those for the writing 
of the Fiscal Compact (Hewitt 2014: 215-234; Peet and La Guardia 2014: 
115-120).
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Beside  states,  European  institutions  were  on  the  front  line  for  the 
enhancement  of  the  SGP.  Indeed,  being  the  process  represented  not 
only by a new treaty creation but also by the renovation of secondary 
legislation,  supranational  institutions  were  fully  involved  in  the 
process. The Commission, first of all. Realistically, the executive’s initial 
preferences were twofold: on the one hand, it wanted to secure the fact 
that  the  process  of  SGP’s  reform would  walk  along the  community 
method – in a time when the creation of the Van Rompuy task force 
prefigured an “intergovernmentalization” of the crisis–management. In 
other words, the Commission presumably aimed at confirming its role 
of agenda-setting over the claims of European Council. And it is not a 
case that there was a competition between the two bodies to lead the 
debate,  by issuing its  own proposals  before the other (Chang 2013a: 
162).  As well as it is not by coincidence that the Franco-German duo 43
interfered with the Commission’s work through formal and informal 
messages  (ibid.).  On  the  other  hand,  the  Commission  aimed  at 
reinforcing  its  own  position,  to  the  detriment  of  member  states,  by 
enhancing its control over budget rules,  with the aim of introducing 
automatic sanctions in order to sideline Ecofin in the EDP, or at least 
impede  that  a  simple  majority  vote  of  the  Council  may  override  a 
Commission’s decision over fines.
The European Parliament, in line with the Commission’s preferences, 
aimed at securing the community method first of all, because a policy 
“re-intergovernmentalization”  would  completely  marginalize  the  EP 
itself. Notwithstanding the political and national cleavages within the 
parliament, an official document shows the EP’s preferences over fiscal 
rules  at  the  beginning  of  negotiations  (European  Parliament  2011): 
automatic  sanctions  for  rule-breakers,  a  clear  definition  of  states’ 
engagements to re-enter within fiscal limits, and more transparency of 
the whole process – i.e.  more involvement of the EP and open–door 
decisions on fiscal issues within the Council. 
 Interestingly,  borrowing from principal-agent  theorizations,  Chang (2013a, 43
2013b)  suggests  that  the  “Van  Rompuy  Task  Force”  was  created  by  the 
European Council (principal – or better, multiple principals) as a “police patrol” 
in order to take under control the Commission (agent) and defend principal’s 
interests while rewriting SGP. 
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The ECB’s attitude toward the tightening of fiscal rules, laid down in a 
clear-cutting list of eleven priorities for the reform of the governance of 
the  common  currency  (ECB  2010a),  was  the  one  of  determining  a 
“quantum leap” toward a more integrated Europe. Concerning fiscal 
discipline, the ECB proposed an independent fiscal agency under the 
European Commission, in order to depoliticize the enforcement of fiscal 
rules (Bastasin 2012: 222). In this sense, the ECB was very sympathetic 
with the Commission on the modalities of reforming the SGP, calling 
for an empowerment of supranational institutions in order to enhance 
credibility and offer concrete enforcement to rules.  Deprived of formal 44
decision making powers, the ECB did not intervene in the reform of 
SGP, but it enjoyed a de facto political weight since it was a fundamental 
player in the realm of financial assistance to member states. And since it 
operated according to the underlying idea to intervene in sustaining 
member states only after obtaining their serious commitment to fiscal 
discipline ,  its  vision has  been taken into  great  account.  The  list  of 45
possible reforms envisaged by the Frankfurt-based institution includes 
greater “automaticity” and stricter deadlines in the sanction procedure, 
so as to eliminate escape clauses,  increased reporting obligations for 
non-compliant member states as well as possibility of review mission 
by the European Commission – and the ECB, of course. In addition, 
ECB praised for more ambitious and legally binding benchmarks for 
establishing the existence of a public deficits and for improved quality 
of national data and statistics.
In the complex renegotiation process of the SGP, coalitions of interests 
and preferences  were  then  differentiated  and radically  divided over 
different cleavages. On the one hand, those seeking hard and binding 
rules  –  creditor  countries  plus  supranational  institutions  –  were 
opposed to those more disposed to to fiscal flexibility and solidarity. 
Nonetheless,  a  typical  cleavage  among  states  and  institutions  was 
 In this sense, the ECB can be methodologically considered as an external ally 44
(without formal decision making powers) of a coalition of actors empowered 
with formal powers.
 See for example the declaration by Mario Draghi (2011) on the necessity of a 45
binding fiscal compact.
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equally at stake, the former, both creditor and debtor countries, aiming 
at leading the process in an intergovernmental way – through treaty 
reform and eventually parallel intergovernmental agreements – and the 
latter pledging for a global reform within EU legal framework. 
During the negotiation process leading to new fiscal rules,  outcomes 
were  variously  determined  by  different  elements,  such  as  the 
institutional framework surrounding the decision making process and 
the capacity of actors in advocating their preferences over others’, as 
well  as  their  relative  weight.  Indeed,  not  all  the  actors  faced 
negotiations at the same level.  On the contrary, structural conditions 
heavily influenced the process: countries in fiscal troubles, needless to 
say, were in a very weak position while negotiating, because their fiscal 
profligacy, presumed or not, made them barely credible in defending 
the possibility of  a very soft  tightening of rules.  On the other hand, 
creditor countries were in the strong position to impose their point of 
view.  In  addition,  they  were  highly  motivated  in  tightening  rules 
because eventual fiscal transfers would weigh for the most part on their 
shoulders. Such asymmetry among actors in resource ownership if on 
the one hand decidedly influenced the path of negotiations toward a 
progressive tightening of fiscal rules, on the other highlights the nature 
of distributive policy of the reform of those rules, making distributional 
rational  choice  the  most  accurate  explanation  for  the  institutional 
change  at  stake.  Fiscal  discipline  rules,  indeed,  are  not  financially 
neutral,  as  they  involve  fiscal  consolidation,  supply-side  policies’ 
reconfiguration and eventual fiscal transfers.
4.2.2. The European Semester
The  first  recommendation  of  the  Van  Rompuy  Task  Force  to  be 
implemented  was  the  so-called  European  Semester,  aimed  at 
reinforcing  the  ex  ante  dimension  of  fiscal  policy  coordination, 
considered to  be  too fragmented.  In  a  communication the  European 
Commission  (2010a)  proposed  to  synchronize  the  budget  drafting 
procedures in the member states, so as to guarantee a coordinated and 
consistent  guidance  to  all  the  European  countries.  This  process,  the 
European Semester, became effective in January 2011.
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It consists in a cycle of economic policy coordination which starts in 
January and lasts for about six months – hence its name – and has to be 
repeated  every  year.  At  the  beginning  of  the  year  the  Commission 
presents an Annual Growth Survey, where it sets out the main priorities 
to be fulfilled by member states. After discussions within the Council 
and  the  European  Parliament,  the  document  is  endorsed  in  spring, 
when the European Council invites member states to take into account 
those priorities in the drafting of the annual budget. Alongside this, the 
European  Commission  elaborates  country-specific  recommendations, 
policy guidance documents which are to be followed by member states. 
On the bases of policy guidances, each state has to present to its peers a 
Stability  or  Convergence  Programme  (SCP)  in  April,  then  before  the 
discussion  in  their  respective  Parliaments,  which  gave  rise  to  some 
doubts about the democratic legitimacy of the measures (Hallerberg et 
al.  2011).  The  semester  cycle  ends  with  the  Council’s  elaboration  of 
country-specific policy recommendations based on the SCP, which then 
feeds in to the final drafting of the budget in the last part of the year. 
The  Commission  subsequently  analyzes  budget  outcomes  in  the 
Annual Growth Survey at the beginning of the following year. 
The European Semester is designed explicitly as a six-months timetable 
to be followed by member states and the Commission in order to align 
the  timing of  budget  elaboration,  but  also  the  coordination  of  fiscal 
policy  among  member  states.  The  intention  here  is  to  establish 
synchronic  and  consistent  policy  guidance  issued  from  a  common 
document  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  and,  most  importantly,  an 
aligned system of budget monitoring. 
The Commission’s proposal for the adoption of the European Semester 
came in May 2010, at a time when the crisis in Greece begun to severely 
concern financial markets; it was also present in the VRTF’s proposals 
and an agreement was found before the end of the year,  in order to 
begin  to  implement  the  instrument  in  2011.  Being a  sort  of  code  of 
conduct, rather than a rigid set of binding rules, and basically residing 
in  the  area  of  policy  coordination,  the  adoption  of  the  European 
Semester did not find any major obstacle in the process of adoption. 
Preferences, indeed, were not so divergent so as to shape a considerable 
strategic  interaction  among  actors.  Still,  the  fact  that  the  same 
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procedure was envisaged both in the Commission’s proposal  and in 
VRTF’s  document  –  respectively  advocating  supranational  and 46
intergovernmental  principles  –  and that  the  negotiation process  was 
very quick, demonstrates that the measures proposed were already a 
good compromise for actors at stake. On the one hand those pledging 
for tighter fiscal rules,  were glad to insert some sort of Europe-wide 
coordination  in  the  writing  of  national  budgets,  and  on  the  other 
member  states  were  all  satisfied with  the  relative  freedom they still 
maintain in the practical elaboration of their budgets, which would be 
undermined only with provisions of the Six Pack to be approved in the 
following year.  What is  to be noticed,  however,  is  that  such relative 
consensus  over  rules  was  a  direct  consequence  of  the  climate  of 
economic  incertitude,  which  begun  to  be  felt  in  2010  after  the  the 
unfolding of the Greek drama, making member states aware that some 
sort of fiscal coordination was necessary at least to prevent any further 
crisis. In any case, the institutional change triggered by the European 
Semester, thus the provision of an ex ante coordination in the writing of 
national  budgets,  does  not  contemplates  any  formal  obligation  or 
binding clause, as the measures to come would.
4.2.3. The Six Pack’s provisions
While the European Semester provides a timetable for enhancing fiscal 
policy coordination, the set of directives known as Six Pack  offers a 47
 The VRTF’s press release explicitly refers to the Commission’s proposal of a 46
European Semester, and the proposal was officially incorporated in the VRTF 
works in June 2010 (Chang 2013b: 260). For a closer analysis on vote behavior at 
the European Parliament, see Schwarzer 2013.
 The Six Pack draws its name by the composition of the legislative package: 47
five regulations and a directive (three regulations and the directive on fiscal 
policy and two regulations on macroeconomic imbalances). More specifically, 
the regulations are the n. 1173/2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary 
surveillance  in  the  Euro  area,1174/2011  on  enforcement  action  to  correct 
excessive  macroeconomic  imbalances  in  the  Euro  area,  1175/2011  on  the 
strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance 
and  coordination  of  economic  policies,  1176/2011  on  the  prevention  and 
correction  of  macroeconomic  imbalances,  1177/2011  on  speeding  up  and 
clarifying  the  implementation  of  the  excessive  deficit  procedure  and  the 
directive  2011/85/EU  on  requirements  for  budgetary  frameworks  of  the 
member states (to be implemented before the end of 2013).
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comprehensive  –  though  incomplete,  given  the  further  measures  to 
come – reform of the SGP. Agreed in September 2011 according to the 
community method, it entered into force in December, and represents a 
formal amendment of the preventive and corrective arms of the SGP 
along with some further dispositions for member states.  48
Concerning  budgetary  discipline,  the  Six  Pack  formalizes  the 
introduction  of  the  European  Semester  into  the  EU  legislation;  it 
maintains all the provisions of the SGP concerning early warnings in 
case of significant deviation from the medium-term target and the EDP, 
though accelerating the timing and reinforcing the amount of sanctions 
to undisciplined countries (namely, sanctions are gradually delivered at 
an early stage of the EDP and not in the end); it provides new technical 
tools to measure growth of public expenditures in order to have more 
accurate  data  and  limit  the  possibilities  of  public  deficits  (i.e.  a 
benchmark is introduced to target public expenditure growth at a rate 
equal or lower than GDP’s expected growth); it includes further fines 
for countries misreporting their national data and the possibility for the 
Commission to enhance the surveillance over public finances through 
review missions of its staff  in European countries,  with the eventual 
presence of ECB’s staff in case of Eurozone member states. Moreover, 
unlike  previous  provisions  focusing  almost  exclusively  on  national 
deficits,  greater  attention is  devoted to countries  with high levels  of 
public debt. A progressive path towards debt reduction is foreseen in 
 For a comprehensive assessment of the novelties introduced in the secondary 48
legislation see the economic governance review of the European Commission 
(2014a).
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the legislative package through an operationalization of debt criteria, so 
as to enhance the sustainability of their public finances.49
More importantly, a proposed amendment in the voting system for the 
EDP represented a significant change in institutional rules. Before the 
reform,  members  of  the  Council  voted  to  deliver  sanctions  by 
approving  the  Commission’s  proposals  and  recommendations  by 
simple majority, which in 2003 made it possible to stop the sanctions 
proposed by the Commission against France and Germany. According 
to the “reversed qualified majority” (RQM) method established after 
the reforms, a majority vote is needed to block Commission proposals, 
rather  than  to  confirm them.  As  a  result,  the  process  of  imposing 50
sanctions, while not being completely automatic, is substantially more 
routine today than before the crisis. 
Official  proposals  for  a  Six  Pack  were  issued  by  the  European 
Commission in September 2010, during the second wave of the crisis, 
and were largely tailored on the VRTF’s report,  which represented a 
sort  of  non-formal  delimitation of  the  Commission’s  freedom in  the 
agenda-setting  phase.  On  the  base  of  the  VRTF  report,  indeed,  the 
Commission acknowledged what European governments were ready to 
accept in terms of fiscal rules’ reform, then it avoided to present a too 
ambitious  reform  package,  knowing  that  this  would  obtain  a  firm 
opposition by member States. In this sense, the institutional setting was 
functional in determining actors’ strategic behavior and in shaping the 
 Beyond the object of the case study but equally worth to be mentioned, two 49
regulations  of  the  Six  Pack  create  a  brand-new  Macroeconomic  Imbalance 
Procedure  in  the  framework  of  a  stricter  surveillance  of  macroeconomic 
imbalances  among  member  states,  by  taking  into  account  macroeconomic 
elements  such  as  external  imbalances,  competitiveness,  asset  prices,  and 
internal  and external  debt  (Geeroms et  al.  2014:  258-263).  The  aim of  these 
measures  is  to  alert  states,  and  eventually  sanction  them,  about  major 
macroeconomic  imbalances  that  can  mine  financial  stability  and  engender 
negative spillover effects among members, but they’ve not yet found concrete 
implementation.
 More precisely, if the Council does not vote nor approve a recommendation, 50
the Commission can – after a month – present the same recommendation and 
have it automatically adopted unless a majority vote of the Council refuses it 
within ten days. 
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information structure. The strategic interaction behind the adoption of 
the  legislative  package  partially  overcame  the  boundaries  of  fiscal 
policy,  overlapping  the  one  of  financial  support  to  troubled  states. 
Indeed,  initial  preferences of  actors made it  very difficult  to find an 
agreement with respect to the “automaticity” of sanctions in case of non 
compliance to the SGP’s provisions,  on their  timing and amount,  as 
well  as  on  the  balance  of  power  among  European  institutions  and 
states, and on their degree of flexibility in the elaboration of national 
budgets.
The tug-of-war over the Six Pack pitted the Commission, the European 
Parliament  and creditor  countries  plus  the  UK and the  ECB against 
debtor  countries.  Even  before  the  delivery  of  the  Commission’s 
proposals in July the German minister of finance sent a paper to his 
peers to claim the inclusion in the future revision of treaties of a clause 
for  politically  sanctioning  rule  breakers  through  the  suspension  of 
voting rights within the Council. That was probably an attempt to show 
how far Germany would go in order to affirm the necessity of fiscal 
discipline. A first comprehensive solution came in the agreement taken 
by  France  and  Germany  in  the  Deauville  meeting ,  one  of  the 51
milestones of the Eurozone crisis. In October, when the Irish banking 
system was on the brink of collapse, Chancellor Merkel renounced to 
automatic  sanctions  in  exchange  of  a  treaty  revision  which  would 
suspend  non-compliant  states’  voting  rights  within  the  Council 
(Euractiv 2010).  Of course, German concession was made in view of a 52
future renegotiation of treaties, which with hindsight never occurred in 
 The same meeting in which Angela Merkel agreed to create a non temporary 51
rescue  mechanism  in  exchange  of  the  involvement  of  private  sector  in  the 
eventual  default  of  Greece,  which  for  its  part  demonstrates  the  high 
interdependence among the issues at stake (see §5.3.3). 
 Interestingly,  Franco-German  compromise  of  October  18th  was  reached 52
between  Sarkozy  and  Merkel  in  Deauville  while  the  Ecofin  was  discussing 
SGP’s reform in Brussels. Hence, while the German-led coalition was fighting 
for  automatic  sanctions  in  Brussels,  German  delegation  discarded  its  own 
proposal  in  view  of  a  more  comprehensive  agreement  on  the  crisis 
management, with great surprise of Swedish, Finnish and Dutch negotiators, 
and  great  disappointment  of  ECB’s  President  Trichet  (Chaffin  and  Spiegel 
2010). 
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the way prospected in Deauville, and any voting limitation was never 
included in the EU legislation. However, though dropping claims for 
automatic penalties, the agreement opened up the space for the creation 
of the RQM voting system, thus the necessity to get a qualified majority 
within  the  Council  to  overrule  Commission’s  sanctions,  which  is 
nevertheless  ad  advancement  in  the  direction  of  automaticity  with 
respect  to  SGP’s  initial  provisions.  Moreover,  it  is  a  concrete 
enhancement  of  the  Commission’s  power  to  detriment  of  member 
states, which lose part of the power to limit the behavior of their agent. 
The  greater  “automaticity”  of  sanctions  can  even  be  seen  as  a 
delegation  to  supranational  institutions  of  control  over  the  concrete 
enforcement of legislative provisions. Such delegation can enhance the 
credibility  of  states’  engagement  (Pollack  2003),  limiting  de  facto  the 
possibility  for  member  states  to  indulge  reflexively  in  sub-optimal 
conduct.
The agreement in Deauville was the main framework of the would-be 
Six Pack. For its part the European Parliament, enjoying the co-decision 
legislative procedure providing a sort of veto on the package , boldly 53
intervened  in  the  negotiations  through  more  than  two  thousands 
amendments  to  the  Commission’s  text,  with  the  aim  of  providing 
automatic  sanctions  (Chaffin  2011)  in  line  with  EBC  and  creditor 
countries.  In  the  end,  the  RQM  voting  system  was  agreed  by  the 
parliament, that for its part obtained an earlier delivery of penalties for 
non-compliant  states  as  well  as  sanctions  for  countries  falsifying 
national statistics and greater transparency of the process.  Moreover, 
the Commission obtained from the Council  the possibility of getting 
broader informations from member states in order to closely monitor 
national fiscal evolutions.
 More precisely,  the EP enjoyed of the co-decision procedure only for four 53
legislative provisions out of six, but it managed to obtain a de facto veto power 
through the so-called strategy of cross-arena linkage, that is, dealing with all the 
legislative  issues  as  a  package  under  the  menace  of  blocking  the  whole 
legislative process (Héritier and and Schoeller, 2015).
!76
4.2.4. The Fiscal Compact
The “Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance”, better known 
as the Fiscal  Compact  is  the intergovernmental  agreement taken in 54
late 2011 and then signed the following March by 25 out of 27 members 
of the European Union (i.e. before Croatia’s accession). The UK and the 
Czech  Republic,  both  non-Eurozone  countries,  elected  not  to 
participate.  The Fiscal  Compact,  which entered into force in January 
2013,  formally  resides  outside  the  legislative  architecture  of  the  EU, 
being  an  international  treaty  voluntarily  signed  by  contracting 
countries to circumvent the longest – and politically fatiguing – process 
of  the  EU-treaty  reform.  The  result  is  a  somewhat  unusual  legal 55
creature, which runs separate and parallel to EU legal provisions, but at 
the  same  time  draws  upon  EU  structures  and  institutions  in  its 
enforcement phase.
In  general  terms,  the  Fiscal  Compact  does  not  provide  any  new 
measure of fiscal surveillance beyond those inserted in the Six Pack. 
Rather, its objective is to give them “more teeth at national level” (Buti 
and Carnot 2012:  907).  In other words,  the agreement tries to confer 
more visibility and credibility to national engagements in terms of fiscal 
consolidation. Needless to say, the treaty was forcefully advocated by 
Germany,  under  the  equation  that  more  solidarity  needs  more 
discipline (Baratta 2012). Indeed, the agreement came in the middle of 
one  of  the  worst  phases  of  the  Eurozone  crisis ,  at  a  time  when 56
European governments were struggling to restore market  confidence 
 The provisions on fiscal rules are just one part of the TSCG (Title III), but 54
being the most relevant section of the agreement it turned out to give its name.
 However, contracting parties pledge for the integration of the Fiscal Compact 55
in the EU legislation within five years (art. 16). Such a “repatriation clause” was 
demanded and obtained by the European Parliament, which did not participate 
to  the  negotiations  but  succeeded  in  putting  forward  another  strategy  of 
“linked  arena”  strategy  thanks  to  the  chronological  coincidence  of  Fiscal 
Compact  negotiations  and those  over  the  Two Pack (Héritier  and Schoeller, 
2015). For the reasons underlying the use of international law instead of EU 
legal framework, see infra.
 According  to  the  chronology  proposed,  the  Fiscal  Compact  was  adopted 56
during the fourth wave of the crisis (October - November 2011). 
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after  a  dramatic  summer  in  which  the  core  of  the  Eurozone  was 
attacked by speculation and just after the fears of a “Grexit” following 
the Greek referendum on membership of the Eurozone. 
The Fiscal Compact largely reproduces provisions of the Six Pack such 
as the statement of debt and deficit levels to be pursued, the system of 
reversed qualified majority and the respect of country-specific Medium 
Term  Objectives.  The  supposed  enhanced  credibility  –  on  which 
observers however have doubts (Feldstein 2012) which reality seems to 
confirm  (Godin  2014)  –  comes  from  the  obligation  for  contracting 
parties of inserting in national Constitutions the set of budget rules, to 
give  them  "binding  force  and  permanent  character,  preferably 
constitutional". The rules at stake, namely, are the limit of 0.5% of GDP 
every year of  the structural  deficit,  and the progressive reduction of 
debt stock of 1/20 of the amount exceeding 60% of GDP every year so 
as to converge towards the threshold of a sustainable debt. At the same 
time, the treaty imposes a sort of automatic corrective measures in case 
of non respect of its obligations, such as the block of national expenses. 
Another novelty, which is also a naiveté of the treaty, comes from the 
provision  of  empowering  the  EU  Court  of  Justice  (ECJ)  to  impose 
sanctions to those countries that do not respect treaty discipline, in a 
sort of external delegation of provision enforcement. Further, the treaty 
formalizes the Eurosummit meetings, which are to be held at least twice 
a year.
The  rationale  of  the  agreement,  then,  more  than  including  new 
provisions in terms of fiscal discipline, is one of trying to enhance the 
possibilities  of  having  them correctly  implemented  and enforced  by 
member  states,  which  all  through  the  crisis  often  promised  to 
undertake  costly  structural  reforms  without  following  through 
effectively. The insertion at constitutional level of those provisions, as 
well  as  the  empowerment  of  the  ECJ  in  the  monitoring  phase,  was 
thought  as  necessary  by  Germany  in  order  to  fight  against  moral 
hazard.  All  in  all,  according  to  Jean  Quatremer  (2012),  the  fiscal 
compact is just “a treaty aiming at reassuring markets”. 
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Negotiations  for  the  treaty  started  at  the  European  Council  of 
December  2011 ,  as  a  sort  of  fiscal  tightening  counterpart  for  the 57
anticipation of the establishment of the ESM (Council of the European 
Union 2011), and two main issues were at stake: the first concerning the 
form  to  be  taken  by  the  agreement  –  formal  EU  treaty  revision  or 
parallel  intergovernmental  agreement;  the  second  concerning 
provisions  of  the  central  part  of  the  agreement,  the  one  about  the 
enforcement of rules. Positions on the new treaty, as usual, were quite 
diversified (Quatremer 2011): needless to say, the treaty was strongly 
advocated by Angela Merkel, who desired an official treaty revision in 
order  to  calm  down  internal  opposition  (Hewitt  2013:214),  avoid 
antagonizing the German Constitutional Court (Bastasin 2012:209) and 
restore markets’ trust. Even though it was backed by most of EU peers, 
according to one diplomat, “no one else but Germany wanted it” (ibid: 
233). The sole explicit opposition came from UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron, who, miscalculating the German desire to revise treaties and 
threatening  a  formal  veto  on  them,  proposed  a  formal  protocol  to 
prevent the City from even stricter financial regulation in the future. 
Moreover, the UK argued for a return to the unanimity principle within 
the Council for issues related to the single market. That was too much 
for European partners, who agreed to conclude an intergovernmental 
agreement outside the EU framework to circumvent the British veto, 
which  concretely  isolated  the  UK.  Neither  Britain  nor  the  Czech 
Republic signed the treaty.  All in all, such choice helped states avoid a 58
longer  process  of  formal  treaty  modification,  and  all  the  associated 
political challenges.
 An apocalyptic climate characterized the meeting. During the preparation of 57
the meeting, aimed at demonstrating to markets that a concrete plan for Italy 
and Spain existed, leaders did not hide the stakes: according to Juppé, French 
foreign minister, “Peace in Europe was at stake”; Barroso argued that “We must 
do anything to save the Euro”, and Polish foreign minister warned that a break 
up of the Euro would be apocalyptic (Hewitt 2013: 219).
 For an authoritative reconstruction of the British affair on the Fiscal Compact, 58
see Hewitt (2013: 215-234). Beside, it is worth to observe that the choice of using 
international law instead of EU legal framework may not be a premeditated 
strategy  for  the  “re-intergovernmentalization”  of  Europe,  but  rather  a 
consequence of contingencies of the crisis (De Witte 2013).
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On  the  issues  tackled  by  the  fiscal  compact,  Germany  proposed  an 
effective “Germanization” of Europe (Bastasin 2012: 308), through the 
constitutional inclusion of the golden rule into national legislations and 
an automatic procedure to let ECJ enforce eventual infractions. As the 
new treaties passed through six different drafts, such dispositions were 
discussed and renegotiated, leading to a partial tightening and a partial 
watering  down  (Krillinger  2012).  To  start  with,  the  first  two  drafts 
contemplated  the  transpositions  of  the  treaty’s  dispositions  into 
“provisions of  a  constitutional  or  equivalent  nature”,  while  the final 
draft states that such transposition shall happen through “provisions of 
binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional”, thus 
letting  Ireland  use  an  extra-constitutional  transposition  to  avoid 
holding a referendum. Nevertheless, the Irish victory came at the price 
of  strict  conditionality  linking  future  assistance  by  ESM  to  the 
ratification of the treaty that, for its part, is a clear result for German 
negotiators. A partial watering-down with respect to the provisions of 
the Six Pack came with the elimination of the reverse qualified majority 
principle when it comes to decisions about debt criterion, a measure 
fiercely sustained by highly indebted countries, headed by Italy.
Concerning the role of ECJ, a first draft permitted any country to bring 
a case before the court  when in its  view another state had failed to 
comply with the its treaty obligations. A further tightening came when 
it was decided to allow the Commission to bring case before the court 
of  its  own  volition.  However,  the  final  draft  (art.  8)  states  that  the 
Commission can only issue a report, and when confirming the incorrect 
application of norms, only states may bring a case before the Court, 
which  represents  an  element  of  flexibility  and  politicization  in  the 
system. That  is,  the depoliticized process of  external  delegation to a 
supranational institution in the enforcement phase comes only after a 
politicized step, i.e. the decision by a member state to bring the case 
before ECJ.
All in all, a general assessment on the new treaty has two consider two 
contradicting  aspects.  On the  one  hand,  the  presence  of  an  external 
enforcement mechanism – in the form of the ECJ – is a clear success for 
creditor countries and for those institutions seeking binding fiscal rules. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  certain  ambiguity  resides  in  the  definition  of 
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public  finance  objectives ,  and  the  eternal  presence  of  justifying 59
“exceptional  circumstances”  makes  the  fiscal  compact  a  binding 
agreement,  but  with  substantive  escape  clauses  for  member  states. 
Again, ambiguous definitions and the possibility of open interpretation 
bring about low possibilities of straightforward enforcement of rules, to 
the  detriment  of  the  quality  of  institutional  change.  Acknowledging 
these  features,  financial  markets  quickly  discarded  the  agreement, 
which in hindsight turned out to be minimally effective treaty. 
4.2.5. The Two Pack
While the Eurozone approached the edge of the abyss in late 2011 and 
states struggled over the creation of the Fiscal Compact, the European 
Commission issued two proposals for a further enhancement of the Six 
Pack, given the shortcomings that emerged in those months, namely 
the  scarce  level  of  compliance  of  member  states  of  the  measures 
suggested by the European executive. The set of two new regulations , 60
widely known as the “Two Pack” came into force in May 2013, after a 
process  of  negotiation  which  took  place  under  the  terms  of  the 
community method.
The  two  regulations  provide  extra  coordination  and  monitoring  of 
member  states’  fiscal  policy,  building  on  and  complementing  the 
previous  measures  of  the  Six  Pack  (European  Commission  2013a, 
2014b), and they apply exclusively to Eurozone members and to those 
states under (or  having just  exited)  programs of  financial  assistance, 
including  precautionary  assistance.  Completing  the  annual  timeline 
initiated by the European Semester,  the Two Pack assures that states 
present to the Commission on October 15th a preliminary draft of their 
annual budget, which is then discussed within the Ecofin, and then an 
opinion is issued by the Commission by the end of November. In case 
of severe non-compliance with the obligations under the Stability and 
 The Fiscal Compact does not solve the recurrent ambiguity given by the lack 59
of a clear-cutting definition of “structural balanced budget”, a concept largely 
residing in subjective and contingent appreciations.
 The Two Pack is composed by the regulations n. 472/2013 and n. 473/2013.60
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Growth Pact, the Commission can ask the member state concerned to 
submit  a  revised  plan,  before  the  final  approval  in  the  national 
parliament  by  the  end  of  the  year.  If  coordination  takes  place  in 61
spring,  then,  autumn  brings  about  an  enhanced  surveillance  over 
national budgets.
Moreover, specific measures are designed for member states under EDP 
–  who  are  obliged  to  submit  a  detailed  plan  of  structural  reforms 
envisaged to reduce deficits in a lasting way – as well as those under 
precautionary assistance, and the ESM’s financial assistance program, 
including those having just exited such a program. For these states, this 
enhanced  surveillance  involves  regular  review  missions  from  the 
Commission  and  the  submission  of  full  macroeconomic  adjustment 
programs. In the initial proposal of the Commission, which attempted 
to coordinate EU legislation with the provisions in the Fiscal Compact, 
a requirement to include the “golden rule” of a balanced budget within 
national legislation was presented, although this was excluded in the 
final text. 
As one might expect, the Commission’s proposal, as had been the case 
with the Six Pack, sought to enhance as much as possible its role vis-à-
vis member states, through an unaccountable system of budget revision 
which gave to the Commission a sort of veto on national budget laws, 
which was naturally opposed by the member states. They forwarded 
counter-proposals  to  engender  some  balance  and  flexibility  in  the 
system, i.e. a heavier role for the Ecofin and the European Council in 
the assessment of the validity of national budget rules. Despite these 
disagreements,  a  preliminary  agreement  within  the  Council  was 
reached  relatively  easily,  and  a  common  position  was  issued  three 
months after the Commission’s proposals, in February 2012.
 In view of the ultimate vote of national Parliaments over budget, according to 61
the European Commission (2013), “the Two Pack does not give the Commission 
the right to change draft national budgets, nor does it create the obligation for 
Member  states  to  strictly  follow  the  Commission's  opinion”.  Concretely, 
though, the Commission has a sort of near-veto on national budgets, especially 
towards those states weakened by fiscal troubles.
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Being the Two Pack voted by the co-decision procedure, the preferences 
of the European Parliament over the final outcome of the negotiations 
was fundamental.  In this respect, position of the EP was consistent the 62
one taken during the negotiations for the Six Pack, when it sought a 
greater  degree  of  democratic  control  and  accountability  from  the 
Commission,  along  with  measures  to  “ring  fence”  social  policies 
against  indiscriminate  budget  cuts  and  peculiar  attention  toward 
economic growth (i.e.  less emphasis on extreme austerity) (European 
Parliament  2012a).  The  EP’s  amendments  to  the  Commission’s 
proposals included a roadmap toward the creation of Eurobonds, the 
establishment  of  a  European  Debt  Redemption  Fund  to  mutualize 
ratios  of  national  debt  exceeding  60%  of  GDP,  and  a  program  of 
significant  infrastructure  investment.  In  order  to  counter-balance  the 
empowerment  of  the  Commission  on  the  monitoring  of  national 
budgets, the EP proposed a strict collaboration between the European 
executive and national parliaments, so as to create a collaborative and 
democratic  dialogue  among  institutions  at  stake,  including  the  EP 
(Kovacheva 2012).  Lastly,  the EP defended the presence of  the RQM 
within the Council in all those aspects related to the budgetary process. 
As a result of these contrasting positions, the negotiation process was 
difficult. It took one year and a half years, and seven trialogues among 
European institutions to strike the final deal in February 2013, which 
opened the way for the final approval of the regulations in May.
The  final  compromise  concerned  two  main  issues:  the  level  of 
sovereignty  erosion  in  budgetary  surveillance  measures,  and  the 
proposed countermeasures to the austerity-focused legislative package. 
On the first issue, a degree of flexibility was built in to the legislation. 
No formal obligation for states to comply with measures suggested by 
the  Commission  in  the  budget  drafting  is  included,  and  if  a  state 
chooses to ignore Commission advice and “play hard” with markets, it 
is  free  to  do  so.  Moreover,  states  that  do  not  break  fiscal  rules  are 
 For sure, the position here recalled is not the one of the whole Parliament, but 62
that sorted out within the two committees charged of the analysis of the texts 
(The  Ferreira  and  Gauzès  committees,  from  the  names  of  the  rapporteurs). 
Indeed,  the intra-EP discussions were quite politicized on the cleavage over 
austerity. For a closer analysis of MEPs voting behavior, see Schwarzer 2014. 
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completely free to choose how to allocate national resources. In the end, 
an individual state’s room to manoeuvre is directly proportioned to its 
fiscal health: the worse the state’s financial situation, the more intrusive 
the  Commission’s  surveillance  (De la  Parra  2013).  Indeed,  given the 
Two Pack is particularly focused on troubled states, they remain in a 
very difficult position, and non-compliance triggers systems of closer 
and  closer  surveillance  restricting  countries’  leeways  (ibid.).  The 
Commission can decide to put non-compliant states under enhanced 
surveillance, up to suspending all financial assistance in case of severe 
non-compliance under financial assistance programs.
On the other hand, a compromise was finally reached in the balance 
between attention to  fiscal  discipline  and growth stimulus  and debt 
mutualisation,  strongly  claimed  by  the  EP.  In  this  respect,  the  final 
compromise was found on the basis of a Commission’s commitment to 
elaborate an official feasibility study on a European Redemption Fund – 
which  in  turn  is  strongly  opposed by  some member  states  (Chaffin 
2013).  Concretely,  the  Commission  won  the  resistances  of  the 
parliament  by  committing  itself  in  initiating  a  process  of  debt 
mutualisation that will hardly be implemented in the next future. All in 
all, then, austerity-led measures and fiscal consolidation won – at least 
on the short-time – over financial solidarity.  Anyway, the parliament 
obtained some concrete results on transparency (De la Parra 2013): the 
“economic  dialogue”  among  institutions  is  confirmed  and  the 
Commission  has  to  provide  explicit  reasons  behind  its  decisions  on 
national  budget  processes.  Moreover,  some claims coming from left-
wing  MEPs  were  accepted,  such  as  the  defense  of  healthcare  and 
education in the processes of national fiscal consolidation. 
4.3. Empirical assessment of hypotheses: The case of fiscal rules
The case study on fiscal rules is particularly significant for the empirical 
assessment  of  the  leading  hypotheses,  given  its  specific  features. 
Indeed, among the three case studies, it is the only policy which was 
duly structured even before the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis. In this 
sense,  the  empirical  observation  of  events  makes  it  easier  to  assess 
eventual variations on outcomes while confronting the two periods. As 
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a  result,  the  three  hypotheses  will  be  tested  with  reference  to  the 
variations that occurred between the pre-crisis period (1999-2008)  and 63
the crisis period (2009-2014), so as to confirm or disprove them.
4.3.1. Hypothesis n.1
The first hypothesis asserts that “an economic crisis is fundamental in 
the  determination  of  major  institutional  changes,  in  terms  of  their 
quantity and quality”, that is to say that policy making is multiplied 
during economic downturns in order to cope with emerging problems.
Before the beginning of the crisis, fiscal obligations were dictated by the 
SGP, created in 1997. Scholars agree that following reforms to the pact 
in 2005 its controls were diminished, through the introduction of the 
concepts of structural balance and “national individual circumstances”. 
In  the  period  1999-2008,  then,  there  was  no  real  pressure  on  policy 
makers  to  strictly  observe fiscal  rules.  On the  contrary,  if  a  political 
challenge  presented  itself,  the  rules  were  relaxed,  rather  than 
reinforced.  Moreover,  in  practice  rules  were  not  enforced,  since 
sanctions on rule breakers were never imposed, because of opposition 
from within the Council. 
By way of contrast, between 2009-2014, a multiplication of legislative 
outputs  was  deliberately  agreed  in  order  to  manage  the  crisis  and 
prevent  the  outburst  of  new  ones.  In  fact,  more  change  has  been 
initiated since 2009 than in the entire decade previous. The Six Pack and 
Two  Pack  which  both  contained  several  measures  of  secondary 
legislation – and Euro Plus Pact and Fiscal Compact intergovernmental 
agreements,  which  also  determined the  inclusion of  fiscal  rules  into 
national  legislation,  were  significant.  In  general  terms,  the  Eurozone 
crisis shaped the environment by “obliging” European actors to take 
action against the crisis itself. In that sense, it restricted actors’ available 
actions while confronting them with fiscal rules: if before the crisis they 
were  divided  over  the  possibility  of  reinforcing  or  relaxing  fiscal 
obligations, during  the crisis the only available action appeared to be 
 The SGP was agreed in 1997, but its concrete implementation started in 1999 63
with the creation of the Monetary Union.
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tightening. Cleavages among actors certainly existed in the post-crisis 
period, but only in so far as the degree and modalities of tightening were 
concerned.
Moreover, the crisis exercised a tangible pressure on policy makers, and 
even chronologically speaking, one can find a close connection between 
the  crisis  pressure  and  the  outputs  adopted.  Indeed,  major  outputs 
were adopted when the crisis hit  the hardest,  that is,  during “peak” 
moments  of  the  crisis.  Clearly,  for  those  outputs  adopted  via  the 
community  method,  one  has  to  consider  the  date  of  their  initial 
proposal, rather than the one of of final agreement, since the legislative 
procedure  is  time-consuming.  In  this  perspective,  the  Commission’s 
proposal  for  a  European  Semester  came  in  May  2010  (European 
Commission 2010), during the first wave of the crisis; it was approved 
just  a  few months  later  and immediately  implemented at  beginning 
2011.  During  the  second  wave  of  the  crisis  (last  quarterly  of  2010) 
proposals for the Six Pack were issued. When it comes to the Two Pack, 
the proposal  originated in the dramatic  phase of  October-November 
2011  (European  Commission  2011a)  considered  as  a  the  necessary 
amendment of the existing fiscal framework. 
Concerning the  Fiscal  Compact,  again,  its  necessity  began to  be  felt 
during  the  same  phase  of  late  2011,  and  its  negotiations  were 
unprecedentedly quick. Observers agree that the new treaty’s vocation 
was  twofold:  internally,  it  was  meant  to  “constitutionalize”  rules  of 
fiscal discipline, and externally it aimed at reassuring markets that EU 
would not produce another Greece (Quatremer, 2012). Even the formal 
veto of the UK was not an insurmountable obstacle to the agreement, 
which was finally settled just three months later.
Seen this way, and considering the complex path leading to the new 
fiscal rules in 2009-2014, the first hypothesis of the research is proved 
true. Market pressure on decision makers, unprecedentedly high in the 
history  of  the  common  currency,  shaped  policy  options,  making  it 
necessary  for  leaders  to  create  and  implement  new  rules  of  fiscal 
discipline,  according to  the  dominant  idea that  fiscal  rigidity  would 
help  calm  down  markets,  re-establishing  a  normal  course  for  the 
European economy. Indeed, major outputs occurred when the crisis hit 
the most, showing that crisis exercised a pressing functional demand 
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for  a  concrete  policy  change  (see  appendix,  fig.  a4).  Crisis,  then, 64
shaped the  environment  in  two different  ways:  on  the  one  hand,  it 
restricted  actors’  available  actions,  making  it  somehow necessary  to 
tighten fiscal rules, and obliging states to negotiate how to change rules, 
rather than whether to do so. On the other hand the crisis, through the 
fundamental role played by financial markets and perfectly illustrated 
by the course of spreads among sovereigns and of CDS’ co-variation, 
exercised concrete pressure on policy makers even in terms of timing, 
dictating the timing of reforms, which for a great part were elaborated 
during the phases of major instability and undertook a quick decision 
making process.
Finally, the comparison among the pre- and post-crisis period shows 
how  much,  taking  actors’  preferences  as  fixed,  a  change  in  the 
environment  produced decidedly  different  outcomes,  confirming the 
hypothesis that such independent variable plays a fundamental role in 
determining, at least, the quantity of outcomes. Moreover, confirming 
an assumption drawn by distributional rational choice institutionalism, 
institutional  change  occurs  when  an  external  shock  determines  a 
redistribution  of  power  and  resources  in  the  system.  Indeed, 
distributional implications were behind the renegotiation of fiscal rules 
discipline: namely, the crisis increased the fear of guaranteeing fiscal 
transfers  to  distressed  states,  making  it  necessary  to  rewrite 
institutional  rules,  and during  the  process  asymmetries  of  resources 
were functional to the definition of final outcomes. 
4.3.2. Hypothesis n.2
The second hypothesis of the dissertation inquires on the eventual role 
existing  between  decision  making  processes  and  successful/
unsuccessful nature of outcomes. In particular,  the hypothesis claims 
that  intergovernmental  decision  making  would  bring  about  just 
 In particular, when considering the outputs adopted by community method 64
(e.g. European Semester, Six Pack and Two Pack), the European Commission 
initiated the process during a crisis “peak”; while the negotiations for the Fiscal 
Compact, adopted by intergovernmental decision making, were substantially 
initiated during a phase of major market pressure.
!87
incremental and ineffective policy outcomes, including the possibility 
of institutional deadlocks, while supranational decision making, on the 
contrary,  would  produce  successful  outcomes  and  solve  eventual 
institutional deadlocks. That is to say that the outcomes of negotiation 
processes are not  a  pure reflection of  actors’  bargaining powers,  but 
they  are  mediated  by  the  existing  institutional  setting.  Institutions, 
then, coordinate actors’ behavior toward certain outcomes and shape 
the information structure.
In order to prove or confirm the causal link between decision making 
procedures  and  the  quality  of  outcomes,  a  first  preliminary  step  to 
assess the effective/ineffective nature of the outcomes observed. As it is 
out  of  the  scope  of  the  dissertation  to  provide  a  comprehensive 
assessment of the long-term impact of new fiscal rules adopted – which, 
however, would be very partial given the short distance of time passed 
since  their  effective  implementation  –  their  effectiveness  can  be 
appreciated  in  light  of  the  possibility  of  their  concrete  enforcement. 
That is,  though overlooking whether states complied or not to fiscal 
provisions, a certain policy outcome will be considered as effective if it 
presents an easy possibility of enforcement. In this sense, in line with 
what  already  stated,  the  former  rules  of  SGP  of  1997  were  hardly 
effective.  Concrete  application  of  sanctions  never  occurred.  On the 65
other hand, at least in theory, the concrete enforcement of the Six Pack 
and the Two Pack, given the quasi-automatic sanctions and restricted 
flexibility of rules, appears to be easier than before. Moreover, one can 
say that the gradual transformation of fiscal rules was incrementally 
successful: if the European Semester alone was insufficient, and the Six 
Pack still showed some shortcomings, the application of the Two Pack 
seems to complete a coherent framework of fiscal surveillance that has 
more possibilities to correctly orient states’ fiscal conduct in the whole 
budget cycle.
 The  fact  of  not  having  penalties  delivered  can  be  seen  as  a  sign  of  the 65
effectiveness of  the policy,  whose rules would arguably prevent undesirable 
fiscal behavior. Anyway, we know that sanctions were proposed by European 
Commission,  but  the  Council  expressed  negative  advice  to  such 
recommendations, neutralizing de facto the power of rules.
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When it comes to decision making processes, it has to be noticed that 
the  SGP  was  the  result  of  a  pure  intergovernmental  agreement 
occurring at the level of the European Council on the initiative of the 
German  finance  minister  Theo  Waigel  in  1995,  which  resulted  in  a 
preliminary agreement at the European Council in Madrid in 1995, then 
confirmed in December 1996 in Dublin and finally agreed in the two 
regulations of the Council in July 1997 (Clergerie et al. 2008: 470-471), 
and integrated as a protocol to the EU treaties. Concretely, then, states 
themselves  elaborated  rules  that  would  bind  their  hands  in  fiscal 
matters, which for sure resulted in a poorly successful agreement. There 
is a subtle paradox behind the creation of the SGP. The pact, indeed, 
was created in view of  the launch of  the common currency because 
some states were genuinely worried about the fiscal performances of 
already indebted states – it is not a case that the proposal for a fiscal 
pact came from Germany. Nonetheless, the necessity of obtaining the 
unanimity within the Council, as well as the exclusion of supranational 
institutions from the elaboration of  the policy,  determined a broadly 
ineffective policy outcome, and actually the pact could not prevent the 
outburst of a fiscal crisis in Europe a decade later.
If  unanimity regime had been required even for  the process  of  SGP 
revision, the result would have been probably the same. Instead, what 
we  have  seen  is  that  the  Parliament,  the  Commission  and  the  ECB 
strongly  supported  a  real  tightening  of  rules,  and  they  boldly 
intervened in  the  reform of  the  pact,  thanks  to  the  adoption  of  the 
community  method.  As  a  consequence,  the  voting  system  required 
within the Council was not the unanimity, but the “simple” qualified 
majority. In this sense, even if a compromise was certainly necessary to 
recompose inner cleavages within the Council – flexibility vs discipline 
– it was more difficult to completely water-down fiscal provisions. By 
consequence,  then,  the  fact  of  having  the  SGP’s  reform  under  the 
community  method  was  effectively  functional  to  more  concrete 
possibilities of rule enforcement.
To be more precise, it has to be noticed that in the broad framework of 
the  community  method,  which  involves  the  agreement  of  both 
governments  and of  supranational  institutions  for  the  adoption of  a 
policy outcome, EU institutions pushed for a real tightening of rules, 
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while European governments’  intervention was more functional  to a 
watering down of rules. Indeed, the agreement in Deauville between 
Germany and France eliminated the possibility of automatic sanctions, 
pledged by European institutions, instead; Italy forcefully obtained the 
elimination of the RQM in case of assessments on debt criteria. Ireland, 
for  its  part,  strongly  claimed  for  the  consideration  of  the  “quasi-
constitutional level” when it comes to the transposition of the rule of 
balanced  budget  into  national  legislation.  Given  that  fiscal  policy 
represents a state’s primary means to implement national welfare and 
redistribution  objectives,  governments  understandably  remain  quite 
protective of their fiscal freedom, and quite reticent to surrender their 
sovereignty to supranational institutions.
To return to the point, it is possible to find a certain link between the 
procedures of decision making and the effectiveness of outcomes, when 
it  comes  to  the  adoption  of  fiscal  rules.  Namely,  while  a  pure 
intergovernmental  decision  making  process  underpinned  the 
ineffectiveness of the original SGP, the community method informing 
the 2005 reform seems to have provided more possibilities to improve 
rule design. However, as the analysis has shown, the reform does not 
guarantee a perfect enforcement of rules, mainly due to ambiguity and 
a degree of flexibility possible in their application. That is, the set of 
new  institutional  rules  is  not  unequivocally  designed  for  a  purely 
effective fiscal framework, but they sketch out an ambiguous system. 
All in all, then, we can argue for a quasi-successful outcome, which was 
incrementally ameliorated through the successive amendment of rules, 
that is, through the passage from the European Semester, to the SixPack 
and finally the TwoPack. This pattern suggests the necessity of a partial 
refinement of the hypothesis, i.e. supranational decision making does 
not immediately provide successful outcomes, but they may undertake 
an amendment process to get better.
Moreover,  according  to  the  reconstruction,  the  margins  of  flexibility 
were largely due to member states’ intervention, aimed at protecting 
their freedom in fiscal matters and budgeting processes. In this sense, 
the intergovernmental components of the community method, i.e. the 
vote within the Council, was functional to a certain watering down of 
rules,  while  the  supranational  component,  i.e.  the  Commission’s 
!90
proposal  and  the  EP  intervention,  was  more  prone  to  an  effective 
tightening of rules. 
In  the  light  of  empirical  observation,  then,  the  second hypothesis  is 
partially confirmed: if it is true that intergovernmental decision making 
prevents the adoption of effective outcomes , a supranational decision 66
making  process  is  not  sufficient  to  obtain  such  effectiveness,  as  a 
necessary recomposition of interests in the community method opens 
up the space for ambiguous measures. Such ambiguity, considered as a 
quasi-successful outcome, may result in an amendment process, i.e. the 
adoption of successive outcomes to ameliorate those already adopted.
The hypothesis, however, can be completed by an observation. That is, 
if it doesn’t result a perfect linearity between decision making processes 
and  quality  of  outcomes,  the  successful  nature  of  policy  outcomes 
seems to  reside  in  other  institutional  features.  Namely,  in  the  set  of 
institutional rules governing the management of the policy, rather than 
its  creation.  That  is,  fiscal  rules  appear  to  be  more  effective  if 
supranational  actors  boldly  intervene  in  the  application  phase. 
Otherwise,  if  states  are  left  free  to  carry  out  the  whole  policy 
management,  they operate  in the sense of  letting fiscal  rules  be less 
binding and almost  unenforceable.  In this  perspective,  supranational 
decision making is not sufficient in order to get effective outcomes, but it 
is necessary to have also a supranational management of the policy in 
order to improve the margin of its effectiveness.
All  in  all,  then,  institutional  rules  are  fundamental  components  in 
mediating the quality of policy outcomes in different ways, and for the 
case at stake they not only intervene in the decision making procedures, 
but also in the phase of their effective enforcement. Concerning the case 
of fiscal rules, then, the second hypothesis can be restated as follows: 
Intergovernmental  policy  making  tends  to  have  incremental  and 
ineffective  policy  outputs  and  to  create  institutional  deadlocks; 
 A confirmation of this aspect comes from the elaboration process of the Fiscal 66
Compact,  which saw the  formal  veto  of  UK,  which was  able  to  potentially 
create  an  institutional  deadlock.  Indeed,  while  Germany  aimed  at  formally 
reforming  EU  Treaties,  the  necessity  of  having  unanimity  prevented  such 
reform, which resulted in a simple intergovernmental agreement.
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conversely, supranational policy making tends to have more successful 
and  more  effective  outputs,  which  might  be  eventually  completed  and 
ameliorated  through  policy  amendment,  but  additional  supranational 
management of the policy is necessary in order to improve the effectiveness of 
policy outcomes.
4.3.3. Hypothesis n.3
The empirical  observation of  the transformation of  fiscal  rules offers 
material to test the third hypothesis, according to which, “In the case of 
policy failure due to irreconcilable conflicting interests or institutional 
deadlocks,  a process of delegation to a neutral – i.e.  supranational – 
actor occurs, resulting in an empowerment of supranational institutions 
vis-à-vis  member  states.”.  In  the  case  of  fiscal  discipline,  the  policy 
failure at stake is the complete inadequacy of the SGP to prevent a fiscal 
crisis  and  a  contagion  throughout  the  Eurozone.  Indeed,  provisions 
agreed in 1997 and then reformed in 2005, proved to be insufficient to 
firmly  bind  states’  behavior.  Namely,  the  presence  of  a  number  of 
escape clauses, of a substantial veto of the Council against Commission 
recommendations, and the fact of relying for the most part on a non-
binding system of intergovernmental coordination on fiscal discipline, 
instead  of  having  binding  rules,  made  the  SGP  a  barely  effective 
instrument of fiscal discipline.  The Eurozone crisis,  anyway, came to 
partially subvert such non optimal equilibrium.
The  progressive  reform of  the  SGP followed a  clear  trajectory.  As  a 
general  rule,  there  was  no real  new provision in  terms of  the  fiscal 
macro–prudential  limits  on  set  (the  threshold  of  3%  in  the  ratio  of 
deficit  and  GDP  and  the  one  of  60%  for  debt  remain  untouched. 
However,  there is significantly more emphasis on the instruments of 
fiscal policy coordination, on monitoring and fiscal surveillance, as well 
as on the respect of the effective implementation of rules into national 
boundaries  and  on  the  enforcement  of  the  sanctions’  framework, 
through  a  different  vote  system  within  the  Council  and  the 
involvement  of  institutions  such  as  the  ECJ.  As  a  result,  the  “new” 
Stability Pact is more stringent for members of the Eurozone, and the 
enforcement  tools  are  less  discretionary and less  politicized.  Even if 
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there is still some flexibility in the Pact, the underlying fil rouge of its 
reform  was  precisely  one  of  de-politicizing  the  rules’  enforcement 
phase, making it less discretionary and less politically involved. To this 
aim,  the  rule  of  RQM  was  crafted,  and  two  technical  bodies  were 
empowered, i.e. the Commission and the ECJ.
If it  is true that, at least concerning fiscal rules, the Commission lost 
part  of  its  power  of  agenda  setting  through  the  creation  of  an 
intergovernmental  task  force  for  the  reform of  the  SGP and for  the 
active  role  of  member  states  in  orienting  the  elaboration  of 
Commission’s proposals, the European executive saw during the crisis 
a  substantial  increase  of  its  competencies  in  the  area  of  fiscal 
surveillance (Bauer and Becker 2014). In particular, the Commission has 
today the power of managing the ex ante phase of budget coordination 
in line with the dispositions of the European Semester. Furthermore, it 
has greater role in the delivering of sanctions against  non-compliant 
member states, which kicks in at an earlier stage. Moreover, it achieved 
a  sort  of  near-veto  on  national  budgeting  processes,  which  is  even 
increased in case of countries in fiscal troubles. Lastly, members of the 
Commission can now hold review missions on member states, which 
for their part have the obligation of reporting more and more precise 
data and statistics. Alongside all this, it has to be noticed that staff of 
the European Commission remains part of the so-called Troika, which 
has been accused of undermining national sovereignty and challenging 
democratic legitimacy when operating in those states under financial 
aid programs. 
Such  empowerment  came  through  the  creation  of  new  rules  (e.g. 
review missions of Commission staff; creation of ex ante coordination of 
budget drafting), or through the slight transformation of new ones (e.g. 
the passage from a qualified majority within the Council required for 
the approval of sanctions to a qualified majority for opposing penalties 
delivery; anticipation of the phase of sanction delivery), showing that 
even  small  changes  in  institutional  rules  can  have  major  impact  on 
overall policies. 
Moreover,  the  Commission  was  not  the  only  technical  and 
supranational body that was empowered. For the first time, indeed, an 
intergovernmental agreement felt the necessity of involving the ECJ in 
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the monitoring of contracting parties’ compliance to the provisions of 
the agreement. In line with the Fiscal Compact, indeed, the Court in 
Luxembourg monitors whether or not states transpose the obligation of 
a balanced budget in the national legislation, though this passage can 
only  be  requested  by  member  states  and  not  autonomously  by  the 
European Commission.
The rationale  behind the  empowerment  of  these  institutions,  in  line 
with  principal-agent  theories,  is  to  provide  credibility  to  policies, 
especially  when  it  comes  to  the  effective  implementation  of  rules 
agreed, as strongly claimed by the coalition of creditor countries and 
European  institutions.  Indeed,  their  essentially  technocratic  nature 
allowed these bodies to be viewed as impartial by member states, and 
technically  capable  of  conducting  sensitive  assessments  in  a 
depoliticized process of budget surveillance. In this sense, the policy is 
internally more credible, that is, the commitment of states is perceived 
to be more stringent in front of their peers. This is understood to apply 
now to all states, weak and strong. The highly politicized betrayal of 
the spirit of collective discipline by France and Germany in 2003 shows 
how sorely such a stringent process was needed. Moreover, given the 
main  reason  underlying  the  reform  of  the  SGP  was  to  restore 
confidence  to  financial  markets,  delegation  of  compliance  to 
supranational institutions – rather than trust on peer pressure and non-
binding objectives – decidedly helped in enhancing the credibility of 
states’  commitments towards even external  actors worried about the 
credibility of states’ commitments. 
All in all, then, the progressive reform of the pact, consisting in several 
and different institutional changes, confirms the third hypothesis, i.e. in 
front of a policy failure, states accept delegation of the management of 
policy  (in  this  case  the  entire  phase  of  compliance  surveillance)  to 
supranational institutions, in order to make the policy more credible, 
both internally and externally. As discussed below, this can seen as a 
substantive advancement of the integration process.
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4.4. A more supranational policy? An assessment
A final assessment to be made with regard to the progressive change of 
fiscal  policy  concerns  the  comparison  of  the  overall  level  of 
supranationalization of the policy before and after the Eurozone crisis, by 
applying the index elaborated in the methodological section, so as to 
confirm or disprove the overall conjecture of the dissertation that major 
economic  crises  trigger  a  process  of  supranationalization  of  the 
European polity.
In  order  to  do  this,  it  is  necessary  to  appreciate  and  situate  some 
indicators  along  the  continuum  spanning  from  a  completely 
intergovernmental  policy up to a  completely supranational  one.  The 
dimensions at stake are (1) the width of the supranational management 
of the policy; (2) the power of supranational institutions in the policy 
and (3) the presence of supranational instruments or mechanism. Each 
one of them is composed by different indicators, whose value can span 
from a very low level of supranationalization (n. 1 in the scale 1 to 5), 
up to a very high one (level 5 in the scale),  or an intermediate level 
(level 2 representing a low-to-medium level; 3 as a medium level; 4 as 
medium-to-high  level  of  supranationalization).  Thanks  to  a 
comprehensive  analysis  of  the  indicators,  the  single  policy  can  be 
situated more or less close to one of the poles of the continuum, and by 
comparing the situation in the two periods (before/after the crisis) one 
can appreciate any eventual variation.
Concerning  the  rules  of  fiscal  discipline,  the  three  dimensions  are 
declined into different policy specific indicators. Concerning the width 
of  supranational  management  of  the  crisis,  I  will  assess  the  level  of 
supranationalization of the policy with respect to the phases of agenda-
setting, policy formulation, implementation and evaluation, in line with 
the  heuristic  policy  cycle  approach  proposed  by  scholarship  (Jones 
1970;  Anderson  1975).  With  respect  to  the  power  of  supranational 
institutions,  I  will  situate  on the  scale  the  intensity  of  delegation of 
competencies, the politicization of the policy and the overall room for 
manoeuvre  left  to  member  states.  Finally,  I  will  evaluate  the 
supranational  character  of  any  supranational  institutional  setting, 
mechanism or peculiar  procedure of  the policy.  Being absent for the 
policy  at  stake  an ad  hoc  mechanism (such as  the  ESM for  financial 
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assistance or the Single Supervisory Mechanism for the banking union), 
I  will  consider  the  eventual  supranationalization  of  a  peculiar 
procedure which is the one of excessive deficit (EDP), with regard to its 
evolution before and after the crisis.
The  table  (table  n.2)  restates  the  values  of  the  different  indicators 
identified, including the overall level of each of the three categories of 
indicators in the two periods considered. As it can be easily recognized, 
though  not  becoming  completely  supranational,  the  fiscal  policy 
undertook a  process  of  non negligible  supranationalization,  for  each 
one of the three dimensions analyzed. The overall management of the 
policy cycle underwent a sclerotic transformation: on the one hand, a 
certain intergovernamentalism persisted for what concern the phase of 
agenda-setting – in which the European Council maintained a certain 
relevance and set up an intergovernmental task force to detriment of 
the  Commission  –  and  in  the  one  of  policy  formulation  – 
intergovernmental  agreements  intervened  in  the  process,  member 
states led some phases of the policy formulation through formal and 
informal intervention, and the overall  bargaining process was highly 
sensitive to inner cleavages among member states.
Nevertheless, the progressive transformation occurred did increase the 
rate of supranationalism of the policy in the two other key aspects here 
considered. Namely the implementation phase and the evaluation one. 
Concerning the former, a new implementation phase was created, the 
one of the ex ante coordination through the European Semester; and the 
aspects  of  compliance  and  enforcement  were  strongly  revised  in  a 
supranational perspective, by empowering the European Commission – 
which saw a counterbalance of its loss of agenda-setting powers (Bauer 
and Becker 2014). Concerning the evaluation phase, even if the Ecofin 
can still evaluate countries’ fiscal performance, the Commission again 
obtained indisputably more powers in the overall assessment of states’ 
behavior, that resulted in an increase of the rate of supranationalism.
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* The value of supranationalization is to be considered as the inverse of the hypothetic 
value of the indicator (e.g. a low level of politicization corresponds to a high level of 
supranationalization).
Table 2. Policy of fiscal discipline: Index of supranationalization .
Secondly, the power of supranational institutions rose from a medium-
to-low level (2.2) up to a medium-to-high (4). That is, they passed from 
a  setting  in  which  they  were  scarcely  involved  and  with  very  low 
powers, to one in which they are much more relevant and powerful. 
Such increase was determined by new institutional arrangements, such 
as  the  RQM, which considerably  restricted member  states’  room for 
manoeuvre and the overall flexibility of the system, which was at the 
basis of the precedent policy failure of the SGP. In particular, a double 
delegation of competencies toward the Commission and the ECJ in the 
phase  of  enforcement  of  rules  and  compliance  monitoring,  a 
depoliticization of the policy through semi-automatic sanctions and a 
BEFORE 
THE CRISIS
AFTER THE 
CRISIS
- Agenda-setting 2 2
- Policy formulation 2 3
- Implementation 2 4
- Evaluation 2 4
= (1) SUPRANATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THE POLICY 2 3.25
- Delegation of competencies 2 4
- Policy politicization* 3 4
- states’ room for manouevre* 3 4
= (2) POWER OF SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS      2.6 4
- Excessive Deficit Procedure 2 4
= (3) SUPRANATIONAL MECHANISM/PROCEDURE      2 4
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reduced, though still present , flexibility determined a higher level of 67
supranationalization of this peculiar policy aspects.
Finally,  the  overall  above-mentioned  transformation  occurred  with 
respect  to  the  Excessive  Deficit  Procedure,  which  can  be  rightly 
considered as a unique instrument created in order to make fiscal rules 
effective,  resulting  in  a  significant  increase  of  its  rate  of 
supranationalism.  For  sure,  as  the  sanctions  are  not  yet  completely 
automatic  and  with  quite  a  degree  of  flexibility  remaining  in  the 
system, it  cannot  be considered as completely  supranational,  but  it  is 
certainly less intergovernmentally-oriented than before.
All in all, the policy of fiscal discipline undertook a diffuse increase of 
its  supranational  rate,  measured  according  to  the  index  created.  By 
combining the different values of the three dimensions, the overall level 
of supranationalism of the policy  passed from a low-to-medium level 68
(2.2) up to a medium-to-high one (3.75) (fig. 5).
Figure 5. Evolution of the supranationalization rate of the policy of fiscal rules.
 A completely automatic sanctioning system would translate in a “5” in the 67
supranationalization rate.
 The overall level of supranationalism is given by the average of the three 68
components, each assumed to have the same weight.
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Reflecting  the  intensity  scale  borrowed  by  Borzel  (2005),  the  values 
obtained  mean  that  there  was  a  significant  shift  in  the  rate  of 
supranationalization of the policy. In particular, the index suggests that 
before the crisis the policy was mainly in the hands of governments, 
with a very low involvement of supranational institutions. All in all, the 
policy  was  more  intergovernmental  than  supranational.  On  the 
contrary,  after  the  comprehensive  reform  of  the  SGP,  the  policy 
witnessed  the  enlargement  both  in  scope  and  intensity  of  its 
supranational  dimension.  Supranational  institutions  do  have  more 
power, and this power is exercised in broader areas of the policy. In 
other words, if the set of outcomes adopted did not yet make the fiscal 
policy a completely supranational  one,  it  provoked a shift  from low 
intergovernmental coordination up to a genuine joint decision making, 
providing  a  first  confirmation  of  the  underlying  conjecture  of  the 
analysis, which has still to face the empirical confirmation of the two 
other case studies.
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Chapter 5 
The policy of financial support to states in need
The second case study of the dissertation consists in the analysis of the 
different instruments of financial support adopted and implemented in 
the Eurozone since the outset of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010, up to 
late  2014.  Indeed,  the  outbreak  of  the  sovereign  crisis  made  it 69
necessary for member states and EU institutions to set up brand new 
mechanisms aimed at helping those countries unable to refinance their 
public debt, because of the exacerbation of credit conditions demanded 
by financial markets in response to economic and political interplays. 
Taking  together  all  the  evolutions  occurred  in  the  field,  Eurozone 
governments appear to have progressively set up a new policy sector, 
that is, the one of financial support to member states in need.
Some elements make this case study different from the previous one on 
fiscal rules. First of all, the fact that any real policy of financial support 
toward  member  states  did  not  exist  before  2010.  Indeed,  European 
treaties formally forbid any assistance to troubled states, according to 
the “no-bailout clause” of article 125 of the TFEU.  In this sense, we are 70
 The conclusion of the narrative at the end of 2014 is admittedly arbitrary. It is 69
nevertheless necessary because of the ongoing nature of the Eurozone crisis, 
which continues to offer the prospect of  new developments.  The end of the 
analysis thus predates the beginning of Quantitative Easing by the ECB which 
nevertheless at first sight, appears to confirm the policy trends identified in this 
chapter.
 Article 125 TFEU states:  “The Union shall  not be liable for or assume the 70
commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, 
other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member 
State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of 
a  specific  project.  A  Member  State  shall  not  be  liable  for  or  assume  the 
commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, 
other  bodies  governed  by  public  law,  or  public  undertakings  of  another 
Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint 
execution of a specific project”. 
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in  front  of  a  process  of  progressive  policy  creation,  rather  then 
incremental  policy  change,  as  member  states  played a  sort  of  quasi-
constituent role in the vacuum of the pre-crisis institutional panorama 
(Dehousse 2012). 
As a consequence, the chapter will not provide an explicit comparison 
of the effectiveness of policy implementation in two different periods 
(before/after the crisis),  as in the first case study. Rather, it  offers an 
analysis of the progressive creation and evolution of the policy from the 
beginning of the crisis, by looking at the different steps undertaken by 
European  countries  since  that  time.  Secondly,  the  analysis  will  be 
mostly detached from a simple chronicle of events concerning bailouts, 
save  a  brief  overview  in  the  first  paragraph.  Indeed,  it  would  be 
difficult  to  reconstruct  the  complex  array  of  events  related  to  the 
different  bailouts,  such  as  external  pressures,  domestic  resistance, 
political confrontations, and so on. The focus of the chapter, then, is not 
on  domestic  events,  but  on  the  creation  of  financial  assistance 
instruments and on the institutional change behind them. 
Moreover,  the  analysis  will  leave  aside  the  great  debate  over  the 
conditions  attached  to  the  provision  of  funds:  the  debate  on  the 
necessity/opportunity  of  austerity  within  the  EU  during  the  crisis, 
though interesting and fundamental in the perspective of the European 
polity,  constitutes a different research project.  In this  sense,  both the 
effective  implementation  of  the  instruments  over  the  years,  and the 
elements of conditionality attached will be only briefly addressed, and 
closer attention will  be paid on the process of their creation and the 
strategic  interaction  behind  them.  Here,  how  actors’  preferences 
oriented the decision making, how that process was determined by the 
existing  institutional  setting,  and  the  role  played  by  the  financial 
environment, as well as the overall significance of the new instruments 
for the institutional setting in the European polity will be the significant 
foci of analysis. 
In  spite  of  the  absence  of  any  formalized  instrument  of  financial 
assistance to member states before 2010, the crisis’ years witnessed an 
impressive  effervescence  of  European  policy  making,  through  the 
creation of at least four different instruments or programs of financial 
support: the EFSF in 2010, the ESM in 2011, the SMP in 2010 and the 
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OMT  in  2013.  While  the  first  two  instruments  are  the  product  of 
intergovernmental negotiations, and thus a creation of member states, 
the two other programs are ECB-led operations, thus the product of a 
supranational institution. In this respect, it has to be specified that the 
ECB obviously did not intervene to directly bail out troubled countries, 
but it managed to help peripheral States in quite an indirect instrument, 
that is, the purchase of sovereign bonds in order to calm down markets’ 
pressure on those States. Alongside these instruments, bilateral loans 
were initially provided to Greece in early May 2010, and an additional 
temporary  facility,  the  European  Financial  Stabilization  Mechanism, 
was created by the European Commission. Several other instruments 
were proposed, but never actually established – such as Eurobonds, but 
also a European Monetary Fund and a European Debt Agency. For the 
sake of the analysis, the chapter will only deal with the most significant 
of them, namely the EFSF, the ESM, and the two programs by the ECB – 
SMP and OMT.71
The aim of this chapter is to present empirical data in the specific policy 
area of financial assistance and then use them to test the three main 
hypotheses of the dissertation, as well as the underlying conjecture that 
economic crises foster an effective supranationalization of EU policies. 
As discussed in the theoretical section (§2.4), the three main hypotheses 
of the dissertation are as follows:
H1: An economic crisis is a fundamental driver of major institutional 
changes, both in terms of their quantity and quality;
H2: Intergovernmental policy making tends to have incremental and 
ineffective policy outputs and to create institutional deadlocks; 
 The EFSM, though being important as the first supranational facility – funded 71
with the EU budget  and managed by the European Commission – to grant 
financial assistance during the crisis,  actually has a limited endowment (€60 
billion). For an overview of this instrument, see Bianco (2012). For a discussion 
on the possibility of creating a European Monetary Fund, see the special issue 
of Intereconomics (2010); for the proposition of a European Debt Agency, see 
Leterme (2010); for a discussion on Eurobonds see Intereconomics (2009). As 
observed above, there is no mention of the Quantitative Easing by the ECB, 
which  has  been  implemented  since  January  2015,  and  thus  falls  out  of  the 
chronological scope of the dissertation.
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Table 3: Instruments of financial support: Relevant variables and indicators of   
the case study. 
conversely, supranational policy making tends to have successful and 
more effective outputs;
H3:  In  the  case  of  policy  failure  due  to  irreconcilable  conflicting 
interests or institutional deadlocks, a process of delegation to a neutral 
–  i.e.  supranational  –  actor occurs,  resulting in an empowerment of 
supranational institutions vis-à-vis member states.
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TYPE OF 
VARIABLE
POLICY-SPECIFIC 
VARIABLE POLICY-SPECIFIC INDICATOR 
H1
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE
Pressure on 
policy makers
- Course of yields’ spreads and 
Credit Default Swap (2010-2014)
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE Policy outcome
- Creation of new instrument or 
program of financial support
H2
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE
Modes of decision 
making: 
intergovernmental/
supranational
- Presence of int.al agreements 
- Presence of intergov. negotiations
- Presence of unanimity regime 
                (or, conversely)
- Adoption of community method 
- Adoption  of  new  instruments  by 
supranational institutions 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE Policy success
- Capacity of the outcome of 
decreasing market pressure 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE Policy failure
- Incapacity of the outcome of 
relenting market pressure or 
solving the original problem
- Insurgence of new wave of crisis
- Contagion of the crisis in a new 
country
H3 DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Supranational 
delegation
- Formal act of delegation to 
supranational institutions (e.g. 
Treaty change)
- Upload of competencies for policy 
makin (e.g. legislative power)
- Informal act of delegation (e.g. via 
open interpretation of rules)
Each  of  the  three  hypotheses  will  be  tested  by  linking  specific 
independent and dependent policy-specific variables (table 3). Among 
the policy-specific indicators in the last column, there are also some of 
those used to create the original  index of supranationalization of the 
policy.
The chapter is structured as follows. After a brief overview of the key 
events related to the bailouts of states in need and the main political 
considerations underlying those operations, the chapter will turn to the 
different instruments created to provide financial assistance to member 
states:  after  a  presentation of  the presumed divergent  preferences of 
actors  over  outcomes,  an analysis  of  those  policy  outcomes and the 
strategic  interaction  behind  their  creation  will  be  carried  out.  This 
analysis guides the testing of the leading hypotheses of the dissertation, 
and  it  is  at  the  base  of  a  final  assessment  of  the  degree  of 
supranationalization in respect of the policy.
5.1. To help or not to help? The politics of bailouts
As a necessary addendum  to the commitment to sound fiscal policies, 
while  building  up  the  European  Monetary  Union,  member  states 
agreed to insert a “no-bailout clause” into the treaties (art. 125 TFEU). 
This  clause,  formally  prohibits  member  states  and  European 
institutions from providing any sort of financial assistance to member 
states in financial difficulty. The rationale was straightforward, if seen 
from the perspective of incentives and rational behavior: an eventual 
provision of any form of rescue funds would reduce states’ incentives 
to  exert  fiscal  discipline,  rendering fiscal  rues  pointless  (Pisani-Ferry 
2014:80).  Fears of  this  “moral  hazard,” has been a recurrent element 
throughout the crisis: a state aware that an external agent will agree to 
bear  a  significant  proportion  of  the  costs  associated  with  financial 
troubles has little interest in undertaking costly and painful reforms to 
avoid  difficulty.  Moreover,  in  Maastricht  states  were  confident  that 
measures of crisis prevention would be sufficient to avoid the setup of 
any crisis management instrument, whose existence itself would feed 
states’ moral hazard (ibid: 81). Nevertheless, the events triggered by the 
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crisis  came  to  substantially  subvert  the  pre-crisis  institutional 
equilibrium on the issue.
Notwithstanding an initial formal prohibition financial assistance was 
provided  to  Greece  (two  bailouts  in  2010  and  2012)‑ ,  Ireland  (late 72
2010), Portugal (in 2011), Spain (for recapitalization of its banking sector 
in 2012) and Cyprus (in 2013), as well as the financial support provided 
to  non-Eurozone  members  such  as  Romania,  Hungary  and Latvia.  73
Focusing only  on Eurozone member  states,  it  is  quite  impressive  to 
notice  how  much,  and  how  quickly,  a  solid  framework  of  financial 
assistance was established. At the beginning of Greek drama in 2010, 
states  could  only  agree  on  provision  of  discrete  bilateral  loans  to 
Greece, without any support from the ECB. By 2013, had established a 
permanent rescue facility, and the ECB has become actively involved in 
helping  member  states  through three  different  programs,  for  a  total 
amount of many hundreds of billions of euros.
The politics of bailouts was focused around two main questions: should 
member states be bailed out? And secondly, who should pay? (Pisani-
Ferry  2014).  The  first  issue  focused  on  the  perceived  urgency  of 
supporting  distressed  states,  essentially  ignoring  article  125.  The 
answer to the question, of course, presented a classic dilemma: on the 
one hand, helping a fellow government in need may feed moral hazard, 
encouraging profligate behavior. On the other hand, a refusal to help 
exacerbates the magnitude of the problem through the risk of contagion 
(Zahariadis 2012). Member states faced then a difficult alternative, since 
financial  assistance  would  surely  undermine  the  efforts  for  fiscal 
consolidation, but a lack of financial support would probably trigger 
worse systemic consequences. 
The  second  question  is  related  to  who  should  pay,  raising  the 
underlying issue of the creation of a transfer union in the Eurozone, 
and affecting quite understandably domestic considerations. States in 
 A third program of financial assistance was granted to Greece in summer 72
2015.
 For a complete overview of all the programs of financial assistance provided 73
during the crisis, please refer to the European Commission’s website: http://
ec.europa.EU/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/
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need invoked the principle of solidarity, arguing that treaty rules ought 
to be read flexibly to enable either richer countries or a supranational 
institution – i.e., the ECB – to offer financial support. Creditor countries, 
for their part, envisaged an international organization such as the IMF 
stepping in, as if troubled states were not part of a monetary union. 
The battle over the two issues shaped the process of policy response, 
rendering it  highly  fragmented and unable  to  offer  a  definitive  and 
credible  solution  to  the  crisis.  Indeed,  at  least  until  mid-2012,  the 
response  by  member  states  was  a  set  of  poorly  coordinated  policy 
attempts, that made the situation even worse. According to Jones (2015) 
“The early European response to the financial crisis was piecemeal and 
tactical rather than structural or strategic”, since “strategic action need 
time and deliberation […] and both elements were in short supply as 
the crisis unfolded”. The preferences of actors have been so divergent to 
make it very difficult and time consuming to find a compromise on a 
policy  response  to  the  crisis.  At  the  same  time  financial  markets 
remained highly demanding in terms of the long-term sustainability of 
policy outcomes, but their expectations were barely met (Smeets and 
Zimmermann  2013).  Indeed,  as  a  consequence  of  states’  hesitation 
throughout the crisis, economic and financial instability progressively 
increased, making it necessary for the ECB to step more actively into 
the political vacuum created by governments’ conflicting interests, if not 
by  directly  offer  financial  sustain,  at  least  by  creating  non  standard 
measures to meet markets expectations. As a result, the policy has been 
shaped  by  two  main  elements:  governments  hesitation  and  difficult 
intergovernmental  negotiations  on  the  one  hand,  and  resolute 
intervention of the ECB on the other. In this sense, as the analysis will 
demonstrate, the increased role of the central bank can be seen as an 
unintended  consequence  of  failed  intergovernamentalism  (Sacchi 
2014a).
5.2. Definition of actors and their preferences over outcomes
The progressive evolution of  the policy of  financial  help to  member 
states  reflected the interplay of  a  number of  actors.  In line with the 
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methodological  assumptions  of  the  dissertation,  it  is  necessary  to 74
preliminarily determine the key actors formulating the policy, as well as 
their initial preferences over outcomes.
Likewise the previous case study, in which actors were divided over a 
principle issue, i.e.  the automaticity of sanctions for rules-breakers, a 
major  cleavage  divided  member  states  in  the  policy  sector  of  this 
second case study: the attitude towards the bailout of states in trouble. 
On the  one  hand,  creditor  countries,  the  main  representatives  being 
Germany,  Finland,  and the  Netherlands,  were  generally  against  any 
form  of  financial  assistance,  fearing  that  such  operation  would 
endanger the efforts of fiscal consolidation in weaker states and feed 
moral hazard. Quite understandably,  another group of states,  mostly 
those that had entered financial assistance programs, as well as other 
debtor countries such as Italy and France, were more disposed to to 
financial  solidarity  within  EU  members.  The  key  priority  for  these 
states  was  avoiding  any  risk  of  contagion  among  member  states. 
Patterns of state preferences in this respect partially mapped on to the 
different positions in relation to SGP reform, especially where attitudes 
towards  fiscal  rectitude  and  financial  worries  were  concerned. 
Nevertheless,  states’  positions  also  reflected  national  economic 
traditions and the domestic considerations of member states.
The coalition of surplus countries was not in favor of any bailout in 
whatever form, whether it be financial assistance from EU peers, or an 
active role for the ECB, with its potential to finance national deficits by 
increasing  the  monetary  base  in  the  Eurozone  and  by  mutualizing 
national  debt.  This  “no-bailout  attitude”  was  primarily  rooted  in 
economic considerations, particularly the recognition that the costs of 
any financial assistance program would fall most heavily on them. In 
this sense, ultimately, the issue was about the aversion of progressively 
transforming the EU – or the Eurozone, at least – into a transfer union 
(The  Economist  2010),  where  creditor  states  would  finance  debtor 
states,  as already happens within  every European country,  including, 
most notably, Germany itself. Quite understandably, northern leaders 
 For a discussion on the definition of actors and their features see § 2.3.274
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desired to keep the costs of the Eurocrisis low for taxpayers  (Mayer 75
2012:  171),  so  as  to  avoid  that  external  events  could  interfere  with 
electoral dynamics.  At the same time, scholars have highlighted that 76
the  fiscal  interests  of  taxpayers  were  not  the  only  domestic  source 
shaping creditors’  preferences.  Other societal  interests  were relevant, 
among them, trade interests of the export-oriented sectors and financial 
interests  of  the  banking  industry  (Steimberg  and  Vermeiren  2015). 
These considerations were reinforced by the strong belief that indebted 
countries needed bold fiscal consolidation, and that assistance would 
inevitably reduce incentives to undertake needed structural reform. In 
this sense, the German idea has been to offer help only as an ultima 
ratio, i.e. only when all other solutions had been tried. Additionally, the 
Germans felt that bailouts would never solve all states’ problems in any 
cases, leaving states vulnerable to market pressure (Bastasin 2012: 159). 
Financial support, then, should not come neither too early, in order to 
increase the pressure for reforms in distressed states, nor too late, so as 
to avoid a complete lost of confidence of financial markets in troubled 
countries,  resulting  in  a  careful  evaluation  of  the  “timing  of 
politics”  (Jacoby  2015).  Being  very  difficult  to  discriminate  the 
appropriate  timing  of  intervention,  such  tactical  attitude  has  been 
labelled as the “policy of uncertainty” (Bastasin 2012:310).
Nevertheless,  these  realistic  and  practical  considerations  went  along 
with other more ideationally, sociologically and historically lead ones. 
First, public opinion in northern countries, particularly in Germany, is 
overwhelmingly  against  any  rescue  of  (supposedly)  profligate  states 
(Barysch 2010). Indeed, the view is that the Eurozone crisis is itself a 
direct  consequence  of  southern  states’  misbehavior  and  of  their 
unsound fiscal policies, so they are responsible for solving their own 
 Reducing costs for taxpayers does not only means to avoid any rescue plan, 75
but also – in case of their effective implementation – the involvement of the IMF 
and of private investors, as to relieve member States’ burden.
 In this respect, it has to be noticed that all along the crisis EU decisions were 76
often postponed as to avoid the interference with domestic elections – or they 
were decidedly influenced by electoral  considerations.  For instance,  the first 
Greek  bailout  was  postponed  in  view  of  local  elections  in  North  Rhein-
Westphalia, which probably contributed to exacerbate Greek fiscal situation.
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problems. This demonstrates the extent to which the economic crisis 
turned  into  a  morality  play  for  Eurozone  members.  According  to 
François  Baroin,  former  French  finance  minister,  “the  [German] 
problem with Greece was not economic or strategic, but moral” (Hewitt 
2013:  67).  And  Mario  Monti,  former  Italian  prime  minister,  once 
suggested to Barack Obama that when discussing economic issues with 
Angela Merkel to always bear in mind that for Germans economics is a 
branch of moral philosophy (Barbera and Feltri 2014: 88). 
Additionally, in Germany the idea of protecting the independence of 
the central bank has deep roots, given how the monetization of debt 
caused catastrophic hyperinflation in Germany in the early ‘20s. Thus 
the independence of the central  bank, which Germany demanded in 
order to reach agreement on establishing the EMU, is not only a pillar 
of  the  monetary  union  (Issing  2010),  but  also  a  strong  element  in 
German economic culture. In the end, then, creditor countries staunchly 
opposed any active role of  the ECB in supporting states in financial 
difficulties through the monetization of debt at European level. 
Creditor  countries  thus  saw resolution  of  the  crisis  in  terms  of  “no 
bailouts”  and  no  shared  debts,  leaving  open  the  possibility  of  a 
”orderly default” within the Eurozone, a position sometimes suggested 
by  the  German  government  (Davies  2011).  However,  a  second-best 
option  for  Germany  and  for  creditor  countries  emerged  during  the 
crisis (Spiegel 2014a). Such second-best option has three aspects: first, 
financial support could be provided, only as ultima ratio,  and only in 
presence of a centralized and capillary control, thus of harsh measures 
of conditionality; second, money should not be provided by the ECB, 
but in a shared way by member states, private investors and IMF as 
well, so as to limit as much as possible the burden on creditor countries’ 
taxpayers;  third,  every  step  towards  a  formalization  of  financial 
assistance should come as a counterpart of a credible commitment of 
peripheral states to sound fiscal policies.
By  contrast,  southern  debtor  states,  headed by  France,  sought  more 
solidarity  among  Eurozone  members  (so  as  to  prevent  contagion), 
flexibility  in  the  interpretation  of  treaties’  rules  on  bailouts,  and  an 
active role for the ECB in the provision of financial support. The view of 
the PIIGS was that creditor countries should actively support  fellow 
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states,  given  it  was  in  their  interest  also  to  contain  the  risks  of 
contagion.  They  demanded  the  creation  of  instruments  at  the 
supranational  level  to  contain  the  crisis  and  prevent  any  future 
sovereign risk. For example, the preferences of Italy and France were 
oriented toward the creation of “Eurobonds”, a Eurozone-wide bond to 
collectivize member states’ debt, so as to avoid high yields for weaker 
states (Kulish and Eddy 2012). At the same time, they sought an active 
role for the ECB, which they argued should act much as the Federal 
Reserve does in the US (“the Fed”) – notwithstanding their different 
mandate  and  the  underlying  institutional  rules.  The  French 
government’s  preferences  in  particular  were  oriented  toward  non-
standard measures by the ECB, which in its view, should commit to 
purchase  national  bonds  to  relieve  the  pressure  on  spreads  (Spiegel 
2014c), which of course ran against German positions.  Sarkozy often 77
urged the ECB to follow the example of the Fed, which demonstrates 
scarce  respect  of  central  bank  independence.  Nonetheless, 
representatives  of  the  Portuguese,  Italian  and  Spanish  governments 
consistently backed Sarkozy’s request, demonstrating how much their 
preferences were oriented toward a crisis management approach that 
politicized the ECB’s role, and a strong commitment of the institution in 
the rescue of countries in need.
As had been the case with fiscal rules, the UK remained largely aside 
from  negotiations.  The  UK’s  position  was  that  whatever  Eurozone 
members  decided,  Britain  would not  contribute  to  any bailout  fund 
(Charlemagne 2010). Even though the City remained highly exposed to 
troubled  states,  the  conservative  government  of  David  Cameron 
decided to stand aloof from any supranational instrument of financial 
support,  following  domestic  public  opinion,  in  the  conviction  that 
Britain would be in a position to offer workable alternatives even in 
 In  different  phases  of  the  crisis,  as  will  be  highlighted,  debtor  countries’ 77
preferences for a proactive role of the ECB were declined in different technical 
devices, which were not limited to the possibility of a direct bond-purchase by 
the ECB, but they’d include the possibility for the EFSF of borrowing money 
from the ECB, let the ECB finance resources of ESM, let the ECB indirectly buy 
national bonds through private banks and other technical devices.
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case  of  a  Euro  break-up  (ibid.).  Nonetheless,  while  standing  apart 78
from rescuing Greece and other Eurozone countries, the UK agreed to 
contribute almost €3.4 billion to the €85 billion Irish bailout in 2010, in 
the  form of  bilateral  loans,  since  the  British  and Irish  financial  and 
banking sectors are highly interconnected (The Guardian 2010).  As a 
general  consequence of  Britain distancing itself  from European crisis 
management,  the  Eurogroup  obtained  significant  visibility  and 
responsibility to the detriment of the European Council, enhancing at 
the same time the role of Germany, as the best placed nation to lead the 
negotiations (Bastasin 2012: 248). 
The European institutions constitute the third key set of actors. Given 
that the Commission, Parliament and Central Bank had each played a 
distinct  and decisive  role  in  shaping  the  development  of  new fiscal 
rules,  it  was necessary to assess the specific position of  each in that 
analysis (see Chapter 4). The evolution of financial support, however, 
followed a different path. Indeed, as an ex novo creation, the policy was 
largely managed at  the intergovernmental  level,  and the community 
method was not considered at  all  either in the provision of  the first 
financial assistance, or in the setup of new instruments. The European 
Parliament,  in  particular,  was  largely  sidelined  in  the  crisis 
management process (Sacchi 2014b; Schmidt 2015).  The Commission, 
for its part, played a limited, mostly technical, role in the setup of new 
instruments. Its main preferences, in line with its institutional position, 
concerned  the  possibility  of  triggering  a  supranationalization  of  the 
policy.  This  process  could  result  from  the  setup  of  two  different 
instruments:  the  creation  of  a  brand  new  instrument  of  crisis 
management with EU resources (the EFSM); and the so-called “Stability 
Bonds”.  In  this  respect,  the  Commission  elaborated  an  official 
proposition  for  the  creation  of  the  “Stability  Bonds”  (European 
Commission  2011b)  through  three  different  options,  which  had  the 
merit  of opening the debate on a issue highly opposed by Germany 
 The attitude of UK, however,  was not shared by all  members outside the 78
Eurozone.  For  instance,  Poland  and  Sweden  offered  their  contribution  for 
supporting European States fallen into the debt crisis, under the consideration 
that they’d enjoy of financial stability in the continent.
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(Spiegel 2011). On their creation, however, there is not yet agreement 
among governments.
The most significant institution in this policy sector has been the ECB. 
Though  deprived  on  any  formal  power  in  the  traditional  decision 
making  process,  i.e.  the  community  method,  the  ECB  undoubtedly 
enjoyed  a  de  facto  political  weight,  that  southern  countries  were 
adamant  to  win  over  to  their  side.  The  Frankfurt-based  institution 
indeed actively stepped into the policy making through at least three 
different  non-conventional  programs aimed at  limiting  the  stress  on 
financial markets due to the sovereign crisis (SMP, OMT and the QE), 
plus the two rounds of Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) for 
the support of the banking sector. Since the beginning of the crisis, the 
ECB’s preferences have been very well defined and openly stated, both 
in relation to its independence and to the eventual role it might play in 
the  crisis,  which  were  the  two  main  issues  under  debate  among 
member states. The ECB position, both under the presidency of Jean-
Claude Trichet and that of Mario Draghi since November 2011 was very 
clear: states must act first. While the central bank has never completely 
excluded the possibility of intervening in favor of distressed states, the 
ECB has  expected  member  states  to  clearly  commit  in  credible  and 
sustainable  measures  of  fiscal  restructuring  –  mainly  through  fiscal 
austerity.  Its  reasoning  has  been  to  avoid  moral  hazard  and  not 
undermine states’ efforts in fiscal consolidation, as well as to defend its 
independence  and to  respect  its  mandate,  Moreover,  unlike  creditor 
countries, the ECB has always claimed that any default, even an orderly 
one,  within  the  Eurozone  should  be  avoided  given  the  disastrous 
consequences  it  may  have  for  financial  stability  in  Europe  and 
worldwide, and for the credibility of the monetary union itself (Bastasin 
2012: 149).
The ECB was cautious in two main directions concerning taking on a 
more active role: the respect of its mandate as dictated by the treaties, 
and the defense of its independence. Any potential action would need 
to be embedded in the rigid framework of institutional rules shaping 
the ECB mandate. Both Trichet and Draghi were concerned to respect 
the letter of the treaties, which explicitly prohibit direct ECB financing 
of national debt. Even in his famous “whatever it takes” speech in July 
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2012,  Draghi  was at  pains  to  mention that  “the ECB is  ready to  do 
whatever it takes to save the Euro”, but “within our mandate” (Draghi 
2012),  a  qualified  commitment  revealing  the  great  concern  for  the 
respect of institutional rules even in emergency conditions dictated by 
the Eurozone crisis. 
A second aspect concerned the defense of ECB’s independence, despite 
the formal and informal requests by member states to boldly intervene 
in favor of weak states. In Sarkozy’s aforementioned 2010 meeting with 
Trichet,  the  French  President  proposed  a  “wall  of  money”  to  avoid 
contagion, to which the head of the ECB angrily responded that the 
ECB was not taking orders from anybody. Were members to continue 
applying pressure, he said, the “ECB Council would react negatively 
with  disastrous  consequences”  (Bastasin  2012:  208),  a  very  clear 
declaration in defense of ECB independence.
A  final  actor  whose  role  in  crisis  management  was  important,  if 
understated, was the United States.  While the US played no role in the 79
debate  over  reform  of  fiscal  rules  in  the  Eurozone,  the  question  of 
potential  sovereign  default  was  clearly  a  sensitive  issue  outside  of 
Europe. The US, while avoiding open statements which could be seen 
as an intrusion in European affairs, often showed its disappointment 
for the poor coordination of European national responses to the crisis, 
concerned that Eurozone troubles might spill over across the Atlantic 
(Barber 2010). The influence of the United States was in fact decisive in 
certain  phases  of  the  crisis,  at  least  in  persuading  European 
governments – especially Germany – of the need for decisive action The 
US declined to advocate any particular policy response of others, but 
rather sought to impress upon European governments the need to act 
in  whatever  direction  necessary  to  save  the  common  currency  and 
guarantee financial stability worldwide. The US role will be carefully 
examined,  in  order  to  understand  how  crisis  exigencies  made  it 
possible for an external actor to intervene in European public affairs.
 As for the case of the ECB, US are obviously not an actor empowered of any 79
role in the European decision making. Methodologically, it can be considered as 
a powerful ally with a de facto political weight of one of the two coalition of 
States (debtor countries, namely).
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5.3. Instruments of financial help implemented during the crisis
A key features of the policy of financial assistance in the Eurozone is its 
progressive character. Member states and institutions systematically built 
up an increasingly complex institutional framework over time, moving 
from the very first solutions adopted to counteract the possibility of a 
Greek  default,  up  to  the  more  complex  programs  of  financial  help 
aimed at addressing potential default in a large economy, such as Italy 
or Spain. In this sense, the evolution of the policy maps closely on to 
the evolution of the crisis. Not only did the increasing magnitude of the 
crisis make it necessary to develop new instruments with new features, 
the crisis  itself  was fed by the weaknesses in each successive policy 
innovation. The chronological and political nexus between key peaks of 
the crisis identified in chapter 2 (i.e. the break-up of the Greek crisis in 
early 2010; the Irish crisis in late 2010; the dramatic summer of 2011; the 
troubles of autumn 2011; the second Greek crisis in mid-2012) and the 
evolution of financial assistance programs’ framework are striking.
5.3.1. The first Greek bailout through bilateral loans
The necessity of providing financial support to Greece was the direct 
consequence of the Greek fiscal crisis, which erupted in early 2010. In 
spite of the efforts of Prime Minister Papandreou in January to reassure 
fellow  member  states  and  the  markets  (The  Guardian  2010), 
international investors progressively abandoned Greece, resulting in an 
unprecedented rise in the spreads on Greek bonds, making it more and 
more  difficult  for  the  country  access  the  markets.  The  situation 80
worsened between late January and the beginning of February, when 
markets  began to  bet  on a  Greek default  and break up of  the  Euro 
Nonetheless,  the  European  Council  could  not  break  a  deal  in  the 
meeting of February 11th. In that occasion, French President Sarkozy 
was in favor of “putting some billion immediately on the table” and 
 The day when Moody’s warned on the bad outlook of Greece, in January 80
2010, CDS on Greek debt saw the most impressive one-day rise ever, soaring 
from 49 to 328 basis points (Bastasin 2012: 148).
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decide later the details, but Chancellor Merkel was doubtful over the 
feasibility of such operation (Bastasin 2012: 167). 
A key element of disagreement was whether to involve the IMF in the 
rescue plan, and what form the action should take – bilateral loans, or a 
supranational program. France and Germany – representing the core/
creditor  vs  periphery/debtor  cleavage  –  could  not  reconcile  their 
positions. France was opposed to IMF involvement  and was inclined 81
to  a  political  management  of  the  crisis  while  Germany,  fearing  the 
partiality of the Commission,  sought the inclusion of the IMF and a 
more rational and technical approach to the rescue action. In the end, 
the final statement of the European Council (European Council 2010) 
asserted  that  “Euro  area  member  states  will  take  determined  and 
coordinated  action,  if  needed,  to  safeguard  financial  stability  in  the 
Euro area as a whole”. The statement was vague enough to reassure 
member states that fellow members were supportive, while avoiding 
any specific or detailed commitments, for the time being. 
That decision came in late March, at a time when markets continued to 
put pressure on Greek bonds, when a EU summit stated that Euro-area 
members  were  “ready  to  contribute  to  coordinated  bilateral 
loans”  (Eurosummit  2010),  thus  not  through  a  common  pool  of 
resources.  Moreover,  contributions  would be  “decided by unanimity 
and  subject  to  strong  conditionality”,  involving  the  IMF  as  a 
complementary financing body. For sure, no automatic rescue fund was 
to be provided. A week later, the financial situation in Greece took a 
turn, because of several related events: a bank run, the downgrade of 
Greek debt, the increase of the spread among German and Greek bonds 
and the soar of CDS’s on Greek debt, which taken together created a 
dramatic  spiral  of  distrust  in  the  markets.  On  April  8th  an  Ecofin 
meeting  was  called  to  discuss  the  technicalities  of  the  rescue 
 The French were hostile  towards the involvement of  the for  two reasons. 81
First, Sarkozy feared that the United States, through the IMF, would interfere 
with  European  affairs.  Secondly,  at  that  time  the  IMF  was  headed  by 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, who was expected to be the Socialist Party candidate 
against Sarkozy in the 2012 election, before a sex scandal in 2011 compromised 
his path toward the Elysée.
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mechanism, which were finally set up a few days later. The joint IMF/
EU support package, to be activated following an official  request by 
Greek government, began to take shape (Ecofin 2010). A collaboration 
between the IMF and the EU was to start in order to sketch out their 
respective  roles  and  contribution  after  which  assistance  would  be 
provided in exchange of harsh austerity measures. A newly established 
technocratic  body,  the  Troika,  obtained  the  role  of  monitoring  its 
implementation. Finally, assistance was provided at “non-concessional 
interest  rates”,  so  as  to  demonstrate  that  Greece  was  not  being 
subsidized. On April 23, Papandreou officially requested the activation 
of the mechanism, whose final features were set up in early May. The 
Troika  (i.e.  the  EU,  the  IMF,  and  the  ECB)  elaborated  the  austerity 
measures demanded for Greece, while member states agreed on figures. 
The final amount of the rescue plan was set at €110 billion, of which €80 
billion was to come from loans by member states, and €30 billion from 
the IMF, at rate 3% above the Euribor rate, increasing to 4% after three 
years. 
The package was the first program of financial aid for a member of the 
Eurozone,  and  it  was  the  result  of  a  dramatic  strategic  interaction 
among actors at stake. Indeed, the provision of bilateral loans was a 
compromise  between  those  seeking  a  more  comprehensive 
supranational mechanism, and those less inclined to provide financial 
aid.  Germany  and  creditor  countries  were  quite  reticent  about  the 
bailout, fearing moral hazard above all. Nonetheless, with the financial 
climate rapidly deteriorating, Germany agreed in the end to a bailout as 
a ultima ratio,  as specified in the Eurosummit statement (Eurosummit 
2010), according to the German idea that a troubled state should feel the 
pressure of financial investors up to the limit, in order to prevent moral 
hazard. Moreover, the provision of robust conditionality in the form of 
demands for  harsh austerity measures,  and prohibitive interest  rates 
were  presented  as  non-negotiable  by  Germany.  On  the  other  hand, 
France  and  other  southern  countries  favored  a  more  political 
intervention, i.e. the creation of a bold supranational mechanism that 
would stop speculators and avoid contagion. Bilateral loans ended up 
being the point of common agreement across actors with such varying 
preferences.
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In all  likelihood,  the package would have not  seen the light  of  day, 
without  the  external  intervention  of  the  US  government,  which 
according to some authoritative reconstructions intervened behind the 
scenes in negotiations (Barbier 2010). At a dinner held on April 22 at the 
Canadian embassy in Washington, the US treasury secretary lobbied his 
European  counterparts  to  take  action  in  order  to  avoid  a  global 
contagion.  Moreover,  the  US  government,  as  had  the  IMF,  offered 
crucial expertise concerning financial rescues, so as to save Greece, and 
warned  that  the  amount  of  the  first  aid  package  envisioned  in  late 
March  would be insufficient to calm financial markets. Actually, the 82
final package was substantially larger than the one that was previously 
foreseen, and the IMF was actively involved in the assistance program. 
According to Barbier, this demonstrates that the meeting in Washington 
was fundamental in determining the necessity for collective action.
Institutional  rules  clearly  played a  significant  role  in  structuring the 
final  outcome.  The “no-bailout  clause”  was  a  major  obstacle  for  the 
creation of  a  new instrument.  In considering aid to Greece,  member 
states had proposed the creation of a European Monetary Fund (Gocaj 
and Meunier 2013) a “European IMF”, in order to support weak states 
and give  to  the  Eurozone  an  instrument  of  crisis  management.  The 
idea,proposed by scholars (Mayer 2009) and initially backed by German 
finance  minister  Schäuble  (2010),  was  however  shelved  by  Angela 
Merkel because of its huge legal implications (Ludlow 2010). Because 
an EMF would require a treaty change to circumvent article 125, and 
would require the unanimity of member states – a difficult and time-
consuming  task  –  it  was  not  seen  as  a  viable  alternative  under  the 
circumstances.
The final package, agreed in May 2, however, was scarcely effective in 
containing  a  possible  contagion  of  the  crisis  to  other  European 
countries, as market dynamics during the following week showed.
 In  a  first  version  of  the  package,  the  one  presented on  March  24-25,  the 82
amount of financial support was €45 billion, one third from the IMF and two 
third from bilateral loans. 
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5.3.2. EFSF – The European Financial Stability Facility 
That the €110 billion package for Greece was insufficient  to forestall 
contagion  became  clear  very  quickly.  Only  a  few  days  after  the 
agreement on the first bailout, interest rates on 10-years Greek bonds 
soared  to  12%,  with  Portugal’s  rising  above  6%  at  the  same  time  83
(Djankov  2014).  Interbank  lending  froze  and  the  money  market 
returned to  a  situation  not  seen  since  just  before  the  Lehman crisis 
(Ludlow 2010). It was a clear sign that financial markets did not trust 
the  way  in  which  the  Greek  rescue  had  unfolded,  in  particular  the 
reticence of member states to act quickly and decisively to help Greece. 
Investors took the view that the European response had been “too little, 
too  late.”  On  May  7th  the  European  Council  held  an  emergency 
meeting  in  which  another  instrument  of  financial  assistance  was 
established: the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). This time, 
EU  leaders  sought  a  structural  mechanism,  rather  than  relying  on 
uncoordinated  bilateral  loans.  An  Ecofin  meeting  on  May  9th  was 
called to define the details of the program, which was voted on that 
same day.84
The  EFSF  is  a  temporary,  limited  facility,  financed  by  European 
members and the IMF, amounting to around €750 billion.  It became 85
effective in August 2010, and it was intended to expire in July 2013. The 
legal basis of the EFSF is rather ambiguous, being an original mix of EU 
law and private financial law (Bianco 2012). Technically, the EFSF is a 
limited liability  company,  established in  Luxembourg.  It  is  a  special 
 During the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, the threshold of 7% on 10-years 83
bonds has become a psychological one, meaning that above that rate national 
debt becomes unsustainable to finance on markets. 
 The  final  communiqué  is  the  “Decision  of  the  Representatives  of  the 84
Governments of the Euro Area Member States Meeting within the Council of 
the European Union”, Brussels, May 9.
 €440 billion of guarantees backed by Eurozone members – with Germany 85
being the biggest contributor, followed by France and Italy – €250 billion from 
the IMF and €60 billion from the European Commission through the ESFM. The 
total amount was imagined to eventually cover a joint crisis in Greece, Portugal 
and Ireland, but the funds available were completely insufficient were the crisis 
to spread to Spain or Italy.
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purpose  vehicle  (SPV),  i.e.  a  company that  raises  money by issuing 
bonds  backed  by  member  states’  guarantees.  As  a  consequence  the 
EFSF is not strictly a fund into which member states transfer money to 
concerned countries, although it is financed only by Eurozone members 
its  benefits  are  restricted  to  Eurozone  members.  Instead,  funds  are 
raised on market, with states simply providing guarantees, up to the 
amount  envisaged  in  the  agreement.  In  sum,  the  EFSF  is  an 
intergovernmental  agreement ,  decided  by  the  governments  of  the 86
Eurozone,  but  relying  on  the  European  Commission  for  technical 
aspects. The Commission can manage the funds raised by the EFSF and 
it negotiates the memorandum of understanding in which are attached 
the  conditions  of  financial  aid,  but  the  whole  process  is  closely 
supervised by Eurozone governments.87
The  strategic  interaction  behind  the  adoption  of  the  EFSF  perfectly 
reflected the cleavages among actors involved, as well as the necessity 
of striking a deal in the dramatic aftermath of the Greek bailout in early 
May 2010, and in particular before the opening of financial markets on 
Monday, May 10, which was imagined to bring about a massive attack 
on the common currency,  according to the US government (Bastasin 
2012:  206),  and  which  was  very  much  feared  by  European  policy 
makers. On the one hand, the position of the ECB was in line with its 
vision of crisis management, according to which member states should 
act  first.  States,  for  their  part,  were  divided over  the  issue:  creditor 
countries  defended  the  ECB’s  independence  and  were  reluctant  to 
create  a  EU-wide  structural  instrument  of  crisis  management,  while 
debtor  ones  were  more  inclined  to  solicit  bold  steps  into  crisis 
management from the ECB. 
 An evocative image of  the complexity of  the legal  framework behind the 86
creation of the EFSF is given by De Witte (2011), according to whom the EFSF 
was  adopted  by  the  representatives  of  the  governments  of  the  Euro  area 
member states, “wearing their intergovernmental hats”, but meeting within the 
Council of the European Union.
 For a thorough discussion on the legal aspects of the EFSF, please refer to 87
Bianco (2012) and De Witte (2011).
!119
Mediterranean countries, headed by France, were quite understandably 
in favor of an operation to stop the possibility of contagion throughout 
Europe,  as  next  in  line  were  Portugal,  thenSpain  and  Italy,  and  – 
inevitably – France. This latter, in particular, was also worried because 
of  the  high  exposure  of  its  banks  to  Greece.  Debtor  countries’ 88
suggested  creating  a  supranational  system  of  crisis  management, 
through the European Commission and the ECB (Ludlow 2010: 30-32). 
The Commission would mobilize a great amount of funds, while the 
ECB  would  intervene  to  release  pressure  on  troubled  countries 
purchasing their  bonds.  Sarkozy also  went  so  far  as  to  propose  the 
creation  of  Eurobonds  (Hewitt  2013:  77).  In  this  regard,  southern 
countries  found  in  the  Commission  a  precious  ally,  given  that  the 
supranational  executive  was  interested  in  creating  a  structural  fund 
under its control. According to the Wall Street Journal (Walker, Forelle 
and Blackstone 2010), on May 9, the Commission signed off on a draft 
pact foreseeing a rescue facility where majority vote by Euro members 
would suffice to make money available. The Commission would raise 
all  of  the  funds by selling collective  EU bonds,  and the  mechanism 
would have no temporal limits, and would not involve the IMF.
Germany, however, disagreed, and Chancellor Merkel headed a group 
of  states  opposed  to  the  French  plan.  Germany,  the  Netherlands, 
Luxembourg,  Finland,  as  well  as  Slovakia were reluctant  to concede 
dramatic assistance to “profligate” states. Their vision, moreover, was 
in line with the defense of central bank independence, whose necessity 
was taken far more into account than in the southern countries. To be 
sure, at a time when it became clear that some sort of financial support 
was an imperative,  they were not against  the creation of  any rescue 
facility, but their vision was quite the opposite of the French one: the 
ECB should not be politically involved in this  phase of  the decision 
making, but the IMF on the contrary was very welcome and over all, 
 To be sure, even German banks were highly exposed to Greece, and in general 88
towards  any  weak  European  country’s  debt,  because  of  the  consolidated 
financial surplus of the country and for the proportions of its banking sector. 
This element probably played some role on the German decision to assure a 
rescue to fellow States, whose modalities however were fundamentally shaped 
by German general preferences over outcomes. 
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the instrument should be in line with treaty’s provisions, an element 
which seemed to be overlooked by debtor countries. 
The  German  government’s  fears,  in  particular,  were  focused  on  a 
possible rejection of the instrument by its Federal Constitutional Court, 
which is particularly attentive to defend the prerogatives of German 
Parliament  in  any  step  toward  further  European  supranational 
integration.  Moreover,  Chancellor  Merkel  was  concerned about  the 89
legitimacy of the EFSF in view of the no-bailout clause in the Lisbon 
Treaty. This explains the final decision to pursue the intergovernmental 
procedure for the creation of the instrument, instead of a process fully 
within EU law (De Witte 2012). In addition, creditor countries wanted 
to avoid the creation of an open-ended fund where countries would 
transfer funds, because it would represent a first step toward a form of 
transfer union, or it could set up a precedent for a common public debt. 
The  choice  of  a  SPV  and  not  of  direct  funds,  was  the  compromise 
solution  suggested  by  the  director  of  foreign  relations  at  the  Dutch 
finance minister Maarten Vervey (Bastasin 2012: 213),  and it  was the 
one on which countries finally agreed on.
Another key issue of the negotiations was the mechanism of activation 
of the fund (ibid: 212). According to debtor countries it should be an 
automatic  mechanism,  or  at  least  one  triggered  by  a  majority  vote, 
while  Germany  was  in  favor  of  a  unanimity  to  activate  the  rescue 
funds,  so  as  to  highlight  the  intergovernmental  character  of  the 
instrument.  This  was,  in  the  end,  the  solution  found.  Two  final 90
features  of  the  EFSF  were  in  line  with  the  preferences  of  northern 
countries. The EFSF was given a time limit, which was decided in order 
to rule out the possibility of an eventual creation of a transfer union 
among member states, and non-concessional interest rates on funding 
 The Constitutional Court in particular has focused its critiques towards two 89
aspects of the crisis management: first, Germany’s financial participation in any 
bailout  must  be  determinate  and  not  open-ended;  and  second,  national 
legislature  must  be  given  an  effective  voice  in  approving  the  extent  of 
Germany’s financial participation. For further details on the role of Karlsruhe 
Court in the crisis management, please refer to Lindseth (2012).
 For an overview on the activation process and the effective functioning of the 90
EFSF, see Gocaj and Meunier (2013: 245-47).
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was  agreed,  in  order  to  rule  out  the  impression  that  the  EFSF  was 
providing subsidies to weaker states.  91
As  with  the  Greek  bailout,  US  intervention  in  the  European 
negotiations signaled the urgency of situation and the risks of delay. 
Again, Washington did not interfere openly, but actively “persuaded” 
European governments  to  act  to  reassure  markets.  President  Obama 
called  Chancellor  Merkel  at  least  twice  during  the  negotiations  to 
remind  her  what  was  at  stake  (Hewitt  2013:  79),  and  other  US 
representatives  made  repeated  calls  to  European  finance  ministers 
during the Ecofin (Barber 2010). While the US intervention played no 
role in the technical aspects of the agreement, American pressure was 
nevertheless a key aspect overall. 
5.3.3. ESM – The European Stability Mechanism
The immediate reaction of financial markets to the creation of the EFSF 
was positive, but only temporarily. The amount of funds mobilized was 
warmly welcomed by investors, who nonetheless soon recognized the 
weaknesses  of  the  project.  Four  limits,  in  particular,  emerged  upon 
closer inspection. First, EFSF lending capacity was clearly insufficient to 
cover an eventual rescue of a core state, such as Spain or Italy (Atkins 
2010).  Additionally,  given  its  nature  as  an  SPV,  the  fund  was  not 
endowed with real money, but member states simply guarantee funds 
that  in  the  end  may  not  be  actually  provided.  Third,  the  EFSF’s 92
activation  process  was  heavy,  and  it  relied  on  the  unanimity  of  its 
contributors (Bastasin 2012: 216). Finally, it  was subject to time limit, 
 The interest rate was the market rate plus a charge of 300 basis points for 91
maturities of up to three years and an additional 100 basis points for longer 
maturities; in addition, a service fee of 50 basis points would be added to cover 
operational costs (Gocaj and Meunier 2013).
 Moreover, the credibility of the EFSF lied on its AAA credit rank, given by the 92
presence  of  “triple  A  creditors”  among  its  contributors.  However,  the 
downgrade of France, Austria lead to a downgrade of the fund, with severe 
implications  for  its  capacity  of  collecting  money  through States’  guarantees 
(Chorafas 2013: 78). Indeed, in 2011, EFSF auctions on markets to collect money 
were very weak (Pisani 2011).
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and investors could see that the fund was not a structural or systemic 
framework  for  the  future  of  the  common  currency,  but  merely  an 
instrument of crisis management created by Eurozone members to buy 
themselves some time, as Angela Merkel later admitted (Euractiv 2011).
Taking  stock  of  these  shortcomings,  investors  rapidly  returned  to  a 
position of anxiety regarding a possible Eurozone break-up , and the 93
EFSF couldn’t  forestall  contagion reaching Ireland,  which just  a  few 
months later, in autumn 2010, became the second Eurozone country to 
succumb,  spreading  panic  among  European  decision  makers,  again. 
Finally, European governments realized that a systemic response would 
be  needed,  through  a  correction  to  the  EFSF’s  shortcomings,  which 
would lead to its transformation into the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM). The road to the new rescue facility, however, was difficult, as the 
different actors had different preferences over the final outcome.
The debate over the transformation of the EFSF, indeed, turned around 
four main issues. The first and most understandable, was the necessity 
of increasing its lending capacity. Realizing that the fund was not large 
enough to save Spain or Italy, and given that it was already operative 
for Greece and Ireland  – and would also be used for Portugal in early 94
2011 – voices raised on the necessity of increasing the amount of money. 
In  particular,  the  ECB,  the  European  Commission  and  peripheral 
countries  praised  for  an  increase  of  EFSF  financial  backing,  but  the 
issue was not welcomed by Germany, Netherlands and Austria (Castle 
2011; Spiegel and Pignal, 2011). The second issue was the provision of 
any formal conditionality – or, alternatively, of some flexibility – for the 
rescue  fund.  According  to  northern  countries,  it  was  necessary  to 
establish  some  kind  of  formal  conditionality  for  those  countries 
accessing the EFSF, so as to limit the possibility of moral hazard. For 
their part the ECB, the European Commission and member states that 
accessed financial  aid programs called for a re-discussion of  lending 
conditions, i.e. lower interest rates and more flexibility – so as to avoid 
 Less than a week after the creation of the EFSF, the Euro fell to its lowest level 93
against the dollar since November 2008 (Bowley 2010).
 Irish government official requested the access to EFSF on November 22, and it 94
was agreed by the Ecofin a few days later, for a total amount of €85 billion. 
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austerity measures imposed by creditors strangling any possibility of 
economic  recovery  (Spiegel  and  Peel  2011).  A  third  element  was 
represented by the involvement of private creditors into an eventual 
default of a country. This was one of the main arguments of German 
government,  and it  was functional  to  present  German government’s 
role in the bailouts to domestic electorate; and the decision was taken in 
the  famous  Deauville  meeting  between  Chancellor  Merkel  and 
President Sarkozy in October, 2010. The main point of the agreement 
was an exchange between the two parties: on the one hand, Germany 
renounced to have automatic sanctions in the new framework of fiscal 
rules ,  on the other,  France accepted the so-called “collective  action 95
clause”  in  the  future  bailout,  strongly  opposed  by  ECB  President 
Trichet (Bastasin 2012: 232). According to the Deauville agreement, any 
eventual “grand bargain” on a future revision of the EFSF should pass 
through the provision of the private sector involvement. The final, and 
more  technical,  yet  politically  relevant,  issue  about  an  eventual 
transformation of the EFSF was the possibility for the facility to operate 
to directly purchase sovereign bonds. This possibility, highly welcomed 
by  the  ECB  –  which  was  adamant  to  decrease  the  central  bank’s 
involvement into direct bond purchase  – and by debtor countries, was 96
opposed  by  Germany,  which  saw  in  the  measure  the  possibility  of 
directly  financing  national  debt,  against  treaty’s  provisions  (ibid: 
262-263).
The  long  negotiations  for  a  structural  rescue  fund in  the  Eurozone, 
then,  passed  through  the  debates  over  these  issues,  and  the  long 
creation  process  of  the  ESM  somehow  reflected  the  difficulties  of 
composing  the  different  positions  of  actors  at  stake.  A first,  though 
vague, reference to a future ESM was made in the Deauville meeting by 
Angela Merkel, and then included a few days later in the Van Rompuy 
 As noticed in §3.2.2, the agreement in Deauville demonstrates how much the 95
policies  under  scrutiny  have  been  interrelated  during  the  crisis.  From  a 
methodological  point  of  view,  it  shows that  every single  policy  is  not  fully 
causally  independent,  but  its  development  may  be  subject  to  some  events 
related to another case-study. Nonetheless, it is an unavoidable consequences 
while dealing with the Eurozone crisis, because of its multifaceted character.
 In May 2010 the ECB had started the SMP (see infra).96
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Task Force report (2010), which stated that “in the medium term there is 
a need to establish a credible crisis resolution framework”. The turning 
point  came  with  the  Irish  crisis  in  November  2010 ,  when  states 97
realized that it was time to act, and the same day of the approval of a 
line  of  credit  for  Ireland,  the  European  Council  invited  Ecofin  to 
approve the creation of the ESM (Djankov 2014: 131). The plan included 
the  “collective  action  clause”,  but  only  starting  from  2013,  so  as  to 
reassure investors in the present. It took some months of negotiations 
but the fear that contagion could spread to Portugal assisted agreement 
among  member  states.  In  the  Euro-area  summit  of  March,  11  the 98
lending capacity of the EFSF was increased up to €440 billion, and the 
ESM was designed to have one of €500 billion. France was inclined to 
put on the table €1 trillion as maximum lending capacity of the ESM, 
but  Germany and Finland opposed this  decision (ibid).  In  the  same 
meeting, Merkel conceded that the ESM could directly buy bonds on 
the primary market, but that purchase on the secondary market was 
blocked (Bastasin 2012: 263). The idea of issuing Eurobonds, which was 
newly advanced by France and southern rim countries, and backed by 
the European Commission, was also blocked (Djankov 2014: 131-132).
Nonetheless, the effective creation of the ESM was not possible until the 
European Council  by unanimity decided to operate  a  treaty change, 
which  they  agreed  during  their  summit  on  March,  25  (European 
Council 2011). On that day, they agreed in adding a paragraph to article 
136  TFEU,  which states:  “The Member  States  whose currency is  the 
Euro  may  establish  a  stability  mechanism  to  be  activated  if 
indispensable to safeguard the stability of the Euro area as a whole. The 
granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will 
be made subject to strict conditionality”. The treaty change, obtained 
through  the  simplified  revision  procedure  introduced  in  the  Lisbon 
 The contagion to Ireland of the sovereign debt crisis represents the second 97
wave of the Eurozone crisis, according to the chronology proposed in §3.2.
 Indeed, the decision of creating the ESM was taken on the same day in which 98
Portuguese government resigned, which opened the way to the financial rescue 
of the country. 
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Treaty ,  was  a  necessary  step  required  by  Germany  in  order  to 99
circumvent  any  eventual  objections  by  the  Federal  Constitutional 
Court. The treaty for the establishment of the ESM was finally signed in 
July,  2011,  and  then  slightly  revised  in  February  2012  in  order  to 
increase  its  lending  capacity.  After  the  conclusion  of  the  ratification 
process, it  became operational in October of the same year, one year 
before the expected expiration of the EFSF.
Legally  speaking,  the  ESM is  an  international  financial  organization 
under international law, based on an international agreement between 
the seventeen member states of the Eurozone (Bianco 2012). The treaty 
establishing the ESM, then, is a pure intergovernmental creation, which 
nonetheless has direct implications for the framework of the European 
Union  and  the  Eurozone  in  particular  (ibid.).  It  has  a  permanent 
character, enjoying a total subscribed capital of nearly €705 billion. This 
includes €80 billion in the form of paid-in capital provided by the Euro 
area member states and €625 billion of committed callable capital, that 
is, money that member states can be called to pay to absorb eventual 
losses (Munchau 2011). In order to collect money, as the EFSF, the ESM 
can  issue  bills,  bonds  and  other  funding  instruments,  but  being  an 
independent organization, it is less vulnerable to eventual downgrades 
of its members, which was a major shortcoming of the EFSF.100
The purpose of the ESM is to provide financial  support to countries 
which  are  experiencing,  or  are  threatened  by,  severe  financing 
problems. However, unlike the EFSF, the ESM foresees clear measures 
of conditionality. The most important of these is that a country, in order 
to be eligible to receive ESM funds, must have signed and ratified the 
Fiscal Compact. In this sense, the rescue fund has incorporated a major 
 For a discussion on the legal implications of the Treaty change and of the 99
creation of the ESM, including the role of the Parliament in the Treaty revision 
process, see De Witte (2011).
 The problem of a possible “can’t pay, won’t pay” problem in case of major 100
difficulties  of  a  ESM  contracting  party,  however,  it  is  not  fully  overcome. 
Namely, major problems may come in case a weak State without a AAA credit 
rating,  i.e.  Italy,  is  called to increase its  capital  in the ESM in order to help 
another  country,  and  such  endowment  might  possibly  deteriorate  Italian 
finances (Manasse 2011). 
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negotiation point of  Germany. Chancellor Merkel  moreover obtained 
agreement that any major decision, i.e. whether to come and rescue a 
member  state,  must  be  taken  by  unanimity  of  Eurozone  members 
(Manasse 2011). All in all,  then, Germany succeeded in obtaining the 
maximum  value  from  its  economic  and  political  weight  during  the 
negotiations.  As  the  major  contributor,  although in  principle  against 
any  form  of  rescue  mechanism  that  might  trigger  moral  hazard, 
Germany managed to design a permanent rescue mechanism almost 
fully reflecting its preferences over the final outcome, including private 
sector  involvement,  conditionality  with  the  ratification  of  the  Fiscal 
compact, up to the prohibition for the ESM to operate on the secondary 
market, so as to avoid its transformation into a fiscal instrument.
5.3.4. The intervention of the ECB: The Securities Markets Programme
Even if supranational institutions did play some minor role in shaping 
the  creation  of  the  different  instruments  of  financial  assistance  to 
member  states  as  mentioned  above,  the  programs  were  largely 
conducted  by  governments  under  a  preeminent  intergovernmental 
umbrella. On their effectiveness, however, investors were doubtful: as 
had happened for  initial  bilateral  loans  to  Greece  and for  the  EFSF, 
financial markets soon discounted the ESM too. Its major shortcomings 
were, again, the insufficient lending capacity– “too little, too late”– and 
its complex voting mechanism preventing any emergency provision of 
funds, and finally its funding system, still too much subject to the “can’t 
pay, won’t pay” dilemma (Manasse 2011; Munchau 2011).
Actually,  the  creation  of  the  ESM,  even  though  its  concrete 
implementation started only in late 2012, did not prevent the contagion 
of  the  Eurocrisis  to  the  core  of  Europe,  i.e.  Italy  and  Spain,  in  the 
dramatic summer of 2011 and the even more dramatic autumn of the 
same year ,  “the  point  where  clearly  the  Eurozone  as  we  know it 101
could have exploded”, according to a French official (Spiegel 2014b). 
The main limits of the instruments adopted were a direct consequence 
of the deliberative method in the EU (Copsey and Haughton 2012). 
 These are identified as the third and fourth waves of the crisis, see §3.2101
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The the presence of too many actors and of their diverging preferences 
involves too many veto-players, bringing about two major problems. 
The first is timing. European actors seemed to react to events, rather 
than shaping them (ibid.). The second is effectiveness. The necessity of 
accommodating divergent interests brings about policy outcomes that, 
being a compromise, fail to effectively address the underlying problem. 
That is why the intergovernmental momentum  opened up a political 
vacuum during the crisis, and in particular in this specific policy sector, 
in which the ECB could step in.
The ECB’s stance favored persuading member states to collectively act 
in order to address the crisis. The main reason of this attitude lies in the 
ECB mandate. According to article 127 of the TFEU, the ECB has the 
sole goal of maintaining price stability in the Eurozone, defined as a 
year-on-year increase in the index of prices for the Euro area of below 
2%. It is commonly known that, unlike the US Federal Reserve, the ECB 
can  sustain  economic  growth  and  full  employment  only  without 
prejudice  to  the  objective  of  price  stability.  Moreover,  according  to 
article 123 of the TFEU, the ECB cannot directly finance member states 
debt through money creation. In other words, it cannot act as the lender 
of last resort of the Eurozone  (Hu 2014), which represents a major 102
“unsolved  political  problem”  of  the  monetary  union  (Matthijs  and 
Blyth 2015). 
The  bank  since  2008  has  struggled  to  maintain  a  fragile  balance 
between treaty requirements and the compelling necessity of facing the 
crisis,  even more so in the case of  policy failures or  deficient  policy 
making by member states.  In this  sense,  the ECB’s attitude evolved, 
passing  from  the  defense  of  monetary  orthodoxy  up  to  the 
implementation  of  so-called  “non-standard  measures”,  in  the  same 
logic followed by other central banks across the world. Indeed, at first 
President Trichet strongly defended the institution’s independence and 
excluded  any  possible  bailout  of  Greece  by  the  ECB  (Trichet  2010). 
Later, however, the central bank elaborated three different programs of 
bond-purchase, indicating a more and more active interventionism in 
 For a discussion on the issue of ECB as lender of last resort in the Eurozone, 102
see De Grauwe (2011).
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this policy area, through a progressive stretching of its mandate.  In 103
2010  the  Securities  Markets  Programme  was  implemented,  in  2012 
Outright Monetary Transactions were created, and finally in early 2015 
the ECB started its program of Quantitative Easing.  104
SMP is a program of bond purchase implemented by the ECB between 
2010 and 2012  (ECB 2010b). Notwithstanding the formal prohibition 105
for  the  ECB  to  directly  finance  states’  debt,  it  can  operate  on  the 
secondary market – that is, purchasing sovereign bonds already issued 
in the open market – as a normal investor, an option taken up by the 
bank  in  due  course.  In  this  way  the  ECB  succeeded  in  sustaining 
European  countries  under  market  pressure,  with  the  result  of 
temporarily relaxing Europe’s over stressed peripheral states (Eser and 
Schwaab 2013). The ECB enacted two different rounds of SMP: the first 
was decided in May 2010, and a second round was set up in 2011 when 
crisis spread to Spain and Italy. The total amount of money released in 
the two SMP rounds is around €220 billion, massively directed towards 
Italian  (around  €100  billion),  Irish,  Portuguese,  and  Spanish  bonds. 
Despite the boost represented by the SMP, its potential is not infinite: 
 For sure, the role of ECB during the crisis is not limited to this interventions, 103
but spans from the support of banking institutions through different rounds of 
Long-Term  Refinancing  Operation;  the  participation  in  the  Troika  for 
monitoring the respect of conditionality in the rescue programs, up to the re-
orientation of the classic instruments of monetary policy. As to help Greece at 
the onset of the crisis, the ECB also decided to accept Greek debt as a collateral 
even in case of credit rate downgrade. For a discussion on the ECB role during 
the crisis, Barbier (2012), Irwin (2013) and Torres (2013). 
 The analysis will not closely consider QE, as it resides out of the temporal 104
scope of the analysis (2009-2014). Nonetheless, it is worth noticing that it can be 
seen – for the moment – as the apex of the open and non-standard intervention 
of the central bank into this specific policy area, thus a sort of prosecution in the 
line of SMP and OMT, which confirms the trends highlighted in this chapter.
 In line with the methodological assumptions of the dissertation, the ECB is 105
considered to be a unitary actor, even though it is commonly known that these 
interventions  provoked  an  internal  division  within  the  Governing  Council, 
namely because of the opposition of German members. Indeed, Jurgen Stark 
and Axel Weber resigned after the adoption of non-standard measures, both in 
disagreement with the operations of bond-purchase implemented by the ECB. 
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the idea underlying SMP, indeed, is not to finance states without limits 
of money and time, but rather to buy time for governments in order to 
have  the  reforms  voted  and  implemented,  as  confirmed  by  Italian 
member  of  ECB  Governing  Council  Lorenzo  Bini  Smaghi  (Spiegel 
2014b).
The timing and climate in which the SMP were adopted was the one of 
the  first  Greek  bailout,  in  early  May  2010,  when  the  confrontation 
between those defending ECB independence and others claiming for a 
bold  intervention  was  at  unprecedented  levels  (Bastasin  2012:  202). 
While openly Trichet was lobbying member states to act, with the threat 
the ECB would not come to rescue Greece, in a meeting in Lisbon the 
Governing Council of the ECB – with the opposition of German and 
Dutch representatives – decided to start the SMP, but to keep that a 
secret from the finance ministers and heads of state until they’d reached 
their own deal on the Greek rescue (Irwin 2013: 261). A few hours after 
the  announcement  of  the  creation  of  the  EFSF,  President  Trichet 
launched the first round of SMP. In order to remain within the legal 
framework of the treaties, the operation was justified as necessary to 
“reestablish the proper monetary transmission mechanism” in “those 
market  segments  that  are  dysfunctional”.  In  this  sense,  the  spirit  of 
Maastricht Treaty would be violated, while keeping to the letter of the 
law (ibid: 253). Moreover, so as to avoid a rise in the inflation rate, the 
program included a mechanism of “sterilization” – such that the SMP 
would not be allowed to result in an increase in the Eurozone money 
supply overall. 
At  first,  the  program  worked.  Spreads  of  PIIGS  bonds  sharply 
decreased after the launch of the SMP, but the program had the effect of 
reducing not only the pressure of financial  markets,  but pressure on 
southern countries to undertake structural reforms. The ECB, indeed, 
decided to suspend the program in March, and it was reopened only 
when the crisis reached the core of the Eurozone. In this sense, given 
that a round of bond purchase may decrease borrowing costs for almost 
100 basis points for troubled states, the SMP emerged as a means to 
punish or reward the actions of governments (ibid: 365). In this climate, 
in August 2011 the ECB sent the notorious letters to the prime ministers 
of Italy and Spain spelling out what they needed to do to regain the 
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confidence  of  markets  (Corriere  della  Sera  2011),  with  the  none-too-
subtle implication that if they did not agree to the plan described, the 
central bank would cease buying bonds to ease the market pressure on 
them (Irwin 2013: 363). 
5.3.5. The final step: Outright Monetary Transactions
As time passed,  the effectiveness of  SMP decrease.  As a program of 
limited purchases, financial investors found ways to keep yields at high 
levels.  In  the  turbulent  political  phase  of  late  2011 ,  Mario  Draghi 106
became the new president of the central bank, and he soon launched 
two unprecedented operations of liquidity for the European banking 
system, the LTROs (Wyplosz 2012). The underlying idea was to let the 
banks fund themselves at very cheap costs – the total amount of LTRO 
two  rounds  was  around  €1  trillion  –  so  as  to  have  them  purchase 
sovereigns and ease the ECB's burden of purchase programs.
In the next summer, nevertheless, a fifth wave of the crisis approached, 
this time related to the fear of Grexit due to the Greek general elections. 
At that time, the Spanish bank Bankia went burst,  companies began 
prepare for a Euro break up, and Italian and Spanish yields soared yet 
again. The Eurozone, again, seemed on the brink, when in London, on 
July 26, President Draghi declared that the central bank was ready to do 
“whatever it takes to save the Euro”. Indeed, two months later, he was 
to announce the suspension of the SMP and the creation of a second 
program  of  non-standard  measures,  under  the  name  of  Outright 
Monetary Transactions.  OMT are programs of  unlimited purchase of 
sovereigns  made  by  the  ECB  under  strict  conditionality,  which  are 
implemented when a state clearly shows its intention to apply. It goes 
as follows: when a state needs a credit line, it asks for the intervention 
of the ESM, then accepts some terms of conditionality. In this scenario, 
ECB  guarantees  unlimited  support  to  finance  the  ESM.  Being 
 In a few days panic spread again Europe in October-November: after calling 106
for  a  referendum  in  order  to  have  austerity  measures  approved  in  Greece, 
Papandreou resigned; in the meantime, Berlusconi left Italian government after 
some turbulent weeks in the domestic and international stage. For an account, 
see Spiegel 2014a.
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apparently a limitless support to member states, its strength is its real 
power of deterrence (ECB 2012). Speculation is foreclosed because no 
investor would bet against a central bank showing clear intentions of 
full commitment, even for bond markets as large as Spain or Italy. 
OMT makes up for the two main deficiencies of  the SMP: OMT are 
programs of unlimited purchase, and they present explicit conditionality. 
What is similar to SMP, is the underlying technical rationale: according 
to Mario Draghi, OMT are not an intervention in the fiscal policy of 
member states, but a monetary policy to “remove tail risks related to 
unfounded  fears  regarding  the  Euro,  [that]  was  essential  to  fight 
fragmentation of the Euro area markets” (Barber and Steen 2012). The 
fact that, up to now, OMT have not still being implemented, suggests 
that they could be the definitive arm against speculation on sovereigns. 
As the course of spreads and CDS show, indeed, market pressure seems 
to have declined markedly after the launch of OMT (see appendix, fig. 
a5).
As  one  can  easily  guess,  the  underlying  negotiations  behind  OMT 
creation was not  easy.  Once again,  the turbulent  process of  policy 107
creation reflected the recurrent cleavage among member states on the 
solutions  to  be  found  to  sustain  weak  countries.  The  project  of 
establishing  a  credible,  unlimited  program  of  bond  purchase  was 
opposed by Germany at every level,  both at governmental level and 
within the Governing Council . On the contrary, it was welcomed by 108
Italian PM Mario Monti and all debtor countries, as well as by United 
States. Spiegel (2014a) reports that Professor Monti in a G20 meeting in 
Los  Cabos,  on  June,  succeeded  in  creating  an  axis  with  President 
Obama in  order  to  convince  Chancellor  Merkel  to  agree  on a  ECB–
 As an ECB program OMT should have been independently decided by the 107
central  bank,  but being a very sensitive instrument,  president Mario Draghi 
tried  to  negotiate  its  creation  in  order  to  obtain  a  large  consensus  on  the 
measure among all the European actors involved.
 Jens Weidmann voted against OMT, and its view was known. During the 108
conference press for the presentation of OMT, asked if the decision to enact the 
program was  unanimous,  Draghi  told  reporters,  “There  was  one  dissenting 
view… It is up to you to guess.” 
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backed firewall, that is, on the possibility for the ECB to buy sovereign 
bonds in strict liaison with the ESM. A few days later, Monti is reported 
to  have  opposed its  veto  to  a  German proposition  in  the  European 
Council, in order to force Angela Merkel to back a sort of “anti-spread 
shield”  (Barberi  and  Feltri  2014:  89-92).  These  harsh  negotiations 
effectively  broke  up the  northern  creditor  coalition  and let  the  ECB 
operate  without  the  explicit  opposition  of  its  biggest  contributor, 
Germany.
Mario Draghi's strategy, indeed, was to try to obtain the agreement of 
Angela  Merkel  for  its  bond-purchase  program,  because  without 
German participation the program would be considerably less credible. 
Such  agreement  was  reached  through the  introduction  of  the  major 
feature  of  OMT,  i.e.  its  explicit  conditionality.  In  this  way,  Draghi 
managed to convince Merkel on the merits of the program, lessening 
the feared risk of moral hazard, and opening up the space for what has 
been considered the “coup de grace“ of the Euro crisis (Spiegel 2014a).
5.4. Hypotheses validation: The case of financial support instruments
Unlike the previous case study on fiscal rules, this one does not offer 
the possibility of tracing a policy change with respect to the pre-crisis 
period,  as  the  policy  of  financial  support  to  countries  in  need  was 
absent,  due to the no-bailout clause.  Nonetheless,  the policy saw an 
incremental transformation since the beginning of the sovereign crisis, 
when it was implemented mainly through bilateral loans, up to the late 
developments,  when  supranational  and  EU-wide  programs  and 
instruments were set up. That is why the attention in this section will be 
put  on  the  institutional  transformations  occurring  within  the  crisis 
period,  i.e.  between early  2010  and late  2014,  and the  three  leading 
hypotheses will be tested for this span of time.
5.4.1. Hypothesis n.1
The first hypothesis claims that “An economic crisis is a fundamental 
driver of major institutional changes,  both in terms of their quantity 
and quality”,  that  is  to  say that  policy  making is  multiplied during 
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economic  downturns  in  response  to  the  challenges  coming  from 
external market pressure.
The discussion on the creation of the different instruments of financial 
support  to  peripheral  states  showed  that  -  unlike  in  the  pre-crisis 
period,  when  the  formal  establishment  of  a  rescue  mechanism  was 
peremptorily excluded by member states as to avoid moral hazard – 
Eurozone  members  progressively  set  up  a  framework  of  financial 
assistance, including a stable rescue facility, the ESM. One of the main 
aspects of this policy sector is that EU governments always seemed to 
react to external pressures, setting up what was perceived as necessary 
by  financial  investors,  and  trying  to  follow  the  timing  required  by 
financial markets. This climate of urging pressure is witnessed by the 
reconstructions made by the same actors: finance minister of Bulgaria, 
Simeon  Djankov,  recalls  that  during  the  negotiations  on  whatever 
instrument of crisis management “markets reactions to Ecofin decisions 
became a bigger part of our considerations […]; there was an explicit 
discussion in Ecofin of how much information would be sufficient to 
placate  markets  on  any  one  issue”  (Djankov  2014:  71);  Christine 
Lagarde,  during  tense  EFSF  negotiations,  was  reported  to  be 
particularly fearful of the opening bell of financial markets in Tokyo, 
and to call out the names of markets as they opened (Hewitt 2014: 80). 
That demonstrates how much external pressure – extraordinary well 
represented by the image of the opening of Asian markets, normally on 
Monday – was functional to the decisions that were progressively taken 
in the crisis years.
To  be  more  specific,  one  can  find  some  correlation  between  the 
indicator used to signal the raise of market pressure, i.e. the course of 
spreads  and  CDS  on  sovereign  bonds,  and  the  adoption  of  policy 
outcomes (see appendix, fig. a6). Indeed, the policy outcomes analyzed 
were all adopted when the crisis hit the most, according to the different 
peaks  identified in  the  overview of  the  crisis.  The  first  wave of  the 
crisis,  the one due to the outbreak of  the Greek crisis  in early 2010, 
brought about the adoption of the first bailout package and the creation 
of  the  EFSF.  Moreover,  in  the  same week the  ECB set  up its  first 109
 And of the EFSM as well, which has not been tackled in the chapter.109
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program of bond purchase, the SMP. What is peculiar is that these three 
instruments  were  progressively  set  up  because  financial  markets 
seemed not to welcome what had been done before: the EFSF became 
necessary as markets judged as insufficient bilateral loans, and the ECB 
decided to intervene fearing that states would not find an agreement on 
Greece,  which  would  be  disastrous  for  financial  stability  in  the  old 
continent.
When it comes to the ESM, the process of its creation perfectly reflects 
the  course  of  the  crisis.  It  began  to  be  felt  as  necessary  when  the 
contagion spread to Ireland, as the shortcomings of the EFSF emerged. 
Indeed, on the same day of the approval of a line of credit for Ireland, 
the European Council invited Ecofin to approve the creation of the ESM 
(Djankov 2014: 131). Then, the treaty reform for its creation was agreed 
when Portugal was under market pressure, and the final signature of 
the treaty establishing the ESM was in July 2011, in the middle of the 
financial storm which menaced Italy and Spain, during the third wave 
of the crisis.
Finally,  concerning  the  intervention  of  the  ECB in  the  policy  sector, 
we’ve seen how much SMP creation was due to market instability. For 
sure, even the set up of the other programs was highly influenced by 
the behavior of  financial  markets.  The two LTROs in support  of  the 
banking sector were decided during the fourth wave of the crisis – in 
autumn 2011, probably the most dramatic phase of the Eurozone crisis. 
The OMT, for their part, were the concrete realization of the “whatever 
it takes” discourse by Mario Draghi, in July 2012, in the middle of the 
fifth  wave  of  the  crisis,  due  to  the  re-emergence  of  Greek  troubles. 
Indeed,  it  was  after  some  weeks  of  tense  negotiations  to  buy  the 
agreement of Germany that the ECB launched the Outright Monetary 
Transactions,  which  decidedly  contributed  to  calm  down  markets 
nerves. 
It  appears quite clear,  then, that the first hypothesis is  confirmed by 
empirical  data  concerning  the  case  study  on  financial  assistance  to 
states in need. There is, indeed, a significant causal link between the 
pressure  exercised  by  financial  markets  on  policy  makers,  and  the 
adoption of policy outcomes.
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5.4.2. Hypothesis n.2 
The second hypothesis of the dissertation inquires on the relationship 
between  decision  making  processes  and  whether  outcomes  were 
successful  or  not.  In  particular,  the  hypothesis  claims  that 
intergovernmental  decision  making  result  only  in  incremental  and 
ineffective  policy  outcomes,  including  the  possibility  of  institutional 
deadlocks, while supranational decision making, on the contrary, will 
produce  successful  outcomes  and  solve  eventual  institutional 
deadlocks. In other words, the outcomes of negotiation processes are 
not a pure reflection on states’ and institutions’ bargaining powers, but 
they  are  mediated  by  the  existing  institutional  setting.  Institutions, 
then, coordinate actors’ behavior toward certain outcomes and shape 
the information structure. 
To start with, it is necessary to assess how the effectiveness of a policy 
outcome can be assessed. Given that the policy at  stake is  set  up to 
relieve  weak  states  from  the  pressure  of  financial  markets,  a  good 
indicator to assess the successful character of a policy outcome is its 
effectiveness in meeting markets’ expectations. That is to say, a certain 
policy outcome is not considered to be effective only if it succeeds in 
rescuing a country , but if in doing this it offers a credible solution to 110
the crisis, which can be measured through the observation of markets’ 
reactions to the outcome, i.e. through the change in spreads and CDS 
on sovereign bonds. In other words, if  market conditions deteriorate 
after  the  adoption  of  a  policy  outcome,  it  has  to  be  considered  as 
unsuccessful,  while  if  markets’  nerves  are  calmed,  represented  by  a 
decrease of CDS and spreads, it can be considered as effective.
In this sense, in line with the empirical data reported above, one can 
assess that pure intergovernmental instruments – bilateral loans, EFSF 
and ESM – were far less effective than supranational programs adopted 
by the ECB. Or, to be more precise, bilateral loans and the EFSF were 
very weak in meeting markets expectations, while the ESM was slightly 
 According to this perspective, indeed, ECB’s programs would be ineffective 110
as they’ve never formally contributed to a bailout,  and even the first  Greek 
bailout through bilateral loans,which was very poorly welcomed by markets, 
would be considered as effective.
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more  convincing,  but  it  presented  nonetheless  serious  shortcomings 
undermining its credibility. 
It has been noticed that the first bilateral loans for the first Greek rescue 
in early 2010 were very poorly received by financial investors, so badly 
that European governments were forced to create a further facility just a 
few days later. Indeed, less than a week after the agreement on the first 
bailout, interests on Greek bonds soared at impressive rate. Those of 
other  peripheral  countries  also  increased  (Djankov  2014),  interbank 
lending froze and the market returned to pre-Lehman levels of panic 
(Ludlow 2010). The reason is that governments agreed on a program 
that was at the same time too little and it  came too late,  and it  was 
unable to stop any risks of contagion. Seemingly, markets reactions to 
the EFSF were positive only for a few days, until they realized its major 
shortcomings. Namely, that the amount of the facility was insufficient, 
that the SVP mechanism did not provide real money, that there was a 
heavy activation process and that the facility was temporally limited. 
Again, the outcome was too little with regard to the necessities imposed 
by the situation. Such market reactions demonstrate that, though the 
two instruments were able to offer financial assistance in the short term, 
they were not able to represent sustainable solutions to the crisis in the 
middle and long term.
On the contrary, scholars have highlighted the positive impact of the 
SMP, the program launched by the ECB in those same days of  May 
2010,  in  terms of  influence on spreads and CDS (Eser  and Schwaab 
2012). In particular, the different rounds of bond purchase by the ECB 
corresponded to  a  sharp decrease of  yields  among sovereign bonds. 
Moreover, the suspension of the program decided in March 2011 had as 
a  consequence an expansion of  the crisis,  which spread to Italy and 
Spain, until the ECB did not decide to launch another round of SMP to 
relieve the two countries (Savelin and Darvas 2012). Actually, the SMP 
seems to be “very significant” in positively influencing spreads of the 
country whose bonds are purchased (ibid.).
When it comes to the ESM, its main shortcoming is due to the very long 
process  of  decision  making  behind  its  adoption.  It  took  two  years, 
indeed, from the first references to an eventual transformation of the 
EFSF into a permanent mechanism, discussed in Deauville, in October 
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2010, for the first time, up to its definitive activation in October 2012. 
Indeed,  the  process  involved  a  treaty  change,  the  signature  of  an 
international agreement, and finally a process of ratification, being the 
ESM a pure intergovernmental creature. In the meantime, events made 
it necessary to bailout Ireland, Portugal, Greece again, and the Spanish 
banking sector. All in all, then, even if the ESM can be better placed as 
an  instrument  of  crisis  management  in  the  long-term  –  due  to  its 
permanent  character  and  its  bolder  financial  endowment  –  the 
intergovernmental negotiation process behind its creation provoked an 
institutional deadlock which exacerbated the crisis, as markets realized 
that EU governments were not ready to quickly respond to crisis with 
comprehensive, credible and long-sighted measures. 
As a last instrument here analyzed, OMT were set up in mid-2012 by 
the ECB, and they were presented as the “bazooka” used by the central 
bank to save the Euro (Steen et al. 2012). The program, which was never 
implemented, resulted then as a successful deterrence instrument (ECB 
2012). Indeed, a formal inclusion of conditionality, as well as a promise 
to  unlimited  bond  purchase  in  case  of  activation  make  the  OMT  a 
credible  commitment  of  the  ECB  to  save  the  common  currency.  By 
consequence,  the  launch  of  the  program  in  2012,  together  with  its 
anticipation in the “whatever it takes” pledge by Mario Draghi in July, 
resulted in a considerable,  and lasting, decreases in bond yields and 
CDS for European weaker states. All in all, if the crisis is not yet over – 
the crisis in Cyprus occurred after the launch of OMT, and at the time of 
writing  a  new  Greek  crisis  has  re-emerged  –  OMT  represented  a 
credible instrument of crisis prevention, one that markets waited for 
since 2010, and in response to which they considerably relented their 
pressure on the Eurozone.111
As a result, it appears that the three instruments adopted throughout 
intergovernmental decision making were far less effective than the ones 
adopted  by  a  supranational  institution.  It  is  then  necessary  to 
 The general level of spreads is considerably low after the launch of OMT 111
with respect to the levels of 2011-2012 (see appendix, fig. a5): even the banking 
crisis in Cyprus didn’t manage to skyrocket bonds spread as it happened for 
the prior waves of the crisis.
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understand  why  the  Eurozone  witnessed  such  dichotomy  between 
supranational  effectiveness  and  intergovernmental  deadlocks.  The 
response to the question can be found in the institutional setting that 
was  in  place  before  the  outbreak  of  the  crisis.  First  of  all,  the 
institutional setting precluded the adoption of policy outcomes through 
the  community  method:  co-decision indeed is  the  normal  legislative 
procedure for those competencies which states have already devolved 
in the hands of the EU. Financial assistance to states in need, on the 
contrary,  was  never  set  up  as  an  official  policy  of  the  EU,  so  the 
community  method  could  not  be  used.  By  consequence,  decision 
making  was  carried  out  through  two  main  processes: 
intergovernmental  crisis  management,  in  which  states  at  unanimity 
ruled out their decisions, and supranational decision making, in which 
a  quasi-federal  institution,  the  ECB,  independently  decided  the 
development of its monetary policy in response to the crisis. 
According  to  scholarship,  a  comprehensive  solution  among member 
states could be found at the very beginning of the crisis, i.e. before May 
2010, and this would be far less costly than the ones then implemented 
(Bastasin 2012: 148). Even lacking any counterfactual argument, one can 
easily imagine that a cheaper and less fatiguing solution could certainly 
have been found. As an intergovernmental policy, at the basis of much 
of the problems occurring in the last years, there was the necessity of 
getting  the  unanimity  of  all  governments  in  the  face  of  divergent 
preferences,  which  is  a  challenging  operation  due  to  the  eminently 
redistributive nature of the policy at stake. Moreover, states have been 
confronted  with  the  classical  dilemmas  of  intergovernmental 
negotiations (Fabbrini 2014), and with the veto dilemma in particular. 
This refers to the necessity of neutralizing opposition and multiple veto 
players in a unanimity rule regime, a direct consequence of which is the 
adopting  of  non-optimal  decisions,  representing  the  only  possible 
minimum compromise, in a longer span of time than a majority vote 
would suggest. This is at the core of the “too little, too late” label given 
to much of the policy responses adopted by Eurozone governments.
Moreover,  treaty  provisions  acted  as  an  obstacle  to  a  linear 
development of the policy, in particular due to the presence of some 
articles precluding the creation of EU-wide rescue facilities, namely the 
!139
already cited articles 123 and 125 TFEU – the no-bailout clause.  As a 112
result, some comprehensive solution which was proposed, could not be 
implemented because of major limits of the treaties – see for example 
the proposition of a European Monetary Fund, which was abandoned 
because it required a treaty change. Likewise, the long negotiations that 
occurred for the set up of the ESM were partly due to the necessity of a 
treaty change (article 136 TFEU) to be reached by unanimity of member 
states. This necessary step considerably weighed on the speed of the 
process.  In  this  perspective,  at  least  two institutional  rules  –  formal 
treaty  provisions,  and  the  unanimity  regime  in  intergovernmental 
decision making – represented a main obstacle to the effectiveness of 
policy outcomes.
Besides, another type of institutional rule was fundamental in shaping 
the policy process: the defense of the independence of the ECB, equally 
foreseen  by  EU  treaties  at  article  282  and  by  the  ECB  mandate, 
preventing a politicization of  the institution,  and by consequence an 
earlier and more direct intervention in the bond markets. In this sense, 
the ECB could not be called to act by governments – even if some of 
them often lobbied the bank for active intervention – but the Governing 
Council independently decided to act when it considered it necessary.  113
Nonetheless, a stretched interpretation of the treaties was functional to 
an intervention of the ECB. Indeed, in the presence of article 123 TFEU, 
the ECB did not present the two non-standard measures as instruments 
of financial rescue, but as unconventional monetary instruments to re-
 In the end, the presence of the no-bailout clause did not prevent the set up of 112
rescue facilities nor the interventions of the ECB, as a loose interpretation of the 
article  prevailed (Louis  2010;  Bianco 2012).  Nonetheless,  the presence of  the 
clause made the creation process of the ESM considerably more difficult and 
time-consuming an undertaking.
 Within the Governing Council decisions are taken by majority. As a result, 113
there  are  fewer  possibilities  of  having  blockage  minorities.  Actually,  the 
opposition of the German representatives of the ECB Board to a progressively 
more  interventionist  approach  of  the  ECB  was  not  sufficient  to  block  the 
process.  Moreover,  in  order  to  reinforce  the  independence  of  the  single 
members, transcriptions of the board meeting are kept secret for thirty years, 
which  makes  the  monetary  policy  definition  easier  and  less  politicized,  by 
limiting internal fractures as compared to, say, the European Council. 
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address  dysfunctional  financial  markets.  From a  theoretical  point  of 
view,  the  fact  that  both the  ECB mandate  and the no-bailout  clause 
were loosely interpreted, confirms that incremental institutional change 
can occur through open interpretation of formal rules that can evolve in 
line with external contingencies (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). All in all, 
in line with the theoretical assumptions of the dissertation, institutional 
rules appear to be fundamental in two main aspects: on the one hand, 
their presence influences the nature of policy outcomes, which are not a 
pure reflection of actors’ bargaining powers, but they’re mediated by 
the existent institutional settings; on the other hand, policy outcomes 
are  themselves  the  product  of  an  institutional  change,  sometimes 
formal – i.e. a treaty modification, the creation of a new agreement – 
sometimes informal – i.e. a more flexible interpretation of rules.
As a result, the discussion of the empirical data offers a clear-cutting 
confirmation  of  the  second  hypothesis  of  the  dissertation  for  this 
second case study. Namely, intergovernmental policy making resulted 
in incremental and ineffective policy outputs – “too little, too late” – 
and  in  institutional  deadlocks,  as  the  creation  of  the  ESM  shows. 
Conversely, supranational policy making carried out independently by 
the  ECB  resulted  in  successful  and  more  effective  outputs,  which 
contributed, if not to put a definitive end to the Eurozone crisis, at least 
to a certain relief of states in need.
5.4.3. Hypothesis n. 3
According to the third hypothesis, “In the case of policy failure due to 
irreconcilable conflicting interests or institutional deadlocks, a process 
of delegation to a neutral – i.e. supranational – actor occurs, resulting in 
an empowerment of supranational institutions vis-à-vis member states”. 
Here, the empirical data provide only a partial confirmation. Indeed, on 
the basis of the clear distinction made between the limited effectiveness 
of  intergovernmental  decision  making  and  the  more  successful 
intervention of  the  ECB in  the  field of  financial  support  to  member 
states,  it  may appear that  the ECB was delegated to act  by member 
states in order to provide better policy solutions. Nonetheless, due to 
the independent nature of the central bank, there was never an explicit 
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and formal delegation of authority towards the ECB – as it happened 
for the European Commission and the ECJ in the previous case study. 
Rather,  this  process  of  supranational  empowerment  was  more  an 
unintended  consequence  of  failed  intergovernamentalism,  than  a 
formal delegation of powers.
In other words, even if ECB actually stepped into the policy making 
process  in  order  to  counterbalance  the  problems  created  by 
intergovernmental  crisis  management,  such  activism  was  not  a 
consequence of a formal act of delegation by Eurozone governments, 
but  the  independent  choice  of  the  Governing  Council  of  the  ECB 
enjoying its positional resources and full discretion as an independent 
actor (Héritier and Prakash 2015). Of course, a coalition of states have 
always  been  lobbying  for  bold  intervention  of  the  ECB  in  bond 
purchases. However, these claims, by France, Italy and peripheral states 
in general, and fiercely opposed by northern countries, were there, but 
they were not  the source of  any formal de jure  delegation of  power, 
which indeed never took place. 
As a consequence, even if there seemed to be a de facto delegation to the 
ECB for the solution of the sovereign crisis, such delegation was not 
formally required, nor decided, by member states – as it would also be 
illegal under EU treaties. Rather, this policy sector has seen a process of 
unintended delegation of powers towards the ECB, which turned out to 
be better equipped to offer long-term solution to the crisis. In this sense, 
the  third  hypothesis  is  partially  confirmed:  institutional  deadlocks 
created by intergovernmental management of the crisis may have seen 
a de facto supranational delegation of powers toward the ECB, but such 
delegation was neither formally required, nor causal of formal transfer 
of competencies to the supranational level. In other words, it is simply 
an “emergency delegation” that the ECB assumed on its shoulders and 
that will likely disappear when the crisis is over.
While out of the scope of the research, it is worth noticing as well that 
at least one formal act of delegation toward supranational institutions 
was ruled out during the crisis with regard to the “bailout policy”. The 
Troika,  composed  by  officials  of  the  supranational  ECB,  European 
Commission and IMF were denied the power of monitoring the respect 
of the conditionality in the countries under financial assistance. 
!142
5.5. A progressive supranationalization of bailouts? An assessment
As a general conjecture underlying the dissertation, economic crisis is 
considered  as  a  trigger  of  the  supranationalization  of  the  European 
polity. It is then necessary to assess wether this happened or not for this 
case  study.  As  a  general  consideration,  since  there  was  no  rescue 
mechanism at the European level to support member states before the 
crisis, the mere fact of having provided a series of them throughout the 
crisis,  can  be  considered  to  be  an  advancement  toward  a  more 
integrated  Europe.  Nonetheless,  the  analysis  will  be  carried  out  by 
applying for this case study the different indicators functional to build 
up an index of supranationalization .  114
It  has  to  be  noticed  that,  in  lack  of  a  defined  policy  of  financial 
assistance  before  the  outset  of  the  crisis,  a  sort  of  “intra-crisis” 
comparison  will  be  carried  out.  That  is,  the  first  set  of  measures 
adopted to counteract the financial crisis – i.e. the provision of bilateral 
loans – will be compared to the institutional setup at the end of 2014 – 
i.e. when financial assistance to states in need is composed by the ESM 
and OMT, working together. Some references, in case, will be devoted 
to what can be considered as a mid-range level of institutionalization of 
the policy, the EFSF. 
The index of supranationalization for this case study is composed of 
three main dimensions, each of them having policy-specific indicators 
(see table 4). Concerning the first dimension of the index (the overall 
supranational  management  of  the  policy  cycle),  the  indicators 
correspond  to  the  four  different  phases  of  the  policy  management: 
agenda  setting,  policy  formulation,  implementation  and  monitoring. 
For each of them, the role of governments or supranational institutions 
will  be  checked,  so  as  to  assess  the  overall  level  of  supranational 
management  of  the  policy.  The  second  dimension  (power  of 
supranational institutions) is assessed by looking at eventual delegation 
of competencies and authority to the supranational level for this policy 
area,  the  level  of  policy  politicization  and  the  role  of  supranational 
institutions  in  enforcing  eventual  rules  of  conditionality.  Finally,  the 
 For further references, see the methodological section, §2.5.3114
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third dimension finds its policy-specific indicator in the assessment of 
the supranational level of the combination between ESM and OMT, that 
at the end of 2014 represented the policy framework reigning the policy 
of financial assistance to member states. Like the previous case study, 
each indicator will be assigned a value, ranging from 1 (very low level 
of supranationalization) to 5 (very high level of supranationalization). 
The elaboration of different values of the indicators is then functional to 
make an assessment on the level of supranationalization of the whole 
policy at stake.
* The value of supranationalization is to be considered as the inverse of the 
hypothetic  value  of  the  indicator  (e.g.  a  low  level  of  politicization 
corresponds to a high level of supranationalization).
Table 4. Instruments of financial support: Index of supranationalization.
To start with, it is necessary to note that as a general rule, the policy is 
mostly  intergovernmental  in  the phase of  agenda setting and policy 
formulation. Indeed, since the beginning of the crisis, short of any EU 
ONSET OF 
THE CRISIS
LATE 2014
- Agenda-setting 1 1
- Policy formulation 1 1
- Implementation 2 3
- Evaluation 2 4
= (1) SUPRANATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THE POLICY 1.5 2.25
- Delegation of competencies 1 3
- Policy politicization* 2 3
- Enforcement of conditionality 3 4
= (2) POWER OF SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS      2 3.3
- Instrument of financial assistance (ESM+OMT) 1 3
= (3) SUPRANATIONAL MECHANISM 1 3
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competence in  the field,  member states’  governments  have been the 
protagonists of the policy making, and the legislative competences in 
this sector was not even partially transferred to the supranational level. 
It has been noticed, for instance, that the community method was not 
undertaken and that the Commission’s proposition for the creation of 
Eurobonds was never seriously tackled by the European Council.
As a matter of fact, the multiplication of EU summits at governmental 
level  perfectly  reflects  this  sort  of  “intergovernmentalization”  of  the 
policy making in the field. This is translated into a very low value (1) 
for two indicators (the phases of agenda setting and the one of policy 
formulation)  both  at  the  onset  of  the  crisis  and  in  late  2014. 
Nonetheless, the policy of financial support saw a certain increase in 
the involvement of supranational institutions, namely the Commission 
and the ECB, in the phases of implementation and evaluation. Indeed, 
from the start of the crisis, being part of the Troika, the two institutions 
progressively  obtained  the  power  of  monitoring  compliance  with 
conditionality  for  those  states  under  assistance  programs  – 
conditionality  that  was,  for  its  part,  progressively  strengthened  and 
formalized in the different instruments created. More importantly, the 
ESM  foresees  the  elaboration  of  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding 
between the European Commission and the country in need, to set up 
policy conditions (ESM 2015), which was not foreseen for the delivering 
of bilateral loans. This signals a certain involvement of EU institutions 
in the two other phases of the policy management, the implementation 
and the evaluation. As a result, though being the policy still managed 
eminently at intergovernmental level, during the last years the level of 
co-management  at  supranational  level  slightly  increased  (from  an 
overall level of 1.5 to 2.25). In other words, the policy passed from a 
level  in  which  there  was  no  coordination  at  all  among  European 
governments and institutions to one in which a certain coordination is 
observed.
Concerning the power of supranational institutions in the broad field of 
financial  support  to  states  in  troubles,  empirical  observation 
highlighted  the  progressive  empowerment  of  the  ECB,  mainly  as  a 
response to unsuccessful intergovernmental policy making. According 
to the result of the third hypothesis’ test, the economic crisis seems to 
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trigger a sort of informal and unintended delegation to the ECB of the 
burden of financially rescuing states in need. If in May 2010 states tried 
to  organize  the  rescue  program  through  fully  intergovernmental 
processes,  in  late  2014  there  was  a  far  deeper  integration  of 
supranational instruments, namely the OMT and ESM.
Moreover,  the  crisis  triggered  a  higher  level  of  policy  politicization, 
aimed at involving more actively the ECB in policy making. If at the 
outset of the crisis there was an attempt to include the central bank (at 
that time rejected by Frankfurt), empirical observation has showed that 
the launch of the OMT, though consistent with ECB independence, was 
a highly coordinated negotiation between Paris, Berlin and Frankfurt. 
This  signals  that  the  policy  underwent  a  progressive  politicization 
through the active involvement of the ECB. 
In  the  end,  a  third  indicator  indicates  the  discrete  empowerment  of 
supranational institutions, i.e. their involvement on the enforcement of 
conditionality. This element, though being present in any instrument of 
financial  assistance,  finds  its  main  representation  in  the 
complementarity  between  OMT  and  ESM  –  that  is,  in  order  to  be 
helped through OMT, a state has to apply for ESM aids. And in this 
case both the European Commission and the ECB have the power of 
closely monitoring the respect of conditionality measures, triggering a 
certain  empowerment  since  2010.  As  a  result,  in  the  context  of  an 
intergovernmental  policy  as  the  one  under  scrutiny  is,  European 
institutions succeeded in increasing their powers, as the overall level of 
the indicators  demonstrates  (from 2 to  3.3),  meaning that  the policy 
finds  a  certain  joint  management  among  governments  and 
supranational institutions.
The  third  dimension  considered  in  the  assessment  of  the  eventual 
supranationalization  of  the  policy  is  the  presence  of  an  EU-based 
mechanism.  When  it  comes  to  financial  support,  the  Eurozone  has 
experienced a progressive supranationalization of financial assistance, 
from the provision of bilateral loans up to the creation of a permanent 
rescue  mechanism  –  the  ESM.  The  ESM  is  certainly  not  a  pure 
supranational  instrument,  as  it  is  based  on  an  intergovernmental 
agreement among governments, and requires the unanimity of member 
states  for  its  activation  and it  is  funded by  states’  and not  the  EU. 
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However,  with respect  to the first  bilateral  loans and to the EFSF,  it 
presents some distinct elements of supranationalization. In particular: it 
is based on EU treaties, which have been modified in order to create it 
(article 136), it involves European institutions in the enforcement phase, 
it is integrated with a quasi-federal program – OMT by the ECB – and it 
is explicitly directed towards the members of the Eurozone. As a point 
of  contrast  in  this  context:  bilateral  loans,  a  pure  form  of 
intergovernmental coordination, are assigned a level of 1 in the scale of 
supranationalization, while the ESM obtains 3,  signaling that though 
being formally an intergovernmental agreement, in reality it reflects a 
medium level of supranationalization .
Overall the analysis shows that the policy of financial support to states 
in  need  resulted  in  a  process  of  progressive,  though  discrete, 
supranationalization.  The  policy  remains  formally  intergovernmental 
and member states’ retain much of the power in the definition of the 
policy.  Nonetheless,  the final  value of  the index of  supranationalism 
(final  value:  2.85)  shows  a  medium  level  of  supranationalization  in 
comparison to the low value of the first measures implemented in 2010 
(initial value: 1.5; see figure 6). Following the scale proposed by Borzel 
(2005), we are left to conclude that the policy is now structured along a 
medium level of supranationalization with respect to both scope and 
intensity. Indeed, the character of the instruments progressively set up 
to  provide  financial  assistance  to  troubled  countries  have  changed 
slightly,  whereby  the  involvement  of  supranational  institutions  both 
formal and informal – has increased, and the EU legal framework is 
used progressively more. Unlike the case of the rules of fiscal discipline, 
there was no formal upload of competencies to the supranational level, 
but the fact itself of having set up a policy of financial support may be 
seen as a strengthening of the links of solidarity among member states, 
and  in  the  final  analysis  as  a  discrete  deepening  of  the  European 
integration.
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Figure 6. Evolution of supranationalization rate of the policy of financial 
support.
Chapter 6
The creation of a banking union in the Eurozone 
The object of the third case study is the process of progressive creation 
of the so-called banking union in the European Union, which according 
to some observers can be judged as the most important achievement in 
Europe since the breakout of the crisis, though it often goes unnoticed 
in the public debate (Véron 2015:8). As a matter of fact, the sovereign 
crisis  has  contributed  to  the  creation  an  entirely  new  policy  sector, 
through the progressive transition from an un-coordinated structure – 
i.e.  the powers of  banking regulation being in the hands of  national 
competent  authorities  –  through  to  “soft”  legislation,  and  finally  to 
hard–law instruments (Hennessy 2013). 
The term “banking union” was used for the first time in 2011 (see Véron 
2011)  and  its  first  appeared  in  official  documents  from  2012  (see 
European Commission 2012a). Banking union refers to both the process 
whereby authority over banking policy is transferred from the national 
to  the  European  level,  as  well  as  to  the  European  banking  policy 
framework  resulting from that transfer (Véron 2014). In this sense, the 
banking  union  represents  an  entirely  new  policy  area  in  which 
European  governments  decided  to  transfer  competencies  to  the 
supranational level, by empowering supranational institutions to act in 
the sector. In general terms, the banking union is composed of different 
pillars,  representing  the  main  components  of  banking  policy.  These 
pillars include a set of common rules for European banks – the so-called 
single  rulebook  –  a  single  framework  of  banking  supervision,  a 
common deposit guarantee, a single framework for banking resolution, 
and a  fiscal  backstop  for  temporary  financial  support  (Constancio 115
 Common  regulation  and  supervision  can  be  seen  as  applying  at  the 115
preventive stage, while the other three pillars concern the crisis management 
stage.
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2013).  The single rulebook contains a number of  directives aimed at 
harmonizing some aspects of the banking sector, so as to guarantee the 
fair  competition  within  the  internal  market,  e.g.  the  capital 
requirements  of  banks.  A single  framework  of  banking  supervision 
means that the power to give and retire banking license, as well as to 
check the financial health of credit institutions, is assigned at a single 
European authority, thus it is centrally exercised. In parallel, a single 
resolution framework is a common set of rules and procedures to be 
followed in case of risk of bank default. The common deposit guarantee 
would be a European fund to protect banking deposits up to €100.000 
in case of bank default, and finally a common fiscal backstop represents 
a facility to temporarily finance failing banks.
Though a number of scholars have observed that all these five aspects 
should be collectively adopted to ensure stability of the banking sector 
(Schoenmaker 2012), as a new institutional creature, the banking union 
structure created in the last years does not cover all of these aspects. In 
particular,  while  some rules  were already present  for  what  concerns 
common rules for European banks, and these have been progressively 
strengthened, only two main pillars out of four remaining emerged in 
the  discussions  in  these  last  years.  These  were  the  framework  of 
banking  supervision  and  that  of  banking  resolution.  A preliminary 
agreement has also been reached to let the ESM represent a common 
backstop for temporary financial support,  but major cleavages on the 116
setup of a common deposit guarantee prevented the creation of such 
instrument  and  up  to  now  the  coordination  over  a  pan-European 
deposit  guarantee  scheme  is  only  foreseen  on  a  voluntary  base 
(European Commission 2014c).
Thus, the process of creating a banking union is still in its infancy. Two 
concrete measures have emerged, one related to the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM – that is, the common supervision of European banks) 
and the  second to  the  Single  Resolution  Mechanism (SRM –  setting 
 To be more specific, European governments decided to let the ESM provide 116
financial support to member states, which in turn can use these funds to help 
national banks. Thus, it is a form of indirect financial backstop for the banking 
union (see infra).
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common procedures for bailing-out failing banks). The whole process 
started in June 2012, when the Eurosummit agreed to establish the SSM, 
which was effectively created in October 2013. The SRM was created in 
July 2014,  through the creation of  a  Single  Resolution Board for  the 
management of banking crisis and the provision of a Single Resolution 
Fund  whose  details  were  worked  out  in  an  intergovernmental 
agreement  held  in  May  2014,  and  whose  ratification  process  is  still 
ongoing.
As  for  the  two  other  case  studies,  the  aim  of  the  empirical 
reconstruction is to collect data concerning the progressive setup of a 
banking union and then use them to test the three main hypotheses of 
the  dissertation,  as  well  as  the  underlying  conjecture  according  to 
which economic crises do foster an effective supranationalization of EU 
policies. As discussed in the theoretical section (§2.4), the three main 
hypotheses of the dissertation are as follows:
H1: An economic crisis is a fundamental driver of major institutional 
changes, both in terms of their quantity and quality;
H2: Intergovernmental policy making tends to have incremental and 
ineffective  policy  outputs  and  to  create  institutional  deadlocks; 
conversely, supranational policy making tends to have successful and 
more effective outputs;
H3:  In  the  case  of  policy  failure  due  to  irreconcilable  conflicting 
interests or institutional deadlocks, a process of delegation to a neutral 
–  i.e.  supranational  –  actor occurs,  resulting in an empowerment of 
supranational institutions vis-à-vis member states.
Each  of  the  three  hypotheses  will  be  tested  by  linking  specific 
independent and dependent policy-specific variables (table 5). Among 
the policy-specific indicators, there are also some of those used to create 
the original index of policy supranationalization .
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Table 5: Banking union setup: Relevant variables and indicators of the case 
study.
The chapter is structured as follows. After a discussion on the origins of 
the  banking  union  as  part  of  the  larger  framework  of  financial 
supervision in the European Union,  the divergent preferences of  the 
TYPE OF 
VARIABLE
POLICY-SPECIFIC 
VARIABLE POLICY-SPECIFIC INDICATOR 
H1
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE
Pressure on 
policy makers
- Course of yields’ spreads and 
Credit Default Swap (2010-2014)
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE Policy outcome
- Creation of new tools in the 
sector of financial regulation and 
in the banking sector at large
H2
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE
Modes of decision 
making: 
intergovernmental/
supranational
- Presence of int.al agreements 
- Presence of intergov. negotiations
- Presence of unanimity regime                 
(or, conversely)
- Adoption of community method 
- Adoption of new instruments by 
supranational institutions 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE Policy success
- Capacity of the outcome of 
decreasing market pressure and 
avoiding new banks-driven crises
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE Policy failure
- Incapacity of the outcome of 
relenting market pressure or 
solving the original problem
- Insurgence of new wave of  
banking crisis
- Contagion of banking crisis in a 
new country
H3
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE
Supranational 
delegation
- Formal act of delegation of new 
competencies to supranational 
institutions (e.g. via new Treaty)
- Upload of competencies for 
policy management at 
supranational level
- Informal act of delegation (e.g. 
via open interpretation of rules)
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actors involved in the decision making for the banking union will be 
presented. After that, the analysis will focus on the two main pillars of 
the  banking  union,  namely  the  SSM  and  SRM.  The  empirical  data 
presented will  be then functional  to test  the main hypotheses of  the 
dissertation,  as  well  as  to  construct  the  policy-specific  index  of 
supranationalization.
6.1. Banking union and financial regulation: Origins and legislative 
framework
The debates on the opportunity of designing a common framework for 
the banking sector in Europe are largely precedent to the financial and 
economic crisis of last years. Actually, a system of banking supervision 
in  the  hands of  the  European System of  Central  Banks was already 
advocated  by  the  Delors  Committee’s  report  (1989:  22)  which  was 
precedent  to  the  creation  itself  of  the  common currency,  but  it  was 
postponed  because  of  the  opposition  of  European  governments  to 
upload  to  the  supranational  level  such  a  fundamental  aspect  of 
financial regulation (James 2012: 19). The claims for a comprehensive 
regulation  of  European  banks  stems  from  the  recognition  of  the 
fundamental  importance of  credit  institutions in Europe,  which is  at 
least twofold: on the one hand, the banking sector can be assimilated to 
any other economic sector which needs to be regulated at  European 
level  in  order  to  avoid intra-European competition problems and to 
guarantee  uniformity  of  rules  within  the  internal  market  (Delors 
Committee 1989:31); on the other hand, in a highly integrated financial 
environment,  banks  represents  a  key  component  of  the  European 
economic infrastructure – and of capitalist societies at large – which has 
to be duly regulated so as to avoid that banking crises spread to real 
economy (Cassis 2011) – as it precisely happened in the last years’ crisis. 
In this light, it is not a case that the contingencies of the Eurozone crisis 
pushed  for  accelerating  the  path  toward  the  creation  of  a  banking 
union.
Indeed, the sovereign crisis in Europe was highly interconnected with a 
banking  crisis,  through  the  so-called  banks-sovereigns  vicious  circle 
(also called “sovereigns-banks loop”), which has been a negative aspect 
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of the strict interdependence among banking institutions and sovereign 
bonds’  market  (Véron  2015:14;  Howart  and  Quaglia  2014:  106), 
resulting in a deadly embrace. In short, the weaknesses of peripheral 
European  banks  and the  falling  value  of  sovereign  bonds  created  a 
downward  spiral  of  contagion:  with  sovereign  bonds  being  a  key 
determinant  of  banks’  strength  because  of  their  essentially  national 
structure,  the  erosion of  bonds’  value  contributed to  weaken banks’ 
structure,  transforming  banks  and  bonds  into  “two  sick  Siamese 
twins” (Ruding 2012:1). This occurred at a time when European banks 
kept  on  holding  increasing  shares  of  domestic  bonds,  which 
exacerbated the situation.  To be sure,  banks’  weakness is  not  only a 
problem at the micro level, but it creates a downward spiral because of 
the role that banks play in the broader economy, since they contribute 
to finance investments in the real economy, and their general weakness 
decidedly contributes to deteriorating trust among financial operators. 
Moreover, through the “sovereigns-banks loop”, such weaknesses are 
directly linked to public finances.
The  vicious  circle  of  the  “banks-sovereigns  loop” was  impossible  to 
break on the side of sovereign bonds – that is, by artificially decreasing 
the instability of bonds market, thus increasing their value – because 
this would imply the creation of a transfer union in the Eurozone.  So 117
European decision makers decided to progressively tackle the problem 
on the side of the banking sector, trying to decrease banks’ weaknesses 
through a more credible and comprehensive supervision. It is not a case 
that the Eurosummit declaration that triggered the banking union in 
June 2012 started by assessing that “it is imperative to break the vicious 
circle between banks and sovereigns” (Eurosummit 2012). 
Banks-sovereigns  loop,  for  its  part,  was  not  the  sole  determinant  of 
banking  fragility  during  the  crisis,  but  it  coupled  with  a  collective 
action problem. Indeed, Europe witnessed quite a widespread attitude 
of “banking nationalism” (Véron 2014), that is, the conflict of interest of 
domestic supervisory authorities which tried at the same time to ensure 
financial  stability  of  national  banks  and  protect  them  from  foreign 
competitors,  under the consideration that largest banks are “national 
 See chapter 4 on the policy of financial assistance to member states.117
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champions” that can contribute to domestic general wellness.  Thanks 118
to the exclusive power of  supervision over domestic  banks,  national 
authorities unwisely took domestic interests into account in their task, 
without a broader consideration of eventual cross-boarder externalities 
created by bank failures (Schoenmaker 2013), more likely to happen in 
case  of  imperfect  supervision  dictated  by  national  interests’ 
considerations.  In  other  words,  national  authorities  have  been  quite 
reluctant  in  denouncing  banking  weaknesses,  which  contributed  to 
exacerbate their already fragile situation, making banking crisis more 
likely.
Taken together, the banks-sovereign loop and the banking nationalism 
revealed the necessity for creating a credible Europe-wide system of 
banking  supervision  to  ensure  financial  stability  (Gros  and 
Schoenmaker  2014).  The  urgency  of  the  situation  was  also 
demonstrated  by  the  progressive  dis-integration  of  the  European 
financial sector, once the most integrated aspect of the single market. 
The  economic  crisis,  indeed,  decidedly  contributed  to  the 
fragmentation of the European financial market (Howart and Quaglia 
2014: 104), as a direct consequence of the distrust spread throughout 
financial operators. Such financial disintegration can be appreciated by 
looking  at  several  indicators,  among  them  the  dispersion  in  CDS 
premiums  across  the  Eurozone,  the  divergence  of  national  lending 
rates, the sharp decline of cross-border mergers and acquisitions, the 
decline of inter-bank loans in the EU, and the much discussed decrease 
of cross-boarder bond holdings (for further figures and for a thorough 
discussion on financial dis-integration see ECB 2012). This increasingly 
dysfunctional  character  of  the  financial  sector  was  enough  to  push 
European  decision  makers  to  take  some  decisions  on  reversing  the 
course of European finance and economy. Hence, the double necessity 
of stabilizing the financial sector in order to avoid a recurrence of the 
crisis and a further deterioration of financial integration.
Notwithstanding  the  clear  necessity  of  tackling  the  problems  of  the 
banking  sector,  European  decision  makers’  attentions  turned  only 
 For the policy of “keeping banks’ problems under wraps” carried out by 118
national authorities, please refer to Bastasin (2012: 106-108).
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progressively  to  banks.  Actually,  they  firstly  tried  to  correct  some 
shortcomings in the sector of financial regulation at large, which was 
progressively  amended  starting  from  2009.  Indeed,  the  aspect  of 
banking supervision can be placed in the broader context of financial 
regulation,  which underwent an incremental  normative change from 
the beginning of the crisis. Indeed, the creation of the banking union 
itself can be seen as the end point of a long process of changes in the 
field of financial markets and institutional regulation. More specifically, 
the setup of common rules in financial regulation can be seen as the 
first  step  leading  to  a  solid  and  credible  banking  union  (Gros  and 
Schoenmaker 2014: 534).
The  financial  turmoil  in  2007-2008  revealed  that  Europe  lacked  a 
comprehensive system of macro-prudential analysis and that it suffered 
from  fragmented  micro-prudential  control  (Hennessy  2013:  156).  119
Given the impressive integration of  European capital  markets  in the 
late 1980s and in the 1990s, European decision makers did not create 
any common institutional framework to ensure financial stability but 
instead kept on relying on national institutions for banking supervision 
and regulation (Jones 2015). That is, there was scarce attention at the 
macro-level for the possible consequences of financial disorder, and the 
control  of  individual  banks  was  entirely  remitted  to  national 
authorities.  That  is  why,  at  the  outset  of  the  crisis,  the  European 
Commission mandated Jacques de Larosière,  former governor of  the 
Bank of France, to issue a report on the future of financial regulation 
and supervision in Europe. The report (De Larosière 2009) considered 
letting the ECB coordinate the work of national supervision authorities 
as  the  best  option,  thus  empowering  Frankfurt  only  with  macro-
prudential, and not micro-prudential, supervision fearing for the risks 
to its independence that micro-prudential  supervision may endanger 
(ibid: 43). 
 In  the  field  of  financial  regulation  and  supervision,  a  micro-prudential 119
approach differs from a macro-prudential one in that the former attempts to 
prevent failure of individual financial institutions and attends to the risks for 
investors and deposit holders, while the latter adopts a macroeconomic view in 
order to safeguard the financial system as a whole and to reduce the costs of 
financial instability (Geeroms et al. 2014: 275).
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On  the  basis  of  the  recommendations  issued  by  the  report,  the 
European  Council  in  June  2009  decided  to  establish  a  European 
Systemic  Risk  Board  (ESRB)  and  a  European  System  of  Financial 
Supervisors (ESFS), the two first institutional innovations in the field of 
financial regulation since the outbreak of the crisis. The ESRB should 
have been the institution in charge of macro-prudential oversight, with 
the aim of preventing systemic risks for the financial stability in Europe 
–  by  collecting  information,  issuing  warnings  and recommendations 
(Geeroms et al. 2014: 276). Composed of members of the three agencies 
of banking supervision recently created (see infra), by staff of the ECB 
and the  European Commission,  it  mostly  relies  on  measures  of  soft 
coordination, but its power is largely undermined by the fact that it can 
only issue recommendations without the power to enforce. On the side 
of  micro-prudential  control,  European  governments  decided  to 
establish three different  supervisory authorities,  each composed of  a 
steering committee and national supervisory authorities and direct to 
specific tasks (ibid: 277): the European Banking Authority (EBA) aims at 
safeguarding the  stability  of  banks  and other  credit  institutions;  the 
European  Insurance  and  Occupational  Pensions  Authority  (EIOPA) 
deals  with  institutions  for  occupational  retirements  provisions;  the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) supervises capital 
markets and carries out the supervision of credit rating agencies (figure 
7). 
Taken together, the three agencies should have offered a comprehensive 
micro-prudential  control  of  European financial  institutions.  But  their 
weak powers (i.e. mere coordination role, as in the case of the ESRB), as 
well  the  competing  role  of  national  authorities,  meant  the  the  three 
authorities were less than successful. This was demonstrated by the fact 
that since their establishment in 2011, the banking sector in Europe has 
undergone  a  further  deterioration  (ibid.).  A vivid  example  of  such 
deterioration is represented by the break up of new banking crisis in 
some European countries, such as Spain and Cyprus.
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                     Figure 7. Structure of the European Systemic Risk Board. 
                                      Source: www.esma.europa.eu
In  general  terms,  we  may  say  that  due  to  the  financial  shock  in 
2007-2008,  European  governments  tried  to  address  the  main 
shortcomings that emerged in the system of financial regulation, but the 
very  first  phase  of  institutional  innovation  saw  the  adoption  of 
instruments with limited effectiveness, mainly due to the nature of soft 
coordination  among  actors,  the  absence  of  binding  rules  and  of  a 
credible and solid enforcement system. Nonetheless, they opened the 
way to more effective measures, thus the establishment of a banking 
union in the years to come, on whose features, however, actors at stake 
were deeply divided.
6.2. The political economy of banking union: Assessing actors’ preferences 
As a recurrent feature in European decision making during the crisis, 
and even more with respect to such a sensitive issue as the creation of a 
banking  union,  the  preferences  of  actors  over  final  outcomes  were 
divergent and possibly irreconcilable in some aspects. As for the other 
case studies analyzed here, the policy at stake is a redistributive one, 
that  is,  one suggesting a  different  redistribution of  resources  among 
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actors in a zero-sum game, where one actor wins and another loses as a 
consequence of the institutional change. For instance, the provision of a 
common resolution fund for  failing banks might  determine flows of 
money  from  certain  countries  towards  certain  financial  institutions 
based in other countries.  At the same time, the project  of  a banking 
union implies the transfer of a certain amount of competencies to the 
supranational  level,  which  is  understandably  resisted  by  some 
governments.
The actors involved in the negotiations occurred for the creation of the 
banking  union,  in  line  with  the  methodological  assumptions  of  the 
dissertation,  can  be  identified  in  the  two  recurrent  groups  of  states 
(creditor/northern  countries,  debtor/southern  countries),  as  well  as 
three main European institutions: the European Commission, the ECB 
and the European Parliament. When it comes to the ECB, as specified in 
the  methodological  section,  since  it  has  no  formal  decision  making 
powers, it is considered as an actor with de facto political weight which 
stands on the side of one of more actors that do have formal decision 
making powers. Again, as occurred in other policy sectors, negotiations 
witnessed different alliances among actors, namely the convergence of 
one of the two groups of states with one or more European institutions. 
As a general feature, the negotiations over the creation of a banking 
union saw a harsh contraposition between Germany and a few other 
northern countries (the Netherlands and Finland) against all the other 
actors,  i.e.  European institutions and southern countries,  all  oriented 
toward similar positions.
In  general  terms,  states  were  not  divided on the issue of  creating a 
stricter regulatory framework in the field of banking supervision and a 
single supervisory authority for all European banks, as the necessity of 
such  a  new  institutional  setting  was  quite  clear  after  the  disorder 
created by the banking crisis in Ireland (Donovan and Murphy 2013). 
The two main issues at stake, on the contrary, were the timing of the 
banking union setup and its scope – that is, the number of banks falling 
under centralized control.  In this respect,  southern countries (France, 
Italy and Spain in particular) were the main supporters of the rapid 
creation  of  a  banking  union,  hoping  that  a  break  up  of  the  banks-
sovereigns loop may relieve market worries over unstable banks, and 
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over public finances in the end (Howart and Quaglia 2013: 111). French 
President Hollande, in particular, declared that a banking union should 
come  before  a  political  union  (Euractiv  2012).  Such  a  vision  was 
basically  backed  by  the  document  issued  by  the  Van  Rompuy Task 
Force (2012), that called for an “integrated financial framework”. As a 
second aspect,  France  and southern  countries  were  ready to  put  all 
European  banks  under  a  centralized  control,  so  as  to  make  the 
mechanism  more  credible  and  more  quickly  able  to  counteract  the 
financial  instability.  French  attitudes  on  an  enlarged  scope  for  the 
banking  union  was  also  driven  by  a  consideration  of  its  domestic 
banking structure. The banking sector in France is highly concentrated 
in a few very big financial groups; obviously such groups would fall 
under centralized control, and fearing an unequal treatment of French 
banks,  Paris  was  adamant  to  establish  a  comprehensive  supervision 
covering all European banks (Howart and Quaglia 2013: 112).
Such a scheme was comprehensively resisted by Germany and other 
northern governments, namely those of Finland and the Netherlands: 
in their view, signing a good deal was more important than having a 
speedy  agreement  (ibid:  111).  Germany  resisted  the  idea  of  having 
unitary supervision for all  European banks, and its preferences were 
oriented towards a greater role of supervision of national authorities, 
which would retain their control over small banks. In this scenario, an 
eventual  central  authority  for  supervision  would  have  merely  a 
coordination  role  over  the  operations  of  national  authorities.  Such 
consideration  was  mainly  based  on  the  German  banking  system: 
though  hosting  some  of  the  largest  banking  groups  in  Europe  (e.g. 
Deutsche Bank),  the most part  of  German banks consists of  regional 
and local  institutions  –  Landesbanken  and Sparkassen  –  considered  to 
have an important public and social role. 
The German government was adamant to defend regional  and local 
banks from centralized and external control (Barker 2012a). Moreover, 
Berlin feared the moral hazard likely to emerge among banks in case of 
a setup of a resolution mechanism (Howart and Quaglia 2014). In this 
sense, it carried out the idea of creating first of all a supervisory system 
as  a  precondition  for  the  discussions  on  a  resolution  scheme,  even 
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though  the  idea  has  been  contested  on  economic  bases  by  some 
analysts and observers.120
Beside  the  timing and scope of  the  banking union,  decision makers 
were divided over another fundamental issue related to the new policy, 
that is, the features and scope of the resolution fund to be created. As a 
potential  net  contributor  to  the  fund,  and  with  its  longstanding 
concerns about moral hazard, Germany was reluctant to create a pan-
European redemption fund (Howart and Quaglia 2014). The German 
government  advocated  leaving  responsibility  of  distressed  banks 
primarily with national governments (Howart and Quaglia 2013), and 
that  eventual  European  funds  could  be  activated  only  behind  strict 
rules of conditionality. From a political economy perspective, moreover, 
considering  the  structure  of  its  banking  system,  Germany  feared  it 
would be forced to contribute beyond its share to the redemption fund 
but that very few German banks – the biggest ones – would ever benefit 
(Howart and Quaglia 2014). Germany, however, was rather isolated, as 
southern  countries  were  ready  to  create  a  pan-European  fund, 
according to the idea that such a common fund would be more credible 
and more functional to calm down financial instability and distrust.
Following the typical  pattern during the crisis,  the United Kingdom 
stood between the two opposed blocs, and tried to impose its vision 
over  policy  outcomes.  Hosting  the  biggest  financial  center  on  the 
continent,  London was particularly sensitive to the issue of financial 
regulation,  and the  UK government  tried to  avoid the  creation of  a 
Eurozone-limited banking union, fearing that such configuration may 
impose  detrimental  measures  to  the  British  financial  sector  (Howart 
and Quaglia 2013: 115). In other words, the UK feared the creation of 
new standards in the banking sector triggered by the putative banking 
union,  which  the  country  would  be  compelled  to  adhere  to  in  the 
future.  By  consequence,  London  envisaged  a  flexible  mechanism  of 
“opting-in” for non-Eurozone members, that is, the possibility to join 
the banking union even for those countries outside the Eurozone, as 
well as the constitution of a double majority mechanism in order to take 
 For a discussion on the timing of the establishment of the banking union and 120
its main elements, see Elliott (2014: 14-19).
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into account even the interests of those countries outside the common 
currency  in  case  of  prominent  decisions  on  the  resolution  of  failing 
banks (ibid).
All  European  institutions  agree  on  the  need  for  supranational 
delegation  of  the  powers  of  banking  supervision,  although  their 
positions vary slightly. Quite understandably, the ECB sought first and 
foremost a quick stabilization of the whole financial and banking sector 
in the Eurozone. This is evidenced by the increasing interventionism of 
the institution in policy making through standard and non-standard 
measures  –  including  the  two  rounds  of  LTRO  to  sustain  banking 
sector.  The  ECB  advocated  the  rapid  establishment  of  a 121
comprehensive  system  of  banking  supervision  –  i.e.  covering  all 
European  banks  (Howart  and  Quaglia  2013:  117-118)  –  whose  tasks 
were to be remitted in the hands of the same central bank. Thus, the 
ECB backed the position of France and southern countries, as well as 
that of the European Commission, as it was issued in the draft of the 
legislative proposition (European Commission 2012b).
In  the  Commission  document,  the  European  executive  suggested 
transferring to the ECB the task of supervising all European banks, in 
strict  collaboration  with  national  authorities,  which  would  maintain 
day-to-day control on financial institutions. Moreover, the proposition 
aimed at  including into the banking union only the members of  the 
Eurozone, against the claims of the European Parliament to include all 
EU countries  (EU Observer  2012).  In  line  with  its  traditional  claims 
oriented to larger democratic accountability, the EP demanded through 
its committee for economic and monetary affairs an increased role in 
the legislative process for the creation of the banking union, as well as 
more  effective  powers  in  the  implementation  of  the  mechanisms 
(European  Parliament  2012b),  such  as  access  to  information  in  the 
procedures  of  SSM  and  SRM  and  the  possibility  of  hearing  the 
candidates of the bodies in charge, e.g. the SRB.
 The two rounds of Long-Term Refinancing Operations, implemented in the 121
autumn 2011, aimed at easing financing conditions of European banks, so as to 
boost  economic  growth,  stabilize  their  fiscal  position  and  let  them  buy 
sovereign bonds to relieve market pressure on peripheral states.
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As a result of these divergent preferences, thus, both the geographical 
scope of the new banking union and its institutional nature is irregular. 
Concerning the geographical scope, thanks to the “opting-in” system of 
voluntary admission to the banking union for non-Eurozone members, 
it would be larger than the simple Eurozone, but smaller than the EU 
(Véron  2014).  That  is,  the  membership  of  the  banking  union  is 
automatic for the members of the Eurozone, and voluntary for those 
outside the common currency. At the same time, the banking union has 
a mixed institutional  nature,  from intergovernmental  coordination to 
the community method. Indeed, the provisions concerning the set of 
common rules for banking institutions, falling under the umbrella of 
the internal market, are taken according to normal procedures of the 
community method, that is co-decision by the Council and European 
Parliament. Beside, aspects of the new mechanisms – the SSM and the 
SRM  –  are  to  be  taken  by  unanimous  consensus  of  European 
governments,  or  at  least  of  those members of  the Eurozone,  as  they 
represent the transfer of new competencies unforeseen in the treaties or 
a form of special coordination among a limited group of states. When it 
comes to the SRM, for instance, the creation of its resolution board was 
by the community method,  while the setup of  a common resolution 
fund  responds  to  intergovernmental  logics,  as  discussed  in  the 
following section.
6.3. The setup of a banking union: The two main pillars
The progressive setup of a banking union in Europe has passed through 
successive  steps.  After  the  setup  of  the  new  mechanisms  of 
coordination (the three banking authorities EBA, EIOPA, ESMA and the 
ESRB  for  the  assessment  of  systemic  risk)  in  the  field  of  financial 
regulation,  decision  makers’  attention  progressively  turned  to 
European banks. In particular, two main pillars of banking policy were 
tackled.  The framework of  banking supervision and that  of  banking 
resolution, were institutionalized, through the creation of the SSM, and 
of the SRM, respectively.
For sure, the complex banking policy includes also other aspects, that 
were either tackled through the traditional community method because 
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they somehow concerned the internal market – i.e. the directives and 
regulations to be applied to financial institutions such as the Capital 
Requirements Directives (Geeroms et al 2014: 278-284) – or temporarily 
left in the background, such as the common deposit guarantee, because 
of irreconcilable positions of governments (Howart and Quaglia 2013: 
109). The main obstacle to the creation of a common deposit guarantee 
is its peculiarly redistributive nature: indeed, such fund should cover 
deposit  holders up to €100.000 per family and per bank, in order to 
reimburse them in case of bank failure. But at the moment states are not 
ready to pool so many resources, and the project of the common deposit 
guarantee has been left  in the background and it  will  unlikely been 
implemented in the next future.
6.3.1. The establishment of a Single Supervisory Mechanism 
The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is one of the most important 
institutional innovations in the EU since the break out of the sovereign 
crisis.  It  consists  in a  centralized mechanism of  banking supervision 
according to which European countries delegate the power of granting 
and withdrawing banking license to the supranational level, as well as 
the  related  duties  of  banking  control.  In  other  words,  European 
governments  decided  to  shift  from  a  system  of  national  banking 
supervision to a more supranational one, where the ECB has been given 
the power of granting banking licenses to a part of European banks, 
namely the most significant ones. More specifically, the ECB in strict 
collaboration  with  national  authorities  can  conduct  supervisory 
reviews,  inspections  and  investigations,  it  can  grant  or  withdraw 
banking  licenses  and  it  can  ensure  banks’  compliance  with  EU 
prudential rules. 
The process of creating the SSM began at the Eurosummit on June, 28th, 
2012, when the members of the Eurozone agreed on the urgency of a 
Europe-wide supervision mechanism (Eurosummit 2012). In particular, 
they mandated the European Commission to issue an official proposal 
for  the  creation  of  a  SSM,  to  be  quickly  taken  into  account  by  the 
European Council “within the end of the year”. As a matter of fact, the 
European  executive  issued  its  proposition  in  September  (European 
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Commission 2012b), but the formal approval of the SSM came only in 
October 2013 (Council of the European Union 2013) on the base of art. 7 
of  the  TFEU,  giving  to  the  ECB  the  power  of  banking  supervision 
starting from November 2014. Indeed, the translation into practice of 
the  principles  stated  in  June  2012  was  a  difficult  operation  (Barker 
2012b), and EU governments failed to meet the deadline of December 
2012 to conclude the negotiations, due to irreconcilable cleavages over 
some features of the new instrument (Barker and Spiegel 2012), namely 
the scope of centralized supervision and the membership of the SSM. 
Concerning the scope of banking supervision, the features of the SSM 
represent significant progress with respect to the three authorities for 
financial  regulation  created  in  2011.  Indeed,  if  the  micro-prudential 
control of the three banking authorities EBA, EIOPA and ESMA, as well 
as  the  ESFS  relied  on  a  system  of  coordination  where  the  ultimate 
power was in  the hands of  national  supervisors,  the SSM designs a 
different  scenario with an effective delegation of  authority.  The new 
mechanism  is  composed  of  the  ECB  and  of  national  competent 
authorities, working together under ECB control (Geeroms et al. 2014: 
300). It covers all 6000 credit institutions present in the Eurozone, with a 
differentiation based on the size of the banks – the formal criterion is 
“systemic significance”. 
A bank is  considered to be significant if  the total  value of  its  assets 
exceeds €30 billion, or if the ratio of its total assets over GDP exceeds 
20%, or again if the national competent authority designs the institution 
as relevant for the domestic economy (ibid: 301). In those three cases, 
the ECB is responsible for the supervision of the bank. Furthermore, the 
ECB takes the supervision of at least three banks for each member state, 
in  order  to  avoid  a  situation  in  which  countries  without  significant 
financial institutions fall outside any centralized control. Translated into 
figures,  only  130  out  of  6000  (2.5%)  banks  of  the  Eurozone  are 
significant,  although comprehensively  this  group controls  85% of  all 
assets banks. Less significant institutions fall under the supervision of 
national authorities, who work nonetheless under the guidelines and 
regulations issued by the ECB.
The design of the SSM – a two-tier structure determined by bank size – 
is clearly a compromise that emerges from the diverging preferences of 
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member  states,  even  in  the  face  of  evidence  this  approach  is 
economically  suboptimal  (Munchau  2012).  In  particular,  as  noted 122
above, Germany was particularly adamant to retain national control on 
Sparkassen  and  Landesbanken,  considered  to  cover  a  significant  social 
and political role. Indeed, according to the thresholds identified by the 
regulation,  they  are  not  considered  as  systemically  significant.  The 
official proposition by the European Commission aimed at covering all 
the  Eurozone  banking  system,  in  line  with  southern  countries 
preferences. Germany doubted that a single institution, the ECB, could 
efficiently supervise all  6000 European banks,  thus demanding strict 
cooperation among national authorities and the ECB. A second concern 
was  relative  to  the  possible  influence  that  the  task  of  banking 
supervision may have on ECB’s monetary policy (Barker and Spiegel 
2012).  In  line  with  the  recurrent  German  preoccupations  for  the 
independence of the central bank, minister Schäuble feared that the fact 
of knowing banks’ situation may interfere with a regular conduct of the 
monetary policy. In the end, Berlin got satisfaction of its demands, and 
gained  a  commitment  that  smaller  banks  could  continue  under  the 
control  of  national  authorities,  as  the  agreement  of  October  2013 
demonstrates.
A  second  issue  that  made  negotiations  over  the  SSM  particularly 
complex was the question of  membership of  the system of  common 
supervision.  In  this  respect,  in  its  proposition  the  European 
Commission suggested that  only  Eurozone members  would join  the 
SSM,  against  the  position  of  the  European  Parliament,  which  was 
adamant to include all EU members. At the basis of the cleavage there 
were legal as well political concerns. From a legal point of view, a pan-
European supervision system held by the ECB was problematic because 
the ECB Governing Council only represents Eurozone members, and it 
cannot  enforce  its  decisions  in  non-Eurozone  members.  A possible 
solution may come only through the change of the voting system in the 
 It  is  arguable  that  the  size  of  a  bank is  perfectly  related  to  its  systemic 122
significance, and systemic risk in the end. Indeed, the Spanish banking crisis 
was triggered by smaller banks, the cajas. Moreover, there is the risk that the 
threshold of €30 billion may become a limit to circumvent in order to avoid 
centralized control (Munchau 2012).
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ECB Governing Council, that would prove to be difficult and politically 
fatiguing,  requiring  a  treaty  change  (Barker  2012b).  Germany  in 
particular was very sensitive to this argument. On the other hand, as 
noted, the UK feared that an Eurozone-exclusive banking union might 
be  problematic  for  those  outside  the  monetary  union,  and  might 
possibly impose technical regulations that they could not control.
As  a  result,  the  final  agreement  significantly  differed  from  the 
Commission  proposal:  according  to  the  regulation  of  the  Council, 
participation  to  the  SSM  is  automatic  for  member  states  of  the 
Eurozone, but those countries outside the common currency may enter 
into a “close cooperation agreement” in order to submit their banking 
system to the new European supervision, whose details are outlined in 
a  ECB decision (2014a).  If  voluntarily  entered,  the  close  cooperation 
involves  a  gain  of  a  seat  in  the  ECB  Supervisory  Board,  so  as  to 
circumvent the legal problems related to the ECB voting system and its 
representativeness. Following the agreement found in October 2013, the 
ECB started its tasks of banking supervision from November 2014 , 123
and at that time no state outside the Eurozone formally asked to join 
the  SSM,  but  the  ECB  received  only  some  informal  expressions  of 
interest  (ECB 2014b: 16).124
6.3.2. The establishment of a Single Resolution Mechanism
The  Single  Resolution  Mechanism  (SRM)  is  the  second  leg  of  the 
European banking union, set for launch on January 2016. The SRM aims 
at managing an eventual failure of a credit institution in the EU, that is, 
its  orderly  resolution  in  case  of  risk  of  insolvency.  Technically,  it  is 
composed of two main pillars, of which the first is a EU regulation on 
banking resolution procedure, which sets up the rules to be followed in 
case of a banking failure and which creates the Single Resolution Board 
 The start  of  the new centralized supervision was preceded by an “Asset 123
Quality Review” carried out by the ECB so as to test the adequate capitalization 
of banks and boost the credibility of the new supervisory framework. 
 Beyond  the  temporal  scope  of  the  dissertation,  in  April  2015  Denmark 124
expressed its intention to join the banking union (Matze and Tangen 2015).
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(SRB),  aimed  at  managing  banking  crises.  The  second  is  an 
intergovernmental  agreement  concerning the Single  Resolution Fund 
(SRF),  the  fund  entrusted  to  the  SRB  to  be  used  to  relieve  banks’ 
financial  difficulties  (Véron  2014).  Unlike  the  SSM,  the  SRM  is  not 
operational, as the decision of resolving a bank is taken at European 
level in the Single Resolution Board, but the effective management of a 
resolution procedure is allocated at national level.
The importance of the SRM is fundamental in light of the events of the 
Eurozone  crisis.  Indeed,  if  duly  implemented,  the  SRM  may  avoid 
another  banking crisis  in  the  EU,  preventing  member  states  to  bear 
costly banking bailouts, and the consequent unbearable public deficits, 
as happened in Spain and Ireland. More specifically, the structure of the 
SRM  foresees  an  important  change  in  the  case  of  banking  failure, 
whereby a bank might be wound up even without the permission of its 
home  state  (Barker  2013).  This  aspect  is  of  particular  importance, 
considering that during the crisis national supervisory authorities often 
encountered  clashes  of  interests,  trying  to  protect  their  national 
champions from failure. 
Moreover, the new rules and procedures redefine the burden-sharing of 
banking resolution costs, creating a sort of cascade mechanism in case 
of banking resolution (Hadjiemmanuil 2015). In case of bank resolution, 
existing  stakeholders  –  i.e.  shareholders,  junior  creditors,  senior 
creditors  and  depositors  with  deposits  in  excess  of  the  guaranteed 
amount of €100,000 – are required to contribute to the absorption of 
losses of the bank up to 8% of liabilities, the so-called bail-in procedure. 
Then,  resources  from  national  deposit  guarantee  schemes  can  be 
collected. If these resources are not enough, national resolution fund – 
or the SRF since its effective implementation – will  contribute to the 
medium-term financing of no more than 5% of total liabilities. In this 
case, the money comes from the banking industry at large, because the 
resolution fund is financed by banks. 
Finally,  in  case  still  more  resources  are  needed  –  that  is,  above  the 
threshold of 13% of total  liabilities – public money is used (ibid).  In 
other words, the design of the SRM marks the progressive passage from 
a “near absolute pro-bailout stance” present in Europe at the beginning 
of  the  Eurocrisis,  to  a  “new normal”,  that  is,  the  bail-in  of  banking 
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institutions (Véron 2015: 20-22). In this respect, the establishment of the 
SRF  brings  about  also  a  certain  mutualisation  of  resources,  so  that 
member states are called to pool resources in order to save a bank from 
another country, thus making the policy redistributive in nature.
Quite  understandably,  in  the  presence  of  such  a  delicate  pooling  of 
resources and revolutionary rules,  the establishment of  the SRM has 
been a progressive process lasting a few years, and actually still in fieri 
given some future political decisions to be taken in the next months and 
the very progressive implementation of the whole mechanism over the 
years.  Started  in  June  2012  with  the  Council  declaration  of  its 
willingness  to  create  a  banking  union,  the  first  formal  step  for  the 
establishment  of  the  SRM came a  year  later,  when in  July  2013  the 
European  Commission  issued  its  regulation  proposition  (European 
Commission 2013b). In December the European Council agreed on the 
general approach to be taken in the creation of the SRM and on the 
main  features  of  the  SRF,  and  in  spring  2014  both  the  European 
Parliament  and  the  Council  approved  a  revised  version  of  the 
Commission’s  text,  so  that  the  regulation  was  published  in  the 125
Official Journal at the end of July. In the meantime, in May 26 out of 28 
EU member  states  –  the  UK and Sweden did  not  join  –  signed the 
intergovernmental  agreement  governing  the  SRF,  which  is  at  the 
moment undergoing the process of national ratification.126
As resulted by the negotiations,  the SRM structure is  headed by the 
Single Resolution Board, the resolution authority that works in close 
cooperation  with  the  ECB,  the  European  Commission  and  national 
resolution authorities. Composed of six members , the board has the 127
 The EP agreed under  codecision on the  SSM only  after  signing an inter 125
institutional agreement with the ECB to obtain information access in the field of 
banking supervision (Héritier and Schoeller 2015).
 At  the  time  of  writing  only  four  out  of  26  states  already  ratified  the 126
agreement (Latvia, Slovakia, Finland and France). It will enter into force when 
90% of weighted votes of SRM participants will ratify the agreement.
 Given  the  restricted  membership  of  the  board,  only  six  nationalities  are 127
represented: not unexpectedly, it is chaired by the German Elke Konig and vice-
chaired by the  Finnish  Timo Löyttyniemi.  The  other  members  of  the  Board 
come from Italy, France, Spain and the Netherlands. 
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task of avoiding disorderly insolvency of any European bank. At the 
same time, the SRB has the task to manage the SRF, so as to diminish 
the costs of a banking failure for taxpayers. 
In the process of gradual creation of the whole structure of the SRM 
(thus,  the  establishment  of  the  resolution  board  and  the  resolution 
fund), actors were confronted with multiple cleavages, reflecting their 
preferences  over  final  outcomes.  The  most  important  elements  of 
disagreement  were  related  to  four  issues:  the  decision  making 
organization  –  that  is,  what  institution  entrust  with  the  power  of 
shutting banks; the scope of the SRM – which banks are to be covered; 
the amount, the sources of funding and the implementation stages of 
the resolution fund; and finally, the fiscal backstop to cover the SRF in 
case of insufficient endowment. Around these main issues, beside the 
traditional  two groups of  states  confronting their  visions  –  northern 
creditor vs southern debtor countries – European institutions actively 
entered into the negotiations with regard to the creation of the SRM, 
while  they were left  more in  the background for  what  concerns the 
creation of the SRF, which mainly followed intergovernmental logics. 
In general terms, European governments did agree on the necessity of 
creating a banking union, including some sort of resolution mechanism, 
but  they  disagreed  on  its  practical  features.  It  has  to  be  noticed, 
however, that European executives soon appeared to lose that sense of 
urgency expressed in the declaration of June 2012 – most probably due 
to the bold intervention of the ECB through the OMT that contributed 
to  a  decisive  relief  of  European  economies  from  financial  market 
pressures.  At  a  certain  moment  Germany,  indisputably  the  most 128
powerful  and  best-placed  negotiator,  seemed  to  lose  any  attraction 
toward the project, due to three elements: the fear of becoming a net 
contributor to the SRF, the recognition that very few of German banks 
would be covered by the SRM and the fear of moral hazard for banks, 
which would be more likely to engage in riskier activities in presence of 
a  resolution  mechanism  (Howart  and  Quaglia  2014).  Such  attitude 
translated in  a  certain  isolation during negotiations  (Agence  Europe 
 For a discussion on OMT, see §4.3.5128
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2013), which however Germany carried out finally obtaining outcomes 
mostly – though not perfectly – reflecting its initial preferences. 
The first  element  of  disagreement  was the identity  of  the  resolution 
authority,  thus the level  of  the centralization of  the decision making 
operations. In its initial proposal,  the European Commission selected 
itself as the resolution authority in the EU, in line with the vision of the 
ECB and of southern states – in particular, Italy, France and Spain – but 
this choice was poorly received by Germany (Peel and Barker 2013). 
More  specifically,  the  Commission  designed  a  system  in  which  a 
resolution  board  would,  under  suggestion  of  the  ECB,  take  the  key 
decisions on how to manage any bank resolution, but the fundamental 
decision to  enter  into a  resolution would be made by the European 
Commission  itself.  National  authorities  would  retain  the  power  of 
enforcing the decisions taken by the SRB, which for its part oversees 
national authorities. 
Germany raised legal concerns on the resolution scheme as designed by 
the Commission. More specifically, Berlin questioned the use of internal 
market legal bases made by the Commission to justify an expansion of 
its  powers to apply only to Eurozone members (ibid.).  According to 
Germany,  such  a  fundamental  empowerment  of  the  Commission 
should be sanctioned by a treaty change. For its part, Berlin proposed to 
give  the  ultimate  decision  making  power  over  resolution  to  the 
European Council, so that each state could retain its veto power (Barker 
and Spiegel 2013). 
As a final compromise, the co-decision procedure created a system in 
which most of the power is given to the ECB, which has the power of 
triggering  the  whole  process  of  a  bank  resolution,  and  in  case  of 
reluctance by the ECB, the SRB can autonomously decide to trigger the 
process.  After  the  resolution  decision  is  taken,  the  SRB  adopts  a 
resolution scheme and the action plan to address the specific case of the 
failing bank, whose compliance with state aid policy is assessed by the 
European  Commission.  The  European  Council  is  involved  in  the 
process only if the Commission contests the public interest in resolving 
the  bank  and  considers  it  could  be  put  into  normal  insolvency 
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instead  (European Commission 2014d). In this case the Council can 129
express  its  opinion  and  reverse  the  Commission’s  decision.  In  this 
sense, the final text of the SRM scheme appears to be less politicized 
than the one proposed by Germany, where the Council would in any 
case  retain  the  final  word over  the  resolution decision.  At  the  same 
time,  the  role  of  the  Commission  is  also  reshaped  and  limited,  as 
recognized  by  the  Commissioner  in  charge  of  the  reform,  Michel 
Barnier (ibid.). 
As one of the most important features, the whole process of banking 
resolution, according to policy makers, could be finalized in a weekend: 
a resolution scheme could therefore be approved in the span of time 
going from the closing of the US markets on Friday to their opening in 
Asia  on  Monday  morning.  This  was  deemed  fundamental  to  the 
credibility of the mechanism and for financial stability. And which is, in 
the end,  a concrete improvement with respect  to the first  agreement 
found at the European Council in December 2013, according to which a 
resolution scheme could have even involved the voting of more than 
one hundred people at the ECB supervisory board, the ECB Governing 
Council, two committees at the single resolution board and finally the 
European Commission; or even worse in case of a a contested decision 
(Barker and Fleming 2013). Such a simplification was highly demanded 
by  the  ECB,  which  strove  to  enhance  the  credibility  of  the  new 
institutional creature.
The second issue of disagreement has been related to the scope of the 
SRM,  that  is,  the  number  of  banks  to  be  covered  by  the  resolution 
scheme  –  resounding  the  discussions  held  while  creating  the  SSM. 
According  to  the  initial  Commission’s  proposal,  the  SRM  scheme 
should  be  comprehensive  and  applying  to  all  European  banks, 
following the rationale that even non transnational banks and smaller 
ones (e.g. the Spanish cajas) could produce major dangers (European 
Commission 2013b) – as the contingencies of the crisis demonstrated, 
 This  has  been  referred  to  as  the  “silence  procedure”,  whereby  if  the 129
European Council  does  not  raise  any opposition to  the decision of  the SRB 
within 24 hours, its approval the resolution scheme is considered implicit.
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actually. Much as in the case of the SSM, southern countries were in line 
with the proposal, while Germany resisted the idea again.
As  a  rich  and  solvent  state,  Germany  has  a  banking  sector  that  is 
comparatively small and geographically limited (Howart and Quaglia 
2014:131). Moreover, Germany had already set up a national resolution 
procedure, one of the few states to do so. In this sense, the German 
government did not see any incentive in establishing a comprehensive 
resolution mechanism, in which it would have likely played the role of 
net contributor. As a result, the final scheme expressed a compromise 
mainly reflecting the division of tasks resulting in the SSM. The SRM is 
comprehensively responsible for the resolution of all banks in Member 
states participating in the banking union (around 6000), but the SRB is 
directly responsible only for the resolution of those institutions directly 
supervised by the ECB (the “significant” banks) and for cross-border 
groups, while the national resolution authorities are responsible for all 
other entities. Nonetheless, if a resolution scheme implies the use of the 
SRF,  the  board  becomes  competent  for  the  resolution  of  the  entity 
concerned regardless of its size (European Commission 2014e).
A third and major issue of dispute, one that created major difficulties 
and time-consuming deadlocks during the negotiations, was about the 
creation  of  the  Single  Resolution  Fund  and  its  main  features: 
endowment, funding sources and timing of establishment. According to 
the initial proposal of the Commission, in line with the experience of 
those states where a resolution fund is already in place, the fund is a 
pre-financed one, its endowment coming from contributions of banks, 
to be gradually built up in a span of time of several years (European 
Commission 2013b). This model found the support of the ECB and of 
southern countries (Howart and Quaglia 2014:133) but the resistance of 
Germany. Berlin indeed favored a network of national funds, claiming 
that a Europe-wide fund should be created via a Treaty change (Barker, 
Spiegel and Wagstyl 2013). A decisive compromise was found thanks to 
the  proposal  of  Dutch  government,  which  suggested,  in  case  of 
activation  of  the  fund,  to  use  first  national  funds  coming  from  the 
home-state of the bank to be rescued, and then other member states’ 
funds  (Howart  and  Quaglia  2014:133).  On  the  figures  of  the 
contribution of single banks, Germany and France found an agreement 
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only in December 2014, when they agreed that the banking sectors of 
the  two countries  would  contribute  the  same amount  –  around €15 
billion (Barker 2014).  As a result,  the SRF will  be endowed with €55 
billion , to be collected in a span of time of ten years  – twelve in 130 131
case more than half of the fund is activated before that deadline – so as 
to be fully operational by January 2026. In order to circumvent German 
fears about the legal basis of the fund, some aspects were delegated to 
an intergovernmental agreement which is undertaking the ratification 
process.  In  particular,  the  intergovernmental  agreement  aims  at 
governing  the  modalities  of  national  contributions  to  the  fund  and 
some  other  aspect  relate  to  its  endowment  over  time  (European 
Commission 2014c).
A final  point  concerns  the  fiscal  backstop of  the  SFR.  That  is,  what 
happens if the amount of the fund proves to be insufficient to cover 
bank  resolutions.  According  to  Germany,  in  case  of  insufficient 
endowment, taxpayers of the home state of the failing bank should be 
called to finance its resolution (Howart and Quaglia 2014: 134), while 
other states supported the idea of having the ESM contributing to such 
operation. As the main net contributor to the ESM, Berlin resisted the 
idea  of  transforming  the  ESM  into  the  fiscal  backstop  for  a  pan-
European banking resolution scheme. As a compromise, in December 
2013,  member  states  agreed that  extra-funds  should be  provided by 
member states, which if necessary could demand a loan to the ESM. In 
this  sense,  it  has  been  adopted  German  Minister  Schäuble’s  line  of 
negotiation, according to which the ESM cannot directly finance banks, 
but it  can only lend money to member states,  which then can direct 
those  money  to  their  banks.  Moreover,  as  usual  for  the  access  to 
European funds, measures of conditionality are foreseen.
As it is designed today, for sure, the SRM is incomplete. First of all, it 
still lacks the provision included in the intergovernmental agreement 
 €55 billion representing around 1% of all European banks’ covered deposits.130
 Formally, such a long transitional phase has been created in order to avoid 131
short and medium-term effects on banks accounts due to their contributions to 
the  fund.  In  the  meanwhile,  the  resources  are  collected  via  national 
compartments, to be gradually merged into a common fund.
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about  the  SRF,  which  is  still  undertaking  the  ratification  process. 
Secondly,  even  if  in  the  medium-term  it  will  contribute  to  restore 
credibility in the European banking sector, it is unlike that the SRM as it 
is designed today will be able to address a systemic crisis in Europe, 
because of the insufficient endowment of the SRF and the lack of clear 
rules on the fiscal backstop of the system (Dullien 2014). To achieve the 
possibility of credibly avoiding – or at least facing – a new systemic 
crisis,  more  improvements  should  be  added to  the  scheme (e.g.  the 
provision of  clear rules for extraordinary public  support  to banks at 
European level and a clear transformation of the ESM into the fiscal 
backstop for the banking union) but political interplays have limited 
such possibilities, at least up to now (ibid.).
6.4. Empirical assessment of hypotheses: The case of the banking union
The case of the banking policy is partially different both from the two 
discussed in the previous chapters. Indeed, the fiscal policy rules case 
study is a policy that incrementally changed during the crisis – it was 
already regulated at European level and such regulation underwent a 
progressive  transformation  as  the  crisis  unfolded.  The  financial 
assistance  policy,  by  contrast,  was  never  foreseen  by  the  framers  of 
European integration, and was thus created ex novo to deal with the 
crisis.  The  case  of  the  banking  union,  for  its  part,  its  somehow  in 
between: some prior institutional arrangement was there, in particular 
in the sectors of banking supervision and resolution, but they were not 
organized at the European level, rather they were fully managed within 
national  borders,  with  an  extremely  loose  coordination  at  the 
supranational level. 
If it is true that the SSM and the SRM are new institutional devices set 
up as a response to the crisis,  it  is however possible to compare the 
institutional environment today with the one that was present at the 
onset of the Eurozone crisis. The test of the three hypotheses, as well as 
of the conjecture underlying the dissertation, will be carried out in this 
perspective, thus appreciating the progressive institutional change that 
has been carried out by policy makers in this specific policy sector all 
over the years of the crisis, up to late 2014.
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6.4.1. Hypothesis n. 1
The first hypothesis states that “an economic crisis is  a fundamental 
driver of major institutional changes,  both in terms of their quantity 
and quality”,  that  is  to  say that  policy  making is  multiplied during 
economic  downturns  in  response  to  the  challenges  coming  from 
external  market  pressure.  We  expect,  then,  a  certain  coincidence  in 
chronological  terms between the  main peaks  of  the  crisis  and the 132
major evolutions in the field of the banking union setup, namely the 
adoption of the main pieces of legislature on the SSM and SRM.
A preliminary consideration stems from the recognition that in absence 
of markets’ pressure in the first years of the common currency, major 
divergences among member states prevented to implement those early 
propositions for a banking union elaborated in the late Eighties (see 
Delors  Committee’s  report  1989).  Which  is  a  very  preliminary 
confirmation that,  even in presence of a certain necessity of a policy 
change,  policy  makers  tend  to  postpone  the  adoption  of  policy 
arrangements it that is not absolutely urgent. However, the events here 
recalled  make  it  is  easy  to  appreciate  how  much  the  events  of  the 
Eurozone crisis were functional to a policy evolution (see appendix, fig. 
a7). 
A first example is given by the most important day for the creation of 
the  banking  union,  June  28th,  2012,  when  the  European  Council 
decided to start the process for its creation, which occurred during one 
of the most dramatic peaks of the crisis. In particular, in those weeks 
markets were nervous for the double elections held in Greece, for the 
fear  of  a  Grexit,  and  for  the  return  of  the  pressure  on  Italian  and 
Spanish bonds, which determined a new peak of the spreads on the 
bonds of the country after some months of relative calm (see fig. 5.2 in 
the appendix). The case of Spain, in particular, and the banking crisis 
 For an account of the Eurozone crisis, as well as for the identification of its 132
six main peaks, please refer to chapter 2.
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which menaced its public finances , was decisive to let policy makers 133
understand that something was to be made in order to “break up the 
vicious circle between sovereigns and banks”, as in that day the heads 
of states and government declared (Eurosummit 2012). 
A second element to consider is that, chronologically, there is another 
coincidence between a main peak of the crisis and the evolution of the 
banking union. This second aspect is related to the crisis in Cyprus – 
another one peculiarly related to the banking sector – and the main 
evolutions of policy making, both for the SSM and the SRM. Indeed, the 
events in Cyprus took place in early 2013, and they were functional to 
make policy makers realize, at a time when major difficulties seemed to 
stop negotiations, that it was necessary to finalize the project of banking 
union (Jones 2013). In the same year, after the Cypriot crisis, the SSM 
found its decisive implementation, and the SRM found a key agreement 
among member states at first, and then the one between the European 
Parliament and the Council. 
One last  point  related to  the  chronological  coincidence among crisis 
events  and  the  adoption  of  policy  outcomes  can  be  found  in  the 
institutional  deadlock  occurred  in  late  2012,  when  after  the  formal 
declaration of June the European Council seemed to lose the urgency to 
implement the banking union. Indeed, if on the one side that statement 
was the critical enabler for the launch of the OMT by the ECB (Véron 
2015) as recognized also by top decision makers (Van Rompuy 2014), on 
the  other  side  the  creation  of  the  OMT  itself  contributed  to  relieve 
markets, and consequently also European decision makers, that seemed 
to lose that sense of urgency of some weeks earlier (Jones 2014).
As  a  result,  then,  the  events  related to  the  progressive  setup of  the 
banking union, as reconstructed in this chapter,  seem to confirm the 
first hypothesis of the dissertation. In particular, the main evolution of 
the policy making in the field are to be found in those “windows of 
opportunity”  created  by  financial  market  pressure,  that  resulted 
functional to the adoption of policy outputs thought to solve the crisis. 
 In those days, between May and June 2012, Spain received financial aids to 133
recapitalize its weak banking sector (for the chronicles of these days see Hewitt 
(2013:277-295).
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Some  aspects  of  the  policy  also  confirm  that,  conversely,  when  not 
pressed by external enablers, policy makers tend to postpone the timing 
of agreements. Such aspect, in particular, is both confirmed in a general 
way –  though it  was  proposed,  the  banking  union  was  not  created 
before the Eurozone crisis – and in the specific span of time of these last 
years, when European governments procrastinated on the adoption of 
major policy outcomes when markets seemed to be less demanding.
6.4.2. Hypothesis n.2
The second hypothesis of the dissertation inquires about the relation 
between decision making processes and whether or not outcomes are 
successful. In particular, the hypothesis claims that intergovernmental 
decision  making  would  result  in  incremental  and  ineffective  policy 
outcomes,  including  the  possibility  of  institutional  deadlocks,  while 
supranational  decision  making  would  produce  successful  outcomes 
and  solve  eventual  institutional  deadlocks.  That  is  to  say  that  the 
outcomes of negotiation processes are not a pure reflection of states’ 
and  institutions’  bargaining  powers,  but  they  are  mediated  by  the 
existing  institutional  setting.  Institutions,  then,  coordinate  actors’ 
behavior toward certain outcomes and shape the information structure.
As a preliminary step to test the hypothesis, it is necessary to find a 
policy-specific indicator of the degree of success of a policy outcome. A 
basic,  though  effective  and  immediate,  way  to  assess  whether  an 
outcome in this specific policy sector is effective or not is that of looking 
at the occurrence of bank-driven crises in one of the member states. A 
policy outcome can be judged as effective if it prevents the emergence 
of  new  banking  crises,  and  thus  further  economic  turmoil.  A vivid 
representation of this is given by the recalled “banks-sovereigns loop”, 
which  directly  links  banks’  weaknesses  to  public  finance,  and  vice 
versa.  We  may  say  that  the  main  representations  of  the  “banks-
sovereigns loop” have been the Irish, the Spanish and the Cypriot cases, 
respectively occurred in 2010, 2012 and 2013. 
We’ve seen that, on the base on the De Larosière Report in 2009, the first 
instruments  of  crisis  management  for  the  banking  sector  were  the 
creation of a European Systemic Risk Board and of three brand-new 
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agencies with the aim of increasing financial regulation in the EU (EBA, 
EIOPA, ESMA), occurred between 2009 and 2010. Events demonstrate 
that their effectiveness was scarce,  due to their institutional features. 
Indeed,  due to  their  intergovernmental  character  –  e.g.  mere  role  of 
coordination of national authorities, no enforcement powers – they did 
not  succeed in  avoiding the  rise  of  the  banking crises  in  Spain and 
Cyprus.  Moreover,  the  analysis  highlighted  that  a  certain  “banking 
nationalism” characterized the crisis management during the Eurozone 
crisis. That is, in absence of binding rules at European level, national 
authorities were prone to defend the interests of their national banks, in 
what  can  be  seen  as  a  concrete  manifestation  of  moral  hazard  and 
scarce  attention  to  externalities  in  the  banks’  perspective.  Taken 
together,  then,  in  the  first  phase  of  the  crisis,  two  essential 
intergovernmental  elements  contributed  to  the  deterioration  of  the 
banking sector in Europe: banking nationalism, on the one hand, and a 
design  of  limited  effectiveness  of  the  new  financial  supervision 
framework, set up in 2009-2010, on the other. 
In  this  light,  the effectiveness  of  those outcomes adopted before  the 
Cypriot crisis can be judged as poor, while after the setup of the two 
main pillars of the banking union – even though the construction is still 
incomplete as noted above – bank-driven crises did not reoccur.  In 134
this perspective, one may say that a comprehensive setting of banking 
regulation set up at European level was decisive to tackle the “banks-
sovereigns  loop”,  and  more  in  particular  that  the  progressive 
abandonment  of  intergovernmental  logics  was functional  to  increase 
the effectiveness of policy outcomes. Moreover, at the time of writing, 
the  sole  intergovernmental  piece  of  legislation,  the  international 
agreement for the definition of national contribution to the SFR, is a 
major  part  of  the  banking  union  which  is  still  in  fieri.  For  such  a 
politically sensitive issue, indeed, states preferred to retain most of their 
powers and agreed to undertake the issue via a new international treaty 
– alike what happened for the Fiscal Compact in 2012. But the necessity 
 For sure,  future events may disconfirm this claim, and this is  even more 134
likely  considering  the  very  short  span  of  time  passed  since  the  effective 
implementation of the two mechanisms. Nonetheless,  this is  an unavoidable 
consequence of dealing with so recent a political and social phenomenon.
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of collecting the unanimous consensus among member states, and even 
more  in  case  of  a  redistributive  policy,  made  it  very  difficult  and 
fatiguing the decision making process. In this sense, the unanimity rule 
made it difficult to find an agreement on national contributions – that 
came only in late 2014 – and all the institutional necessities of a new 
international treaty make of this piece of legislature the one who took 
more  time  to  be  effectively  implemented.  This  demonstrates  that 
intergovernmental logics often create a slower decision making or even 
institutional deadlocks.
A second aspect related to this second hypothesis is the role played by 
the institutional setting prior to the adoption of policy outcomes. When 
it  comes  to  decision  making  processes  characterizing  the  banking 
union, it has been noticed that its complex architecture is composed of 
different pillars, each one of them responding to different institutional 
logics  of  decision  making.  In  particular,  the  SSM  was  created  by 
community method, as well as part of the SRM, while the SRF is mainly 
based on intergovernmental logics. The rationale of this choice is to be 
found in the treaty’s provisions. Indeed, according to the article 127(6) 
TFEU,  “the  Council  (…)  may  confer  specific  tasks  upon  the  ECB 
concerning  policies  relating  to  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit 
institutions and other financial institutions (…)”, which allows member 
states to take those measures within the community method – even if 
this measure is circumscribed only to Eurozone members. 
At the same time, the possibility to create the SRM via the community 
method was granted by art.  114 TFEU, the milestone of  the internal 
market legal basis, according to which “The European Parliament and 
the  Council  shall,  acting  in  accordance  with  the  ordinary  legislative 
procedure and after  consulting the Economic and Social  Committee, 
adopt the measures (…) which have as their object the establishment 
and functioning of the internal market.” In this sense, the creation of a 
common resolution scheme can be seen as necessary completion of the 
internal market, in order to assure its fine functioning. The same article 
114,  however,  claims  that  fiscal  provisions  are  not  included  in  the 
measures that can be adopted through this procedure. Which made it 
necessary  for  European  governments  to  engage  in  an 
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intergovernmental agreement to establish national contributions to the 
SRF. 
As  a  result,  the  institutional  setting  prior  to  the  adoption  of  policy 
outcomes in the field of banking sector somehow shaped their nature, 
orienting policy makers toward certain policy making processes and 
procedures,  and  orienting  in  the  end  their  behavior.  Which  is  a 
confirmation of the hypothesis of the dissertation according to which 
policy outcomes are not a pure reflection of actors’ bargaining powers, 
but these are mediated by the institutional setting.
In conclusion, the second hypothesis is confirmed by the empirical data 
collected  for  the  case  study  on  the  creation  of  the  banking  union. 
Though more time is needed to assess the real effectiveness of some 
outcomes  that  were  adopted  only  a  few  months  ago,  the  pieces  of 
legislature adopted through the community method seem to be more 
effective  in  counteracting  banking  crises  than  the  precedent  ones 
adopted according to intergovernmental logics. At the same time, the 
empirical  reconstruction confirms that the nature of policy outcomes 
adopted was not a pure reflection of actors’ preferences and bargaining 
powers, but they were oriented by the preexisting institutional setting, 
which contributed to orient the course of negotiations. 
6.4.3. Hypothesis n.3
The  third  hypothesis  of  the  dissertation  claims  that  “in  the  case  of 
policy failure due to irreconcilable conflicting interests or institutional 
deadlocks,  a process of delegation to a neutral – i.e.  supranational – 
actor occurs, resulting in an empowerment of supranational institutions 
vis-à-vis member states”. In the case of banking union, a comprehensive 
delegation of  competencies  is  still  incomplete  –  see  for  example  the 
postponement  of  the  common  deposit  guarantee  –  but  the  crisis 
undoubtedly  contributed  to  a  delegation  of  certain  tasks  at  the 
supranational level.
An example of delegation occurring in the sector of banking regulation 
is the empowerment of the ECB with the task of banking supervision at 
European level under the scheme of the SSM. Unlike previously, when 
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in every state the competent national authority was empowered of the 
supervision of national credit  institutions,  part of the 6000 European 
banks is supervised in a day-to-day centralized way (only 2.5% of the 
banks,  but representing 80% of total  assets of  the European banking 
sector). It is true that such delegation is not complete – non significant 
banks still fall under national supervision – but the delegation of new 
tasks at supranational level is indisputable.
Parallel to the supervision, even some tasks for banking resolution have 
been  centralized  at  the  European  level,  with  the  creation  of  a  new 
European “institutional creature”, the Single Resolution Board, which 
works  in  close  collaboration  with  the  ECB and  national  authorities. 
More importantly,  the European Commission now has the power of 
deciding whether and how to resolve a failing bank, and unlike the first 
drafts  of  the  agreement,  such  process  is  less  politicized  since  the 
European  Council  can  enter  the  process  only  through  the  so-called 
“silent procedure”. Even the other institution empowered to initiate a 
bank resolution scheme, the ESRB, though not being a supranational 
institution,  responds  mainly  to  supranational  logics,  as  not  all  the 
members of the banking union are represented. In this sense, the whole 
instrument triggered a significant delegation of powers from national 
borders to the European institutions, or at least to ad hoc committees.
As a result, even the case of the setup of the banking union in Europe 
seems to confirm that in response to institutional deadlocks and urged 
by the  contingencies  of  the  crisis,  European governments  found the 
way to confer new competencies through the formal – or sometimes 
informal  –  delegation  to  supranational  institutions,  or  to  new 
committees  and  authorities  created  in  order  to  deprive  national 
competent authorities of their exclusive powers, which were often at a 
basis  of  a  dysfunctional  management  of  the  policy.  Unlike  the 
precedent case study on financial assistance to member states, in the 
field of banking union there was not any form of informal delegation, 
as  all  the  competencies  upload  at  the  supranational  level  were 
sanctioned by a treaty change or by a piece of European legislature.
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6.5. Assessing the supranationalization of EU polity: The case of the 
banking union
As a comprehensive banking policy at the European level was lacking 
before 2010 one should expect  that  it  is  this  area that  witnessed the 
most  impressive  increase  in  the  “rate  of  supranationalism” over  the 
course of the crisis. As with the other case studies, in order to construct 
an index of supranationalism of the policy, three different dimensions 
are taken into account, namely: the whole management of the policy 
cycle, the power of supranational institutions in the same policy, and 
the  eventual  presence  –  or  even  creation  –  of  supranational 
mechanisms.  Taking  together  these  indicators,  it  is  possible  to  asses 
whether and how much the policy in question has changed in terms of 
scope and intensity of its supranational character (Borzel 2005), shifting 
from the pole of intergovernamentalism (index value=1, meaning very 
loose  measures  of  coordination  at  European  level)  up  to  high 
supranationalism (index value=5, meaning a complete centralization of 
the policy) (table 6).
As the tasks of supervision and resolution were mainly left in the hands 
of  national  authorities  before  the  crisis,  the  value  of  the  indicators 
before 2010 are almost completely oriented towards a very low rate of 
supranationalism (that is, value close to 1), which reveals a very low 
level of coordination among governments, an absence of binding rules 
and of  enforcement  structures,  and also  of  effective  shared  decision 
making. Actually, it is difficult to label this set of rules as a consistent 
policy of the banking sector. In reality, the decision making was almost 
completely  defined  at  the  national  level,  where  governments  and 
competent authorities were free to set up rules – and by consequence, 
to  initiate  the  legislative  process,  to  adopt  and  implement  those 
measures  and  to  finally  evaluate  the  whole  process  –  in  an  almost 
completely national policy cycle. The sole exception in the management 
of the policy can be seen the phase of the policy formulation, as some 
rules adopted at European level (e.g. the one on capital requirements, 
as  part  of  the  single  rulebook)  set  a  certain  framework for  national 
policy makers. As a result, the final value of the first indicator is very 
close to 1 (1.25 to be precise).
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* The value of supranationalization is to be considered as the inverse of the 
hypothetic  value  of  the  indicator  (e.g.  a  low  level  of  politicization 
corresponds to a high level of supranationalization).
Table 6: Banking regulation policy: Index of supranationalization .
That changed a lot after the set up of the two pillars of the banking 
union. In particular, though the agenda setting has been mainly in the 
hands of governments – which played the role of initiators of the policy 
in the declaration of June 2012, giving to the Commission the mandate 
to  make  legislative  proposition  –  the  other  phases  of  the  process 
(formulation, implementation and evaluation) can be judged to be at an 
average rate of supranationalism. In particular, most of the legislative 
pieces  have  been  adopted  by  community  method,  they  have  been 
proposed  by  the  Commission  and  voted  by  the  Council  and  the 
European Parliament; they are implemented partially at European level 
and partially at national one, and the Commission has its traditional 
powers of evaluation on the correct implementation. As a result,  the 
policy  management  today  can  be  globally  rated  as  “medium 
BEFORE 
THE CRISIS
AFTER THE 
CRISIS
- Agenda-setting 1 2
- Policy formulation 2 3
- Implementation 1 3
- Evaluation 1 3
= (1) SUPRANATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THE POLICY 1.25 2.75
- Delegation of competencies 1 3
- Policy politicization* 1 3
= (2) POWER OF SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS      1 3
- Single Supervisory Mechanism 1 4
- Single Resolution Mechanism 1 4
= (3) SUPRANATIONAL MECHANISM/PROCEDURE      1 4
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supranational”,  with  a  value  of  2.75,  which  means  that  this  policy 
dimension  is  managed  through  a  balanced  joint  decision  making 
among member states and supranational institutions.
Much like the indicators of the policy cycle management, when looking 
at the rate of supranationalism referred to the power of supranational 
institutions in the policy before the Eurozone crisis, the values are very 
low. In particular, there was no delegation of powers at all at European 
level  in  the  field  of  banking  sector  (supervision,  resolution,  deposit 
guarantee) and the policy was highly politicized at national level – see 
the behavior of national competent authorities to defend their “national 
champions”. As a result, the set of rules were not supranational at all, 
and  national  actors  were  free  to  conduct  the  policy  within  national 
borders. That slightly changed after the creation of the three banking 
authorities  in  2010,  but  states’  room  for  manoeuvre  and  discretion 
remained quite relevant in absence of binding rules and enforcement 
powers of the same authorities.
At the end of the period considered here (up to late 2014), the situation 
is almost radically changed: both the European Commission and the 
ECB obtained decisive powers, respectively of deciding the resolution 
of a bank and of supervising European banks. At the same time, the 
policy is  considerably less politicized than before:  the provision of a 
centralized supervision of significant banks restricted states’ room for 
manoeuvre,  decreasing  the  possibility  for  competent  authorities  to 
carry out their tasks in a politicized way. For sure, considering that the 
tasks  of  supervision,  as  well  as  the  others  of  resolution,  were  not 
completely uploaded at  European level,  but  national  authorities  and 
European  body  still  retain  part  of  those  powers,  the  value  of  the 
indicators has been rated as medium (that is, 3).
Finally, when considering the third aspect of the index, the one of the 
presence  of  any  mechanism  or  peculiar  procedure  at  supranational 
level,  it  is  clear  that  they  were  completely  lacking  before  the  crisis 
(hence, value=1 for the indicators), while the creation of the SSM and 
the  SRM makes  it  possible  to  rate  the  indicators  at  medium-to-high 
(value=4).  Of  course,  the  two  mechanisms  do  not  run  under  fully 
supranational logics (i.e.  national authorities still  have some powers, 
the European Council  can intervene in some phases of  the process), 
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which prevents to obtain a value of 5, which would correspond to a 
complete centralization at European level.
As a result, by combining the three aspects, we find that, as expected, 
the  policy  of  banking  regulation  at  European  level  underwent  a 
significant increase of its “supranationalism rate”, shifting from a very 
low level before the crisis (index value=1.08), up to a medium level of 
consolidation of supranationalism in late 2014 (value=3.25), sanctioning 
the greatest increase in absolute terms (2.2 points) with respect to the 
two other policy sectors (figure 8). Translated into words, this means 
that at the beginning of the crisis the policy as a whole was very poorly 
structured  at  European  level,  foreseeing  only  very  loose  forms  of 
coordination  among  governments,  if  any.  The  contingencies  of  the 
crisis, for their part, contributed to set up a European infrastructure for 
the  policy,  as  well  as  to  depoliticize  it,  which  results  in  a  overall 
characterization of the policy as one jointly managed by member states 
and EU institutions. 
   Figure 8. Evolution of supranationalization of the policy of banking regulation 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions
This study has been framed by following research questions: What is 
the institutional impact of economic crises on the process of European 
integration?  How  did  the  effects  of  the  crisis  translate  into  policy 
outcomes? And how did these changes impact the balance of power 
between the national and supranational levels? In order to answer these 
questions, I have conducted an analysis of three different case studies, 
covering the development of different policy areas during the Eurozone 
crisis; namely, the redefinition of fiscal obligations for member states; 
the instruments of financial assistance to countries in troubles; and the 
setup of a banking union. Taken together these three cover more or less 
the  entirety  of  economic  and  monetary  integration  in  Europe. 
Moreover, all three are characterized by a fundamentally redistributive 
logic. In each case, a redistribution of resources from northern creditor 
countries to southern debtor ones was a direct consequence of policy 
transformation.  Methodologically,  the three case studies also provide 
variation  in  the  independent  variables  identified  (i.e.  presence  or 
absence  of  crisis  pressure,  and  the  presence  of  supranational  or 
intergovernmental decision making), so as to understand whether its 
variation corresponds to a similar variation in the dependent ones.
The research has had two theoretical objectives. The first, focused at the 
policy level, aimed at understanding how individual institutional rules 
were developed or altered as a reaction to the impact of the economic 
crisis,  and how institutional  rules in place prior to the crisis  shaped 
decision making process and policy outcomes in the end. Secondly, the 
research considered the system level, and aimed to assess consequences 
of major economic distress on the broader political and social structures 
of the European Union. Taking a set of different policies together, this 
macro-level  analysis  sought  to  understand  the  extent  to  which  the 
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economic  crisis  influenced  European  integration  dynamics,  both  in 
terms of scope and intensity.
Adopting a strategic choice analytical approach (Lake and Powell 1997; 
Frieden  1997)  and  making  rationalist  assumptions  about  the 
characteristics of actors, the research proposed an explanatory model 
linking the independent and dependent variables identified, with three 
hypotheses to guide the research. These hypotheses were then assessed 
empirically,  drawing  on  three  case  studies,  so  as  to  answer  to  the 
original  research questions.  This  concluding chapter  aims to  present 
and discuss the main findings of  the dissertation,  and to offer some 
preliminary avenues for possible future research in the field. In the first 
section,  I  will  briefly  discuss  the  main  findings  of  the  empirical 
assessment of the leading hypotheses for each of the three case studies. 
Following this, I will shift to the systemic dimension, presenting results 
related to  the  elaboration of  the  supranationalism index,  an original 
index created to assess whether European integration has progressed or 
retreated over the crisis era. Then, I will discuss the main theoretical 
contributions of the research in the debate over European integration 
and  its  institutional  features.  Finally,  I  will  present  some  broader 
implications  deriving  from  the  research,  as  well  as  possible  further 
elaborations of this particular study area.
7.1. Empirical assessment of the hypotheses and model refinement 
The research was guided by the following three hypotheses: 
H1: An economic crisis is a fundamental driver of major institutional 
changes, both in terms of their quantity and quality;
H2: Intergovernmental policy making tends to have incremental and 
ineffective  policy  outputs  and  to  create  institutional  deadlocks; 
conversely, supranational policy making tends to have successful and 
more effective outputs;
H3:  In  the  case  of  policy  failure  due  to  irreconcilable  conflicting 
interests or institutional deadlocks, a process of delegation to a neutral 
–  i.e.  supranational  –  actor occurs,  resulting in an empowerment of 
supranational institutions vis-à-vis member states.
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These  hypotheses  combine  in  an  explanatory  model  of  institutional 
change in the context of European integration during a major economic 
crisis (fig. 9). If validated, the model suggests that the occurrence of an 
economic  crisis  fundamentally  influences  the  adoption  of  policy 
outcomes,  because  the  effects  of  the  crisis  put  pressure  on  decision 
makers,  restricting  their  range  of  available  actions,  and  making  it 
necessary to reconcile divergent preferences. The model also specifies 
that the nature of the policy making process directly shapes the quality 
of  policy  outcomes.  It  shows  that  fully  intergovernmental  decision 
making  tends  to  generate  institutional  deadlocks  that  result  in 
outcomes of limited effectiveness, while supranational decision making 
tends to result in more effective outcomes. Finally, the model indicates 
that  institutional  deadlocks  generate  a  process  of  delegation,  which 
invests supranational institutions with new competencies, in order to 
resolve the original policy problem.
Figure 9: Explanatory model of the dissertation.
As observed at the end of each chapter, the empirical findings suggest 
that the leading hypotheses of the dissertation are confirmed. This thus 
provides  comprehensive  validation  of  the  model,  which  needs  only 
slight refinement. To restate, the first hypothesis was confirmed for each 
of the three case studies. The reconstruction of the events related to the 
redefinition of fiscal obligations for member states, the creation of new 
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instruments  of  financial  assistance  to  troubled  states,  as  well  as  the 
setup  of  the  banking  union,  all  confirmed  a  chronological  overlap 
between  the  main  peaks  of  the  crisis  and  the  adoption  of  policy 
outcomes.  In this sense, the European Union seems to be reactive to 135
the external pressure put by the crisis, in line with the claims of the first 
hypothesis. 
Methodologically, the case studies confirm that assuming a variation in 
the  independent  variable  –  i.e.  different  pressure  on  policy  making 
according to the policy at  stake –  we observe the development of  a 
similar  variation  in  the  dependent  one  –  that  is,  adoption  of  major 
policy  outcomes.  Indeed,  the  main  policy  outcomes  related  to  each 
policy  were  adopted  –  or  proposed,  in  case  of  new  legislative 
instruments – in strict chronological coincidence with one of the main 
peaks of the crisis. This demonstrates how much the external pressure 
of  financial  markets  shaped  policy  adoption.  Empirical  observation 
thus  confirmed  the  initial  proposition  that  the  Eurozone  crisis 
constitutes  a  “pressing  functional  demand”  for  EU  institutional 
structures.  Following  Lindseth  (2010:  13),  the  concept  of  “pressing 
functional  demand”  is  understood  as  an  objective  set  of  external 
circumstances  that  exerts  sufficient  pressure  on  existing  institutional 
structures and legal categories to result in substantive transformation, 
as was observed in Europe during the years of the crisis.
Moreover,  policy  inertia  during  periods  in  which  crisis  pressures 
resided presents a sort of a contrario confirmation of the first hypothesis. 
Empirical analysis shows a clear tendency among decision makers to 
either  procrastinate  or  delay  action  when  circumstances  pressed  no 
urgency.  Indeed,  during  the  first  ten  years  of  monetary  integration 
(1999-2009) when it was widely understood that a set of instruments for 
a banking union and the reinforcement of fiscal obligations would be 
eventually  necessary,  European  governments  failed  to  act.  As 
discussed, in the case of the SGP, regulations were actually weakened. 
 The course of the crisis has been reconstructed in chapter 2, and six peaks of 135
the crisis were identified, each corresponding to periods of particular instability 
of financial markets.
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Such a tendency to avoid action unless compelled to do so was also 
clearly  in  evidence  once  the  crisis  got  underway.  During periods  of 
relative financial calm, for example, decision makers tended to discard 
certain  measures  –  e.g.  the  establishment  of  a  common  resolution 
mechanism – even though at  peak moments of  crisis  they had been 
recognized  as  vital.  All  in  all,  then,  the  empirical  findings  clearly 
confirmed the correlation suggested in the first hypothesis, establishing 
a  significant  link  between  the  external  pressure  brought  to  bear  by 
financial markets and the adoption of policy outcomes in the field of 
economic and monetary integration.
The second hypothesis, which links the features of the policy making 
process to the degree of success of policy outcomes, was found to be 
partially  confirmed by  the  empirical  assessment  of  the  case  studies. 
Analysis demonstrated that the hypothesis proved correct with regard 
to  the  link  existing  between  intergovernmental  policy  making  and 
outcomes  of  limited  success.  Whenever  European  governments 
undertook fully intergovernmental  negotiations,  requiring unanimity, 
the outcome was either an insufficiently effective policy response or a 
politically  fatiguing  institutional  deadlock.  Véron’s  observed, 
“Europeans have to explore the unwieldy intergovernmental  options 
until  they  realize  that  it  doesn’t  work  when  tested”  (in  Barker  and 
Fleming 2013).
 Both the development of the Fiscal Compact in late 2012, with its major 
implementation problems, and the process of bilateral loans accorded 
to  Greece  in  2010  showed  how  difficult  intergovernmental  decision 
making could prove.  Relatedly,  major  aspects  of  the  EFSF and ESM 
mechanisms developed under the intergovernmental aegis were clearly 
not  credible.  Finally,  intergovernmental  attempts  to  establish  a 
resolution fund during the development of the banking union failed, 
due  to  the  divergent  and  possibly  irreconcilable  preferences  of 
European governments over its features. As a consequence, then, the 
model is accurate in foreseeing that intergovernmental decision making 
and its related institutional rules, such as the requirement of unanimity 
among  participants,  is  suboptimal.  Either  the  adoption  of  effective 
outcomes  is  precluded  or  the  process  is  subject  to  indeterminate 
incrementalism or even institutional deadlock.
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A  slight  refinement  to  the  model  is  needed  in  respect  of  the 
hypothesized link between supranational decision making and policy 
outcomes.  A  significant  correlation  between  the  two  variables  – 
supranational decision making and policy success – was not observed 
across the three policy cases.  While it is true that in general policy 136
outcomes  adopted  via  supranational  decision  making  were  more 
effective than intergovernmental ones, it is also true that those policy 
instruments were not  immediately a  policy success.  It  was observed 
that  either  amendment  or  policy  fine  tuning  was  often  in  order  to 
achieve maximum effectiveness. Both the Two Pack (which was seen as 
a necessary addition to the Six Pack) and the OMT (adopted by the 
ECB, to rectify SMP deficiencies) are good examples. As a result, the 
initial model requires a slight refinement, admitting the possibility that 
supranational decision making may need a policy amendment in order 
to obtain fully effective outcomes (fig. 10).  Thus, the link among the 
variables identified is not perfect, but it is somehow mediated by the 
apparent eventuality that the policy success does not come as a result of 
the first outcome adopted, but after a policy amendment or after the 
adoption of a new policy outcome to complete the previous one.
Such refinement does not come as a disconfirmation of the model, as it 
highlights  the  fact  that  when  confronted  with  imperfectly  effective 
outcomes,  supranational  decision  making  does  not  engender  an 
institutional  deadlock,  as  is  that  case  for  intergovernmental 
negotiations,  and  provides  a  relatively  straightforward  corrective 
mechanism to engender policy success.
 The successful nature of a policy outcome was qualitatively assessed relying 136
on policy-specific indicators, identified and clearly stated for each policy sector.
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Figure 10. Refinement of the explanatory model of the dissertation.
Finally,  the  empirical  analysis  led  to  a  confirmation  of  the  third 
hypothesis  of  the  dissertation,  which  claims  that  an  institutional 
deadlock resulting from an intergovernmentally-led policy failure – i.e. 
the independent variable – may result in a supranational delegation – 
the dependent variable. In each of the three policy cases observed, a 
blockage  engendered  by  intergovernmental  decision  making,  led  to 
supranational institutions being granted new competences, in order to 
overcome the institutional deadlock. In the case of the redefinition of 
fiscal  obligations,  where  the  creation  of  new  rules  –  or  a  new 
interpretation of existing ones – both the European Commission and 
the  ECJ  were  granted  new  competences  in  the  monitoring  and 
enforcement phases of the policy. With respect to the two other policies, 
it  was  the  ECB which  benefited  the  most  from the  transfer  of  new 
competences to the European level. The central bank obtained a major 
role in the granting of  financial  aid to member states – via the new 
power to purchase sovereign bonds – as well as in the supervision of 
European banks. 
The confirmation of this third hypothesis is of fundamental importance 
for the argument of the dissertation, as it suggests that for every policy 
analyzed a transfer of competences occurred, in the form of a partial or 
complete  delegation  of  powers  and  authority  to  one  or  more 
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supranational institutions (Tallberg 2002). As will be discussed further 
below,  taken  together,  the  set  of  competences  and  the  degree  of 
sovereignty  transferred  to  the  supranational  level  represents  a 
widening  of  the  remit  of  the  European  Union  vis-à-vis  national 
governments. 
What  the  explanatory  framework  did  not  consider  is  that  this 
delegation of powers from the national to the supranational level does 
not  always  comes  as  a  voluntary  and  formal  political  decision. 
Sometimes, indeed, the process of power shifting has reflected a sort of 
unintended consequence of crisis circumstances, and has been at least 
partly  resisted  by  European  governments.  Critically,  however, 
unintended  delegation  is  not  the  same  as  informal  delegation,  the 
possibility of which, was initially included in the model. That is to say, 
the model considered that the delegation might be either formal (i.e. 
sanctioned  with  a  formal  institutional  change)  or  informal,  (i.e. 
obtained via a flexible interpretation of existing rules). The possibility 
that circumstances might generate such unintended consequences was 
not considered by the original model. However, this omission does not 
disconfirm  the  model,  but  rather  must  be  included  as  a  necessary 
addendum to complete the analysis (see infra).
7.2. A more integrated Europe after the Eurozone crisis
The analysis of the three policies also included an assessment of the 
eventual power shift from the national up to the supranational level, 
that is, the possibility that because of the contingencies of the crisis, the 
scope of supranational competences produced a widening. While the 
degree varied somewhat, the analysis highlighted that for each policy 
the  Eurozone  crisis  did  in  fact  engender  an  enlargement  of  the 
European institutions’ powers and a transfer of certain competencies to 
the European level, thus a de facto supranationalization of the policies, 
and of the European Union at large.
The creation of an original “supranationalization index” revealed the 
extent of this supranationalization. The index is composed of a set of 
indicators measuring the degree to which a certain aspect of the policy 
was  managed  at  national  or  supranational  level.  The  value  of  each 
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indicator spans from 1, i.e. no coordination at all at European level, up 
to 5, i.e. complete centralization at supranational level. Derived mainly 
from policy-specific indicators, the index considered three main aspects 
of a policy – the variation of the power of supranational institutions, the 
transformation that occurred in the overall management of the policy, 
and  the  eventual  creation  of  new  pan-European  instruments.  The 137
attempt  to  measure  the  eventual  variation  of  the  supranational 
dimension of a policy was applied to each case study, resulting in the 
assessment that all the three policies underwent a process of significant 
supranationalization.138
Supranationalization  was  more  evident  in  the  case  of  the  banking 
union, which was not fully structured as a policy before the crisis, but it 
is significant even for the two others. In particular, the application of 
the “supranationalism index” reveals  that  in many aspects  the crisis 
engendered an enlargement of European institutions’ powers. This is 
represented by the act of supranational delegations discussed above,the 
creation  of  new  Europe-wide  instruments  or  agencies,  as  well  as  a 
certain centralization at the European level of the overall management 
of the policy cycle. Interpreting the results of the index measurements, I 
found  that  if  at  the  beginning  of  the  crisis  the  three  policies  were 
organized  along  the  categories  of  loose  coordination  among 
governments or they were only partially linked with the community 
method,  after  the  crisis  the  same policies  present  a  decidedly  more 
supranational  character,  spanning  from  the  full  organization  by 
 For the methodological aspects related to the construction of the index, see 137
§2.5.3
 That is to say, when comparing the value of the indicators before and after 138
the crisis for each policy, it resulted an increase of the supranationalization rate. 
For further information on the development of the index for each policy, refer to 
the last section of chapters 3, 4 and 5.
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community method  up to the complete centralization at  European 139
level of some of their aspects.140
All  in  all,  then,  the  empirical  observation  confirms  the  underlying 
conjecture of the research, which states that major economic crises do 
contribute to the supranationalization of the European polity, even if 
such  supranationalization  comes  at  different  rates  of  intensity 
depending on the policy observed. We may say that the economic crisis 
triggered  a  particular  process  of  integration  based  on  a  paradox: 
although  institutional  structures  of  the  post-Maastricht  era  allowed 
European governments carry out decision making through deliberative 
and  consensus  seeking  procedures,  the  ineffectiveness  evidenced  by 
this kind of decision making created the functional conditions for the 
supranational deepening of the EU. Such a dynamic may come as a 
confirmation of the concept of functional spillover, proposed by neo-
functionalist  scholarship  (Lindberg  1963:10),  whereby  the  crisis 
represented the functional enabler for the advancement of integration, 
as it  revealed contradictions and major limits of the policies initially 
implemented. As one of the theoretical contributions of the research, 
this aspect is discussed in the following section. What is important to 
point out in this respect, is that such integration was first and foremost 
experienced by Eurozone members, rather than all the 28 members of 
the EU as a whole, with significant implications for the so-called “two-
speed  Europe”.  It  seems,  indeed,  that  membership  of  the  common 
currency brings about far more responsibilities over peers, making it 
more likely the integration process to further strengthen. It is not a case, 
then, that major evolutions concerned inner dynamics of the Eurozone.
 For instance, it is the case of the redefinition of fiscal rules for member states. 139
Before the crisis the definition of these rules was in the hands of the European 
Council – which adopted the Stability and Growth Pact – while today a large 
part of the budget rules representing the substantial revision of the SGP have 
been set up following the community method (Six Pack and Two Pack).
 See  for  example  the  transformation  undertook  in  the  field  of  banking 140
supervision  and  regulation,  passed  from  a  very  soft  coordination  among 
European governments before the crisis up to an almost complete centralization 
in the hands of the ECB for most of its aspects.
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7.3. Particular patterns of integration: Theoretical contributions
The current study makes no claims to provide a general theory of the 
European  integration  process,  but  rather  to  elaborate  a  mid-range 
explanation of some dynamics of integration arising during periods of 
economic crisis. In this respect, while trying to empirically assess the 
validity of the explanatory framework proposed, I encountered some 
specific  patterns  of  decision  making  that  can  contribute  to  the 
theoretical debate about European integration. This comports with the 
empirical approach adopted by this research which takes a position that 
the  EU  has  been  mostly  driven  by  the  development  of  individual 
policies, rather than on abstract and a priori theorizations on its nature 
(Wallace et al. 1977). As a result, these theoretical contributions derive 
from the empirical observation. 
In particular, the dissertation offers a clear contribution to the debate on 
European  integration  through  the  identification  of  three  specific 
patterns  of  crisis-driven  European  integration,  which  I  will  call 
“progressive  supranationalization”,  “unintended  delegation”  and 
“technocratic supranationalization”.
7.3.1. The idea of “progressive supranationalization”
By “progressive supranationalization” I refer to the incremental nature 
of the policy outcomes adopted as response to the external challenges 
of the economic crisis. That is, the supranationalization of a policy did 
not  occur  instantaneously  through  the  adoption  of  a  single  policy 
instrument,  but  rather  passed  through  phases  of  incremental 
empowerment  of  supranational  institutions,  and  through  the 
progressive  set  up  of  diverse  and  increasingly  more  supranational 
instruments.  The  financial  assistance  policy,  began  as  a  loosely 
coordinated system of bilateral loans, but result in the end in the formal 
establishment of a pan-European facility mechanism, the ESM, with the 
development  of  the  EFSF  as  an  intermediate  phase.  In  parallel,  the 
banking  union  emerged  progressively,  from  non-coordinated 
organization before the crisis, up to the formal setup of the SSM and 
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SRM, passing again though intermediate measures represented by the 
three banking authorities and the ESFS. 
“Progressive supranationalization” is not a new concept, in so far as it 
resembles aspects of the concept of path dependence widely deployed 
in  the  field  of  historical  institutionalism,  as  well  as  with  the  neo-
functionalist concept of spill-over. The underlying idea is that despite 
the  existence  of  exogenous  shocks,  institutional  change  is  rather 
incremental, more than abrupt (Streeck and Thelen 2005), giving rise to 
incremental dynamics of change, following for the most part the legacy 
of precedent institutional changes (Gocaj and Meunier 2013). 
As with the concept of functional spillover , the idea of progressive 141
supranationalization holds  that  a  major  integration process  –  in  our 
case, the maintenance of fiscal, economic and financial stability in the 
Eurozone, thus the safeguard of the common currency itself – can be 
secured only through incremental steps of integration, each demanded 
by  functional  pressures.  In  other  words,  contingencies  of  the  crisis 
represented  a  functional  necessity  triggering  increasing  integration. 
However,  the  concept  of  functional  spillover,  though  significant  to 
describe  this  integration  dynamic,  does  not  capture  a  fundamental 
aspect  of  policy  making,  namely  the  nature  of  the  decision  making 
process. That is, in the neo-functionalist perspective functional spillover 
may come under any form of policy process, either intergovernmental 
or supranational, wit the result of the institutional transformation as the 
key focus.
The  original  dimension  of  the  concept  of  progressive 
supranationalization as it presented here is that supranational decision 
making is more reactive than the intergovernmental approach in the 
process of policy amendment, elaborating new outcomes when those 
 Within  neo-fuctionalist  scholarship,  the  concept  of  spillover  has  found 141
different characterizations (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991): political spillover refers 
to  the  role  played  by  interest  groups  in  the  integration  process;  cultivated 
spillover  emphasizes  the  interests  of  supranational  institutions  in  enlarging 
their  competencies;  functional  spillover  is  the  idea  that  a  major  integration 
objective can be reached only through incremental integrative actions due to 
functional pressure.
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adopted previously present a critical shortcoming. This is mainly due to 
the  set  of  institutional  rules  governing  each  policy.  Given  that  the 
unanimity rule and the multiplication of veto-players make it difficult 
to find an agreement in the intergovernmental area of decision making, 
an agreement once settled upon is more difficult to amend. As a result, 
functional spillover is elaborated more quickly through supranational 
decision making, thanks to the majority rule and the lower number of 
veto-players,  which  makes  this  particular  decision  making  process 
more  reactive  than  the  intergovernmental  one  in  responding  to 
functional demand, and then in speeding up the integration process.
7.3.2. Voluntary vs unintended delegation
The  idea  of  “unintended  delegation”  is  particularly  suitable  in 
describing  the  case  of  financial  assistance  policy,  where  the 
empowerment  of  the  ECB  resembled  to  an  effective  delegation  by 
member states but it did not come from a formal act of delegation – 
much like the case of banking union. Rather, it happened through the 
independent  initiative  of  the  ECB,  which  took  advantage  of  its 
positional  resources  to  implement  the  two  systems  of  financial 
assistance to member states, the SMP and the OMT.  Actually, the ECB 142
exploited the formal delegation of managing monetary policy in order 
to enlarge its  powers in the realm of financial  assistance to member 
states,  which  resulted  in  a  strange  form  of  “delegation  without 
delegation”.
Scholarship  on  delegation  and  principal-agent  theory  (Pollack  2003) 
claims  that  authority  delegation  occurs  because  it  enhances  policy 
credibility through the use of neutral actors – the delegate – as arbiters 
among conflicting interests, and because it improves outcomes thanks 
to  technical  expertise  of  the delegated actor.  Such delegation can be 
 For  sure,  the  two  instrument  do  not  represent  a  mechanism  to  directly 142
finance  Eurozone  members  –  i.e.  European  governments  do  not  get  loans 
though SMP or OMT – rather they aim at lightening the burden of debt serving 
through  limited  (in  the  case  of  SMP)  or  unlimited  (for  OMT)  purchases  of 
sovereign bonds on secondary markets. In any case, they have been considered 
as an instrument of financial support to troubled states.
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sanctioned formally,  via  formal  legislative  initiative  such as  a  treaty 
change, or informally, through the open interpretation of existing rules 
without any particular innovation. In any case, the underlying rationale 
is  that  the  act  of  delegation  is  a  voluntary  process  to  circumvent  a 
policy deadlock or to confer more credibility to the policy, through the 
empowerment of  an agency or an institution with new tasks,  which 
were previously exerted by delegating actors. 
The empirical analysis of the three policies reveals that such a process is 
not  always voluntary or rational;  that  is  to say,  decided through the 
adoption of a formal act of delegation or even by informal operations. 
Indeed,  for  the  financial  assistance  policy,  there  was  no  formal  or 
informal act of delegation, even though the ECB emerged de facto as the 
institution  guaranteeing  financial  aid  to  peripheral  states.  Here,  the 
delegation  is  clearly  unintended,  occurring  only  a  response  to  the 
failure  of  intergovernmental  measures.  Moreover,  in  this  kind  of 
delegation there is no control by the principal (member states) over the 
agent (the ECB): indeed, though the launch of OMT was more or less 
negotiated  with  European  governments,  they  cannot  nevertheless 
control either the amount of money used by the ECB or the timing of 
financial  assistance.  The  process  was  enabled  by  the  positional 
resources  in  the  hands  of  the  ECB,  as  well  as  its  organizational 
structure, rather than by explicit will of European governments – many 
of whom, indeed, resisted such empowerment.
”Unintended  delegation”  is  not  a  trivial  phenomenon,  since  it 
demonstrates that integration can advance even against member states’ 
will,  in  sharp  contrast  with  liberal-intergovernamentalist  claims 
(Moravcsik 1998)  and more recent  new-intergovernamentalist  ones  143
(Bickerton et al. 2015). For sure, this observation doesn’t come as a total 
disconfirmation  of  these  strands  of  scholarship,  but  rather  as  an 
empirical  limit  of  their  theorization,  given  that  supranational 
 According  to  new-intergovernamentalism,  in  the  post-Maastricht  era 143
integration has advanced at the detriment of supranational institutions, being 
primarily  driven  by  intergovernmental  coordination  and  deliberative  and 
consensus-seeking  policy  making  at  governmental  level.  New-
intergovernamentalism  concludes  that  integration  comes  without 
supranationalism.
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institutions during the crisis appeared to be decidedly more active than 
expected by the theory, and over all European governments seemed to 
be passive rather than active with regard to this particular institutional 
change. In other words, rather than an incentive to ameliorate policy 
making, this act of unintended delegation can be seen as a constraint on 
European executives.
7.3.3. Technocratic (or illegitimate) supranationalism
Finally,  the  concept  of  “technocratic  supranationalization”  –  or 
illegitimate  supranationalism  (Sacchi  2014)  –  seeks  to  describe  a 
particular aspect of delegation dynamics occurring during – and as a 
consequence of – the crisis.  The newly empowered institutions – the 
European  Commission  and  the  ECB  –  do  not  represent  European 
citizens, either directly nor indirectly, but are rather non-majoritarian 
and  technocratic  bodies.  The  European  Commission  is  a  non-
representative  institution  advocating  the  European  interest,  and  the 
ECB is  a  technocratic  body  aimed at  managing  Eurozone  monetary 
policy. 
In the complex institutional balance of the EU structure, the institution 
called  to  directly  represent  European  citizens  is  the  European 
Parliament.  As a  matter  of  fact,  however,  the  role  of  the  Parliament 
during the crisis was controversial. On the one hand, it was one of the 
key players in some of the negotiation phases and it also contributed to 
decisive  changes  with  respect  to  initial  propositions  –  namely  those 
cases when co-decision was the legislative procedure to follow. On the 
other, it was completely marginalized in the adoption of certain policy 
outcomes, such as the Fiscal Compact or the Single Resolution Fund, 
and it did not find any enlargement of its competences in the broad 
field of  policy  innovations  occurring in  the  monetary  and economic 
sector – aside from the slight increase of the consultative role of the 
parliamentary committee for economic affairs in certain policy aspects. 
In other words, although participating in those policy processes carried 
out by community method, the European Parliament did not see any 
increase of its competencies as a result of the institutional changes that 
occurred (Schmidt 2012). To be sure, for each one of the three policies, 
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the  European  Parliament  might  have  been  more  unequivocally 
included, but this did not happen. Indeed, the EP did not obtain any 
role  in  the  definition  of  conditionality  measures  for  member  states 
under financial aid programs, nor the power of controlling European 
Commission’s  monitoring  operations  over  governments’  fiscal 
behavior, nor any role in the newly created institutional infrastructure 
of the banking union. 
The  crisis,  in  this  sense,  has  sanctioned  a  transition  from  the 
intergovernmental,  which  at  least  reflect  second–order  legitimation 
through  national  governments,  to  supranational  delegation  to  non-
representative institutions. As a result, the European Union undertook 
a  process  of  supranationalization  to  the  detriment  of 
representativeness,  with  serious  consequences  for  the  democratic 
legitimacy  of  the  whole  polity.  In  other  words,  supranationalization 
went hand in hand with a process of depoliticization of the EU, given 
that  more  and  more  powers  and  tasks  were  conferred  to  the 
technocratic  level,  without  any  democratic  counterbalance.  What  is 
more important is that such enlargement of supranational tasks went so 
far  to  include  very  sensitive  policy  aspects,  such  as  the  power  of 
monitoring  over  national  taxation  and  public  spending,  which  are 
traditionally  one  of  the  cores  of  national  sovereignty,  with  severe 
implications  for  the  democracy of  the  European polity,  as  discussed 
below.
7.4. Beyond the Eurozone crisis: Which future for Europe?
As a mid-range explanation of particular dynamics of the integration 
process,  the  research  does  not  have  the  ambition  of  predicting  the 
future of European integration, being in this sense quite agnostic on 
eventual  evolutions  of  institutional  structures  even in  the  very  near 
future.  Indeed,  if  one can learn anything from the experience of  the 
crisis, it is that policy making is highly volatile and more exposed to 
external pressures and external contingencies than one might imagine, 
making it  very  difficult  to  trace  future  evolution  for  the  integration 
process.  If  it  is  true  that  institutional  change  follows  some patterns 
already traced,  thus  confirming the  validity  of  the  path dependence 
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ideas,  it  is  also  the  case  that  external  circumstances  are  critical  in 
shaping  institutional  change,  adding  a  considerable  amount  of 
indeterminacy to the theory. It is thus more or less impossible to assess 
precisely how the European Union and the Eurozone will appear in a 
few years.  Nonetheless,  the  findings do “travel”  beyond the current 
Eurozone crisis, offering a contribution to thinking about the broader 
consequences of institutional changes conditioned by economic crisis in 
this general sense.
This focuses us on the question of what challenges Europe will face if 
the  dynamics  highlighted  by  the  research  continue  to  characterize 
policy  making  in  Europe.  The  crisis  engendered  a  number  of 144
particular  patterns  of  integration.  The  limited  effectiveness  of 
intergovernmentally-led  procedures  of  decision  making  was  one,  as 
were  the  delegation  of  powers  towards  non-representative  and 
technocratic  institutions,  and  the  persistent  cleavage  between 
northern/creditor  countries  and  southern/debtor  ones.  Were  such 
dynamics to persist  in the European institutional setting, Europe the 
existing  democratic  and  legitimacy  deficits  in  Europe,  which  are 
already widely accepted in the literatures (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 
2008; Scharpf 1999), are likely to worsen.
Scholars  attribute  different  origins  to  the  EU’s  current  democratic 
deficit. Some focus on the limited responsiveness and accountability of 
executives  at  the  European  level  compared  with  the  national  level, 
while  for  others  the  weakness  of  the  European  Parliament  in  the 
institutional architecture of the EU is a key factor. Finally, the lack of 
democratic contestation as well as the excessive powers in the hands of 
non-elected bodies have been noted.  The crisis served to highlight 145
 The following discussion then stems from the hypothesis that the patterns of 144
technocratic  supranationalization  and  the  poor  effectiveness  of 
intergovernmental  decision  making  do  not  represent  a  parenthesis  of  the 
integration process, but a long-standing feature. Such conjecture, for sure, could 
not be the case.
 Agreement  among  scholars  on  the  democratic  deficit  in  the  EU  is  not 145
unanimous. Other scholars claim that, as a regulatory state, the EU does not 
have to be democratic, but essentially credible and effective in its policy making 
(Majone 2000; Moravcsik 2002).
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some of these factors, particularly the marginalization of the European 
Parliament and the empowerment of technocratic institutions. Herein 
lies yet another paradox of the integration process revealed during the 
Eurozone crisis: as the scope of the European polity expands, the rise of 
an  eventual  break  up  of  the  union  increases  as  a  consequence  of 
unsustainable democratic and legitimacy deficits. 
It is important to note that the crisis has actually exacerbated the the 
democratic deficit in the EU in several respects. Most significantly, it 
has heightened the perception among citizens that the economic model 
proposed as a response to the crisis – i.e. implementation of austerity 
measures  and  structural  reforms  –  has  been  implemented  without 
democratic  engagement,  and  absent  any  serious  debate  on  possible 
alternatives  (Blyth  2013).  The  lack  of  involvement  of  the  European 
Parliament in the delineation of austerity measures – as well as the very 
limited  role  that  national  parliaments  can  play  in  challenging  the 
prescriptions  coming  from  Brussels  –  actually  translate  into  a 
perception  that  these  prescriptions  are  unsustainable.  Where  non-
democratic intrusions from non-elected and non-representative bodies 
are made in the core of political debates, such as the power of directing 
citizens’  resources  and  national  redistribution,  this  is  perhaps 
inevitable. 
The legitimacy deficit is the product of two distinct factors. The first is 
the obvious failures of European policy making in effectively solving 
problems (Fabbrini  2013).  As  the  present  study has  shown,  effective 
policy outcomes often follow only after difficult institutional deadlocks, 
never–ending negotiations at the intergovernmental level, and eventual 
refinement and amendment of policies to correct deficiencies. The delay 
between the emergence of problems and the effective implementation 
of solutions is therefore often significant. 
A  second  source  of  the  legitimacy  deficit  is  the  increasing  divide 
between  member  states,  most  obviously  reflected  in  the  economic, 
political  and  ideational  cleavages  between  northern  and  southern 
states. As a consequence of the crisis, Europe witnessed a dramatic shift 
in the traditional balance of power within the EU. Northern creditor 
countries (Germany in particular) acquired an unprecedented degree of 
power in leading and shaping the political and economic response to 
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the crisis. For southern countries, the austerity-cum-reform package – 
i.e. austerity measures plus wage compression – has been perceived as 
an unfair, and ultimately illegitimate, imposition by northern countries 
(Schmidt 2015). As observed in chapter 2, the most successful narrative 
of  the  crisis  spoke  to  the  supposed distinction  between “profligate” 
southern states and rule-abiding northern countries, rather than to the 
idea  of  complex  interdependence  among  states  in  the  EU,  and  the 
individual responsibilities of each actor. This narrative engenders a sort 
of moral hierarchy among countries, which has been used by creditors 
to impose their economic design on supposedly errant southern states. 
These sentiments exacerbated perceived contrasts among the different 
groups  of  states,  and  among  their  respective  publics  over  all, 
undermining  the  underlying  sense  of  solidarity  and  resulting  in  a 
further disaffection for the EU among citizens.146
These  two  patterns  of  disaffection,  on  the  base  of  democratic  and 
legitimacy concerns, may ultimately produce a shift in European public 
opinion  away  from  permissive  consensus  to  euroscepticism,  a 
possibility that Hooghe and Marks (2014) have termed “constraining 
dissensus“. Simply put, if in the first decades of the integration process 
citizens were happy to leave the process of sovereignty pooling at the 
European level in the hands of political elites (Haas 1958:17), following 
the  Maastricht  Treaty,  and  to  an  increasing  extent,  European  issues 
increasingly shape political debates and as a consequence the EU has 
become  the  subject  of  growing  opposition  from  citizens.  European 
integration has thus become a contested issue among voters, and even 
more in those states more negatively affected by the Eurozone crisis, 
such as Greece (Clements et al. 2014). The crisis therefore represents a 
powerful  catalyst  for  the  disaffection  of  European  citizens  towards 
further European integration. If left unaddressed in the medium- and 
long-term,  these  problems  may  represent  a  serious  obstacle  for  the 
integration process, which might lose its political significance. That is, 
 At the time of writing, the sense of solidarity among states is even more put 146
into question with regard to the issue of refugees coming in Europe and their 
redistribution  among  member  states.  This  gives  the  idea  that  economic 
dissonance may produce negative spillovers on other sensible policy fields. 
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Europe may become merely “policy without politics” (Schmidt 2012), 
which for any political system is in the long run clearly unsustainable. 
If the patterns presented here result in a permanent paradigm shift in 
the  institutional  structure  of  the  EU,  we could  imagine  that  Europe 
might  find  itself  in  fundament  a  political  crisis,  triggered  by  the 
necessity of  rethinking political  equilibria among member states and 
regaining the support of European citizens. This is the case even as the 
present  economic  crisis  eases.  In  order  to  survive  and acquire  more 
legitimacy in the eyes of voters, the EU must develop a more effective 
and reactive policy making framework. Moreover, it should repoliticize 
policy processes, which is to say that European integration should go 
hand in hand with an expansion of the European political space, not 
with its restriction and depoliticization (Rodrik 2015). Several solutions 
to cast new political bases for the European polity in a more democratic 
framework has been proposed by scholars (Hix 2008; Schmidt 2012). 
For instance, the process may pass through the direct election of the 
President of the European Commission, so as to politicize the role of the 
European  executive,  and  the  European  Parliament  might  be 
increasingly involved in the economic and monetary affairs. 
In any case, to be sure, major institutional changes are needed in order 
to  re-establish  a  certain  “goodness-of-fit”  between European citizens 
and  the  EU,  which  the  Eurozone  crisis  has  strained  to  an 
unprecedented  degree.  Such  a  transformation,  for  sure,  will  be 
politically  challenging,  and  if  one  wants  do  the  mental  exercise  of 
translating the findings of the research, it  is possible to imagine that 
such institutional change will appear progressively, and likely – even if 
not hopefully – in concomitance with the break–out of a major political 
crisis, i.e. the birth of firmly anti-European governments in a core state, 
or  a  major  political  clash among member  states.  This  kind of  crisis, 
then,  could  be  the  functional  enabler  of  another  wave  of  major 
institutional changes.
7.5. Europe in hard times: Further research indications
The  idea  of  looking  at  institutional  consequences  of  economic  crisis 
comes not as a surprise during a time of economic distress. As quoted 
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in  the introduction of  the dissertation,  “The production of  books on 
financial crises is counter-cyclical” according to Charles Kindelberger 
(2005:7).  Hopefully, after at least seven years of challenging financial 
and economic crisis, with major social consequences, the issue of the 
economic crisis  might  soon disappear and leave room to a  renewed 
economic growth. This does not mean that the attention of scholarship 
for  economic  crises  should  disappear.  In  this  sense,  the  present 
dissertation  –  though  clearly  working  within  the  body  of  existing 
scholarship  on  European  integration  processes,  decision  making 
analyses and institutional change studies – might possibly open up the 
space for further research on the issue, in at least two directions. 
The first could be an enlargement of the scope of the research, both in 
synchronic and diachronic terms. That is to say, it would be interesting 
to conduct an empirical validation – or to find disconfirmation – of the 
explanatory  model  proposed  here  by  looking  at  similar  policies  in 
different times, as well as at other policies in the same period. A natural 
line  of  research  here,  for  instance,  might  be  the  observation  of  the 
evolution of economic policies during other crisis periods, such as the 
monetary instability in Europe that occurred during the 1970s, which 
opened up the space for fundamental institutional innovations – i.e. the 
creation of the European Monetary System. At the same time, it could 
be  possible  to  enlarge  the  scope  of  the  observation  of  the  policy 
transformation during the Eurozone crisis by looking at other policies 
from  other  sectors,  such  as  the  foreign  policy,  or  the  set  of  social 
policies, so as to understand how much external contingencies of the 
crisis and the pressure of financial markets were determinant in their 
eventual evolution. Preliminary analyses on the development of core 
state  powers  at  European  level  suggest  that  the  picture  is  rather 
ambiguous  (Genschel  and  Jachtenfuchs  2015).  That  is,  although 
increasing integration seems to be at work in Europe, this is developing 
within  the  context  of  institutional  fragmentation,  territorial 
differentiation and political segmentation. 
A second strand of scholarship concerns an aspect largely overlooked in 
this  research,  that  is  the  effective  implementation  of  the  policy 
outcomes observed. In other words, it would be interesting to look at 
how the outcomes observed will find effective implementation in the 
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months  and  years  to  come,  and  what  their  long-term  impact  is.  In 
particular, it would be interesting to see if the rationale of these policy 
outcomes  is  maintained.  Will  an  effective  supranationalization  of 
competences,  and not only on paper continue? Or,  lacking new, and 
hopefully  softer,  external  pressures,  would  procrastination  and 
ineffective implementation of rules come back again, as happened for 
the SGP during the very first years of the monetary integration? In light 
of  the  proverbial  “You never  want  a  good crisis  to  go  to  waste” , 147
directing research toward these strands may help discovering whether 
Europe will finally learn from its errors or if it effectively, and sadly, let 
this unprecedented crisis to go to waste.
 Often used in the political and economic debate in the last few years, the real 147
origin  of  the  statement  is  uncertain.  It  was  supposedly  created  by  Winston 
Churchill, even though there is little evidence of it. For sure, it has been used by 
US President Obama’s former chief of staff Emmanuel Rahm in an interview, 
and the concept has been often repeated by European leaders since then.
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Appendix
Chapter 2
Figure a1: Course of spreads on sovereign bonds of seven European 
countries (1992Europe-2012).
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Figure a2: Course of CDS on sovereign bonds in  (2008Europe-2014).  
                   Source: European Systemic Risk Board
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Figure a3: Course of co-movements of CDS on sovereign bonds in 
  Europe and identification of main peaks of the crisis. 
                   Source: European Systemic Risk Board.
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Fig. a4: Chronological overlapping between the peaks of the crisis and 
the reform of SGP
Fig. a5: Main waves of the Eurozone crisis and programs of financial support 
adopted by the ECB
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Fig. a6: Chronological overlapping between the peaks of the crisis and the 
adoption of instruments of financial aid.
Fig. a7: Chronological overlapping between the peaks of the crisis and the 
progressive setup of a banking union.
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